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Abstract 
Maturity Transformation Risk, Profitability and Stability in Islamic Banking: A 
New Macro-prudential Liquidity Perspective 
 
  by 
Haroon Mahmood 
 
Maturity transformation risk and bank liquidity management practices have drawn substantial 
regulatory attention, in the wake of the 2007-08 global financial crisis. To harmonize the 
robust management and monitoring of maturity transformation risk in the Islamic banking 
industry, while endorsing Basel III liquidity regulations, the Islamic Financial Services Board 
(IFSB), recommended the implementation of a modified net stable funding ratio (NSFR). This 
was designed for Islamic banks as a structural measure for the maturity transformation 
function, to account for their unique balance sheet structure. This macro-prudential measure 
of maturity transformation risk refrains the banks from excessive reliance on unstable short-
term market funding, which adversely effects banks’ financial performance and stability.   
Using a data-set of 55 full-fledged Islamic banks, from 11 different countries, over the period 
of 2006 – 2015, this study investigates the factors that are significantly associated with the 
maturity transformation risk in Islamic banks. We further investigate the causal relationship 
of maturity transformation risk with the profitability and stability of the Islamic banking sector.  
We utilize a two-step system Generalized Method of Moments (system-GMM) dynamic panel 
data estimation technique, on unbalanced panel. The empirical results reveal bank size, 
capital, and external funding dependence are significant contributors of increased maturity 
transformation risk. Whereas, less-risky liquid assets, risky liquid assets, and market power 
are limiting factors to the maturity transformation function of Islamic banks. Among the 
macroeconomic variables, inflation shows significant positive impact on the banks’ maturity 
transformation risk, during the sample period. However, we find no evidence for the effect of 
 v 
bank credit risk and economic growth on maturity transformation risk in the Islamic banking 
system.  
This study provides empirical evidence of a negative association of maturity transformation 
risk with the profitability of Islamic banks, suggesting the beneficial effects of the inclusion of 
the new regulatory liquidity requirement in Islamic banks. Besides, bank capital, asset quality 
and concentration are other important factors that influence banks’ profitability during the 
study period. Furthermore, the positive relationship between NSFR and stability supports the 
need to implement IFSB’s proposed NSFR requirement for the long-term resilience and 
stability of the Islamic banking industry. The results of this study remained consistent after 
applying a series of robustness checks including alternative measure of dependent variables, 
alternative estimation techniques and after controlling for industry-specific and 
macroeconomic factors. 
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The world has witnessed the exponential growth of Islamic banking and finance over the last 
four decades, not with regards to its existence and the unrestricted geographical dispersion 
beyond the borders of Islamic states, but also through increasing numbers of banks/branches, 
accounts and invested capital (Khan, 2010). Many of the leading international conventional 
banks, such as ABN Amro, Bank of America, Barclays, Citigroup, Deutsche Bank, HSBC, JP 
Morgan, Lloydes TSB, Standard Chartered, have begun offering Islamic products and services 
through their Islamic windows. By virtue of global financial liberalization, Islamic Financial 
Institutions (IFIs) have become important players in the global financial system. The latest 
statistics estimate the managed asset value of IFIs between US$ 1.816 and 2.1 trillion (at the 
end of 2014).  The last five years’ compound annual growth rate sits at around 17%, of this, 
Islamic banks hold more than 80% share, with a growth rate of 14% over the period of 2009 
to 2014 (ICD & REUTERS, 2015). There are more than 614 Islamic financial institutions, 
including Islamic banks presently operating, in almost 75 countries (Farahani & Dastan, 2013).  
Four hundred and twenty of these institutions offer exclusively Shari'ah1 compliant products 
and services, while the remaining 194 are conventional institutions which provide financial 
services through their Islamic windows. From its infancy stage, Islamic banking and the 
associated financial institutions, have transformed from an ambiguous experimentation 
project into a key player in the global finance market (Khan, 2010). For example, the Islamic 
banks of Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries outgrew their conventional peers between 
2009 and 2012. They showed a compound average asset growth of 17.4%, compared with 
conventional banks’ 8.1% during the same period. Furthermore, their net lending and 
customer deposits grew by an average of 18.2% and 19.9%, compared with conventional 
banks 8.1% and 10%, respectively (Holmes & Kathpalia, 2014). Figure 1.1 shows the recent 
growth trend of Islamic banking and global Islamic financial assets. Although Islamic banks are 
                                                          
1 A set of Islamic principles based on the teachings of Quran (Holy book of Muslims) and Sunnah (deeds and 
sayings of Prophet Muhammad PBUH)  
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concentrated more in Muslim majority regions, such as the Middle East, Southeast Asia and 
Africa, their existence is gaining prominence in several parts of the US and Europe. For 
example, the UK plans to become the global Islamic banking hub in the region (Kerr, 2007). 
According to Hasan and Dridi (2011), Islamic banking has gain prominence because of its 
superior performance and resilience shown during the recent 2008 global financial crisis. 
 
 
Figure 1.2 Growth Trends in Islamic banking and Total Islamic Financial Assets 
Sources: KFHR, IFIS, GFIR, ICD-Reuters (2017) 
 
The exponential growth in the Islamic banking industry does not mean that Islamic banks are 
free from risks in the global financial environment. Similar to their conventional counterparts, 
Islamic banks also face various types of risks due to contemporary changes and developments 
in the global financial market, along with the recent financial crises, which have generated 
much financial distress and created challenges for the world’s economy. Moreover, Islamic 
banks face additional risks because of their unique and complex nature. According to El Tiby 
(2010), maturity transformation risk, fronting Islamic banks, is among the most critical risk. 
























Islamic Banking Assets Total Islamic Financial Assets
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i. Limited Shari'ah compliant financial instruments, listed in the secondary market, 
which call for the institutions or regulators to increase participation in asset-based 
securities such as Sukuk (Ismal, 2008).  
ii. Existing liquidity management options, such as secondary markets for debt 
instruments, interbank money markets and lender of the last resort (LOLR) are based 
on interest rates (riba), which are prohibited by Shari'ah law (Islamic finance). This 
presents a huge challenge to Islamic banks in meeting their time to time liquidity 
requirements. 
iii. The unique specifications of the Islamic financial contracts, such as cancellation risk in 
murabaha instruments, restrictions on refinancing or contracts, such as bay salam, 
that can only be traded at par value, pose additional limitations to manage liquidity in 
Islamic banks.  
iv. Absence of adequate depth in Shari'ah compliant money markets also restricts the 
ability of Islamic banks to effectively manage liquidity. 
Islamic banks depend largely on their customers' deposits as their main funding source. This 
is due to the restrictions on refinancing as well as lack of the lender of last resort facilities 
(Dusuki, 2007). Their deposits can be divided in two main forms– non-remunerative accounts, 
as Wadiah or Qard Hassana, and remunerative accounts, as unrestricted Mudarabah, where 
the latter accounts for two-third of the total deposits of Islamic banks (Visser, 2013; Fakih, 
2009). Thus, Islamic banks have restricted opportunities to perform term and risk 
transformations, which are two of the main functions of most intermediary financial 
institutions (Bryant, 1980). This impacts on their liquidity transformation (Berger & Bouwman, 
2009; Bhattacharya, Boot, & Thakor, 1998). Subsequently, Islamic banks may be exposed to 
potential risks associated with growing asset-liability maturity mismatches. Furthermore, 
there is no explicit or implicit deposit insurance in the Islamic banking system (Archer & Karim, 
2013). This may provide incentive for the Islamic banks to follow risk absorption hypothesis, 
which advocate increasing capitalization and decreasing bank-risk-taking (Merton, 1977) 
while performing their liquidity transformation function. 
Banks, whether conventional or Islamic, create liquidity through their maturity 
transformation function. This process is considered to be a primary role of banking 
institutions. The theory that posits banks acquire short-term deposits to finance loans for a 
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longer term and thereby contributing towards the economic development, has long been 
established by Smith (1937). In contemporary banking, the idea that the liquidity creation 
process is fundamental to banking institutions was prominently rejuvenated by Bryant (1980) 
and Diamond & Dybvig (1983). These studies argue that banks create liquidity by accepting 
relatively liquid liabilities (fund deposits) and making relatively longer term- illiquid assets 
(loans). While doing so, banks as intermediaries, hold illiquid assets and provide cash to the 
economy. Although such transformation offers the underlying principle for the existence of 
banks, this prime role is also attributed to the intrinsic maturity transformation risk, such as 
mismatch of maturities in a bank’s assets and liabilities (Berger & Bouwman, 2009). Further, 
the banking system undergoes continuous change and rapid development due to increasing 
globalization of the financial markets in a highly volatile environment. This leads to the 
increasing use of multifaceted financial instruments by many large banks, imparting severe 
challenges related to their liquidity transformation ability. 
A financial institution is said to be liquid when it is able to meet all legitimate demands for 
funds (Yeager & Seitz, 1989). Garber and Weisbrod (1992) refer to liquidity as the banks’ 
ability to transform illiquid assets into more liquid liabilities, with minimum losses. In the 
financial system, bank liquidity is broadly categorized into asset liquidity and funding liquidity. 
The former refers to the ability of a bank to offset its assets position, either by selling or 
through securitizing a non-monetary asset, at market price without incurring substantial 
losses (Van Greuning & Bratanovic, 2009). Whereas, funding liquidity corresponds to the 
bank’s ability to access external funding sources by attracting more deposits or by issuing debt 
or equity securities in the interbank market (Gatev, Schuermann, & Strahan, 2009).  
Despite their distinct natures, both funding liquidity and asset liquidity are considered to be 
closely interrelated (Brunnermeier & Pedersen, 2009). A relatively high leveraged bank that 
is unable to, or unwilling to sell its assets when required, warrants for adequate funding 
liquidity. Similarly, an institution that faces difficulty to fulfil its depositors’ obligations on 
time, would likely sell or securitize assets, which becomes difficult if it holds a large proportion 
of illiquid assets. As a result of the mutual interaction of both funding liquidity and asset 
liquidity, unexpected withdrawals from depositors are likely to increase from the available 
amount of cash that a bank holds. Consequently, such imbalances may result in a reduction 
of the banks' asset liquidity, thereby generating asset liquidity risk or exposing banks to 
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funding liquidity risk through potential deposit run-offs. The mutual interaction of asset 
liquidity risk and the funding liquidity risk limits the banks to meeting its obligations regarding 
its borrowers or depositors, hence exposing them to maturity transformation risk.  
Matz and Neu (2006) discuss bank maturity transformation risk in relation to three 
dimensions. The first dimension corresponds to the "structural or mismatch liquidity risk," 
that exists because of the maturity mismatch and asymmetry of commitments in the structure 
of the on-balance sheet and off-balance sheet items. The second dimension focuses on the 
"contingent liquidity risk." Since a bank is exposed to various inherent risks because of the 
functions it performs, every additional risk factor attracts more liquidity requirements that 
can result in the distortion of bank’s balance sheet structure, hence exacerbating maturity 
transformation risk. The third dimension is the "market liquidity risk," where banks either 
bear higher losses than expected, to off-set their asset position in more illiquid market 
conditions, or are unable to meet unexpected customer withdrawal because of reduced 
funding options. In broader terms, the more the banks perform liquidity creation, the higher 
risks they face in terms of losses while offsetting their illiquid assets. Consequently, banks 
(both Islamic and conventional), may be forced to sell their assets in times of distress, to meet 
the liquidity demands of their customers (Berger & Bouwman, 2009; Allen & Gale, 2004). A 
bank’s inability to meet its obligations towards its borrowers or depositors may not only cause 
classical bank run but also the contagion effect may impair the solvency of the entire country’s 
financial system and ultimately paralyse the country’s economy.  
The fundamental function of bank liquidity creation, as well as the depositors run on banks, 
provide rationale for bank regulations. Additionally, the increased interdependence of banks, 
has worsened the impact of failure of any given bank on the stability of the overall financial 
system; in short, the current banking system is more exposed to systemic risk. Indeed, explicit 
or implicit deposit insurance has become a commonly used tool in almost all countries, to 
protect depositors and to avoid bank runs, especially after the 2008 global financial crisis 
(Demirgüç-Kunt, Kane, & Laeven, 2015). Furthermore, regulators also take on the role of the 
lender of the last resort, to fund banks that are unable to access external funding sources. 
Even though such mechanisms mitigate the risk of depositors run on banks, as well as 
systemic risks, they also provide incentive to banks to engage in greater moral hazard 
behaviours. For example, banks may find incentive to take greater risks if deposit insurance 
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premiums are undervalued. Moreover, the implicit guarantee provided by the lender of the 
last resort (in case of financial distress) may encourage banks to invest in more risky assets. 
To discipline the banks in their risk taking behaviour or to avoid depositor runs on banks, the 
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) has recommended several capital and 
liquidity standards for regulators. More recently, the BCBS has proposed guidelines to 
manage bank liquidity in the Basel III accord (BIS, 2010). Among them, the Basel III accord 
includes the implementation of net stable funding ratio (NSFR) across the global financial 
system. This ratio is a micro-prudential measure of maturity transformation risk that limits 
banks’ excessive reliance on unstable short-term funding (Arvanitis & Drakos, 2015). In an 
attempt to harmonize the robust management and monitoring of liquidity risk in the Islamic 
banking industry, the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB), an international standards-
setting body for Islamic financial institutions, has endorsed the implementation of NSFR in 
the global Islamic banking industry. The IFSB proposed a modified NSFR in Guidance Note No. 
6 (GN-6), to account for the unique characteristics of the Islamic banking sector (IFSB, 2015). 
Purpose of the Study 
The aim of this study is to analyze the impact of operational and market restrictions, with 
regards to Shari'ah compliant financial instruments, and refinancing options, as well as the 
macroeconomic factors on the maturity transformation function of Islamic banks. These 
restrictions significantly affect the liquidity creation of Islamic banks. Previous studies that 
have examined the intermediation functions of Islamic banks, and particularly the liquidity 
management requirements, theoretically or empirically, are either restricted to one country 
or are descriptive in nature (Bacha, 2008; Brown, Hassan, & Skully, 2007; Iqbal & Molyneux, 
2005; Rosly, 2005; Khan & Ahmed, 2001). This is the first dynamic panel study that attempts 
to measure the maturity transformation risk and its determinants in Islamic banks, with 
regards to the IFSB and Basel III liquidity regulations. This study will provide insight into the 
synergies between liquidity creation and the maturity transformation risk of Islamic banks, 
such as the structure and variations of product portfolios (Lepetit, Nys, Rous, & Tarazi, 2008; 
Behr, Kamp, Memmel, & Pfingsten, 2007; Acharya, Hasan, & Saunders, 2006), capital 
structure or size (Koziol & Lawrenz, 2009; Diamond & Rajan, 2000), as well as the 
macroeconomic factors, by analyzing  the structure and development of Islamic  financial 
institutions and their refinancing sources (Dinger & Von Hagen, 2009). 
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Research Objectives 
Previous studies on the determinants of liquidity transformation have focused primarily on 
the conventional banking system. Although Islamic banking and finance has shown 
phenomenal growth in recent years, it has received very little academic attention and less still 
from policy makers. This substantial growth calls for more intensive risk management 
practices and policies at all levels. Most of the existing literature has focused on the efficiency 
and stability of Islamic banks. However, an important gap exists in the empirical literature on 
how Islamic banks perform their liquidity transformation function. Moreover, the lack of 
literature which explains the relationship between maturity transformation of Islamic banks 
and their financial performance and stability is also a key motivator for our study.  
This study aims to offer managers, investors, policymakers and regulators of Islamic financial 
institutions a better understanding about the factors that influence the maturity 
transformation function of the Islamic banking sector. It also hopes to fill the gap in the 
literature of the new IFSB liquidity regulatory requirements, and its relationship with the 
performance and stability of Islamic banks. The study’s objectives are as follows:  
1. To evaluate the influence of various factors in explaining the maturity transformation 
function of Islamic banks. 
2. To evaluate the relationship of maturity transformation risk with the financial 
performance of Islamic banks.  
3. To investigate the impact of maturity transformation risk on the financial stability of 
the Islamic banking sector.  
Research Questions 
This study attempts to address the following questions: 
 
1) What are the factors that significantly influence the maturity transformation risk in 
the Islamic banking sector?  
2) How is maturity transformation risk associated with the financial performance of 
Islamic banks? 
 8 
3) Does the inclusion of net stable funding ratio contribute towards the improved 
stability of Islamic banks? 
Significance and Rationale of the Study 
The importance of the banking system is not only restricted to the economic development of 
a country, but its scope also extends to the stability and health of the overall financial system 
and environment (Halling & Hayden, 2006). However, due to some anomalies in the 
conventional banking system, banking crises have begun occurring more frequently with 
increased severity in recent times2. This augmented frequency of crises calls for an evaluation 
of risk management practices and policies at all levels, including individual banks, their 
regulators and financial sector policy makers. Liquidity risk presents a challenge for today’s 
banks (Comptroller of the Currency, 2012). A bank with a sufficient capital, strong earnings 
and good asset quality may be unsuccessful if it does not retain sufficient liquidity (Crowe, 
2009). The recent 2007-08 global financial crisis has not only demonstrated the failings of the 
established “Western” financial system, but has also amplified the consideration on a parallel 
neonatal financial system, the Islamic banking system, as some researchers have noted, the 
latter demonstrated a superior performance during the financial crisis (Hasan & Dridi, 2011). 
In principle, Islamic finance is significantly different from conventional finance. The guidelines 
for Islamic finance stem from Shari'ah law; the unique and global legislation for Muslims with 
the Quran, Hadith (Sunnah), Ijma (consensus) and Qiyas (deduction of juridical principles from 
Quran and Sunnah) as its main sources. Shari'ah compliant financing is not permitted to 
charge Riba (interest payments), as only physical commodities and services are assumed to 
hold a value. Gharar (uncertainty), or Mayser (speculation or gambling) and all transactions 
that involve trading illegitimate goods and services, like weapons, drugs, and alcohol, are 
forbidden.  The Islamic banking system is based on the principle of risk sharing (profit and 
loss). This applies to both financing and deposits. Islamic banking posits that all transactions 
must involve tangible assets (Iqbal & Mirakhor, 2011; Hassan & Lewis, 2009). 
                                                          
2  Asian Banking Crisis 1997, the Collapse of Long-Term Capital Management 1998, the Russian Financial Crises 
1998, and the US Sub-prime mortgage crisis, which led to the 2008 Global Financial Crisis. 
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These principals require clear variances in bank financing and liabilities arrangements. Due to 
these difference, we argue that both financial systems behave differently in managing their 
risks. However, there is limited research on the functions and performance of Islamic banks.  
Previous studies have attempted to explain the relationship between bank liquidity and 
financial performance and stability (Bhattacharya & Gale, 1985; Waldo, 1985; Diamond & 
Dybvig, 1983; Bryant, 1980). These studies have found that a mismatch of maturities between 
assets and liabilities put banks in an intrinsic unstable condition by exposing them to the 
likelihood of panic-based bank runs. Some recent studies have also analyzed the impact of 
banks’ choices of liquid assets (Acharya & Viswanathan, 2011), and banks’ fear of fire sales 
(Diamond & Rajan, 2011), on the stability of financial institutions. However, most of these 
studies have focused on the conventional banking system. To the best of our knowledge, no 
prior study has addressed this issue in relation to the Islamic banking system. Given the 
phenomenal growth and the increasing importance of Islamic banking in the last decade, 
there is a need to understand how different banks’ specific and external factors influence the 
liquidity creation of Islamic banks. More specifically, we empirically investigate the influence 
of Sharia regulations (that is, Islamic laws/principles) on various determinants, which affect 
maturity transformation risk, in Islamic banking.  
Further, the management of banks varies in their policies in dealing and monitoring the risks 
and objectives linked with their operations, and thus the financial performance of each bank 
also varies. This study therefore investigates the linkage between transformation risk and 
profitability at the bank level.  
Additionally, this study investigates the association between maturity transformation risk and 
stability in Islamic banks. We argue that investigating this association is vital because external 
factors may have severe implications on the stability of financial institutions (Turk-Ariss, 
2010), particularly Islamic banks. 
To achieve the research objectives, we use a sample of 468 bank-year observations of 55 full-
fledged retail Islamic banks from 11 countries, which represents about 83 percent of the 
International Participatory Banks assets (Ernst & Young, 2017) and 52 percent of the global 
Islamic Banking assets (IFSB, 2017) at the end of 2015. The sample size is restricted because 
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of the non-availability of granular data from publically available banks’ annual reports, which 
is required to measure the maturity transformation risk in Islamic banks. Moreover, we could 
not include banks from Iran in our data sample (which constitutes 34 percent of global Islamic 
banking assets (IFSB, 2017)), as the published annual reports are not available in English 
language, which precludes the risk measurement for these banks. This study employed state 
of the art two-step system Generalized Method of Moments dynamic panel data estimation 
technique to determine the factors influencing the maturity transformation risk as well as its 
relationship with profitability and stability of Islamic banks.  
 
Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the relevant literature, including the 
factors which influence the banks’ maturity transformation risk, the measures of maturity 
transformation risk, and the causal relationship between the maturity transformation risk and  
bank profitability and stability. Chapter 3 decribes the research methodology and data used 
in this study. Chapter 4 presents and discusses the empirical results from dynamic panel data 
estimation and a series of robustness tests. Chapter 5 summarizes  the major findings of the 







In the framework of risk and maturity transformation function of financial intermediaries, the 
latter undertakes the tasks of liquidity creation and insurance for inter-temporal smoothing 
of income and the consumption of economic agents (Diamond & Dybvig, 1983). Banks create 
liquidity through pooling of deposits, in which a certain proportion is the liquidity reserves 
while the rest is used for profitable illiquid investments (Acharya et al., 2006; Kashyap, Rajan, 
& Stein, 2002; Diamond & Dybvig, 1983; Bryant, 1980). However, the liquidity creation 
function of the bank, through investing in long-term illiquid assets, renders them intrinsically 
vulnerable to maturity transformation risk (Diamond & Dybvig, 1983). More commonly, with 
increased liquidity creation, banks reduce their ability to meet unexpected liquidity 
requirements of their borrowers and depositors. This is because illiquid assets are difficult to 
be monetized, especially when the economy is facing liquidity pressures or crises (Calomiris 
& Kahn, 1991; Diamond & Rajan, 2001). 
In relevance to this study’s research objectives, the following sections expand the previous 
theoretical and empirical literature on maturity transformation risk factors, bank profitability 
and stability. Section 2.2 reveals the theories linking maturity transformation risk and its 
associated factors. Section 2.3 discusses the empirical evidence on the influence of various 
factors in explaining the banks’ maturity transformation risk. Section 2.4 reviews the previous 
empirical studies on the causal relationship between maturity transformation risk and banks’ 
financial performance, followed by previous studies on maturity transformation risk and bank 
stability, outlined in Section 2.5. The chapter concludes with discussion on the main studies 
on the various measures of banks’ maturity transformation risks.  
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Theoretical Features of Maturity Transformation Risk and its 
Determinants  
Liquidity transformation has been extensively studied (Berger & Bouwman, 2009; Kashyap et 
al., 2002; Holmström & Tirole, 1998; Bhattacharya & Thakor, 1993). However, these studies 
focus mainly on quantifying the extent of liquidity created in the banking sector, and their 
exposure to maturity transformation risk. Recently, some developments have been made in 
investigating the factors which affect the banks’ liquidity creation function (Vodová, 2011; 
Fungáčová, Weill, & Zhou, 2010; Shen, Chen, Kao, & Yeh, 2009) and the relationship with 
maturity transformation risk (Angora & Roulet, 2011). However, most of these studies are 
based on the conventional banking model. Using findings from previous literature, this study 
investigates the relevant determinants of maturity transformation risk in the Islamic banking 
system. The following section provides insight into the various bank-level and macroeconomic 
variables that are likely to influence bank exposure to maturity transformation risks. 
2.2.1 Bank Capital  
Previous theoretical literature has divided the effect of bank capital on maturity 
transformation risk in two broad categories. One set of literature explains that with an 
increase in equity capital, banks tend to either invest less in long-term illiquid assets or reduce 
their holding of short-term liquid liabilities, thereby mitigating their exposure to liquidity 
transformation risks. Diamond and Rajan (2005) argue that a nominal intermediary service 
levy is charged to depositors to lend their deposits. However, the mismatch of this fee with 
the repayment capability of risky borrowers, will provoke depositors to withdraw their funds, 
promoting “financial fragility,” which, in extreme cases, may lead to run on the bank, causing 
severe liquidity problems, both for the banks and the financial sector as a whole.  Gorton and 
Winton (2000) similarly explain the “crowding-out effect,” where banks prefer to meet higher 
capital requirements by replacing depositors’ funds with their capital accounts. Nevertheless, 
these investments are susceptible to financial uncertainty and cyclical variations, which are 
not insured and difficult to withdraw when required, ensuing a decrease in liquidity creation. 
The impediment of holding the amount of assets by banks for issuing deposits, with respect 
to higher capital requirements, has also been studied by Heuvel (2002). The author claims 
that such regulations can be excessively costly to banks. Both the “financial fragility” theory 
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and “crowding-out effect” demonstrate that higher capital buffer may reduce a bank’s 
liquidity transformation risks. 
On the contrary, under the “risk absorption” theory, Allen and Gale (2004) assert that higher 
capital requirements can increase banks incentive for more liquidity creation. The authors 
reveal that increased liquidity creation exposes banks to higher degrees of risk, as losses 
increase with increased levels of illiquid assets to satisfy customers’ liquidity demands. This 
activity is directly associated with the risk transformation role of the financial intermediaries 
(Al-Khouri, 2012). Furthermore, Besanko and Kanatas (1996) posit that a higher capital 
requirement may dilute insiders’ ownership and increase outside equity that could lead to 
asset-substitution moral hazard problem of managers. Blum (1999) and Gennotte and Pyle 
(1991) have also made similar claims, suggesting that banks are more likely to take on greater 
risks with increased in capital requirements. Subsequently, the increased liquidity needs 
encourage banks to incur higher losses due to the disposal of illiquid assets at available market 
prices, rather than desired prices, to meet their customers’ obligations. However, higher bank 
capital can absorb these losses and expand the risk-bearing capacity of financial 
intermediaries (Coval & Thakor, 2005; Repullo, 2004; Bhattacharya & Thakor, 1993). Thus, 
higher capital ratios allow banks to create more liquidity, as well as the extent of their 
exposure to maturity transformation risks, presenting a positive relationship between bank 
capital and transformation functions. 
2.2.2 Non-Interest Income  
Previous literature proposes that banks can benefit at large, through diversification (Boyd & 
Prescott, 1986; Diamond, 1984; Ramakrishnan & Thakor, 1984). Some studies also suggest 
that diversification benefits firms through product portfolio management or from activity 
diversification on the asset-side. On the liability-side, it generates economies of scope for the 
organization (Drucker & Puri, 2009; Gatev et al., 2009; Iskandar-Datta & McLaughlin, 2005; 
Kashyap et al., 2002). The seminal article by Boyd, Hanweck, and Pithyachariyakul (1981) laid 
the foundation for the relationship between non-interest income and bank risk. They argue 
that an increase in non-interest income can help banks to improve risk diversification, leading 
to higher degrees of stability. A number of empirical studies support this argument. Using a 
dataset of 249 listed banks and non-bank financial firms, from 1974 to 1981, Boyd and 
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Graham (1988) found that banks expanding into insurance companies significantly reduce 
their earnings volatility as well as the risk of bankruptcy. Similarly, using market based data 
from 1979 to 1986, Templeton and Severiens (1992), revealed that diversifying into other 
uncorrelated financial activities reduces banks’ unsystematic risk. More recently, Köhler 
(2013) shows that non-interest income has a significant positive effect on the stability of small 
and retail oriented banks, as this increases their income structure diversification and limits 
their dependence on interest rate risks, as well as the maturity transformation function.  
In contrast, DeYoung and Roland (2001) highlighted the large volatility of non-interest income 
in three ways. Firstly, income from traditional banking activities (that is, lending and 
borrowing), is more likely to be stable over time, as it involves high switching and information 
cost to either lenders or borrowers, to shift their financing relationship. However, returns 
from non-interest income activities may face larger variability, as they do not involve high 
switching and information costs, lowering the barriers for switching banks for such type of 
activities. Secondly, increased concentration on non-interest income activities give rise to 
additional fixed costs, hence increasing the operational leverage of banks. On the contrary, in 
a conventional lending relationship, the marginal costs incurred while creating additional 
loans is limited to interest expenses. Thirdly, banks find incentives to involve more in non-
interest income activities, as they are not disciplined by regulators for capital requirements, 
suggesting a higher degree of financial leverage, consequently increasing their earnings 
volatility. Furthermore, Busch and Kick (2009) found that banks' risk-adjusted returns increase 
with increases in the portion of fee income activities, but retail banks that are heavily involved 
in non-interest income activities, have shown significantly more volatile returns, leading to 
increased bank risks. Altunbas, Manganelli, and Marques-Ibanez (2011) and Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Huizinga (2010b) presented similar results, using data from listed investment-oriented 
banks. Likewise, Brunnermeier, Dong, and Palia (2012) found evidence that banks involved 
more in non-core banking activities (such as trading and investment and venture capital 
activities) earnt higher non-interest income, contributing more towards systemic risk than 
those following traditional banking functions of deposit taking and lending. Their findings 
were consistent, even after categorizing non-interest income into trading income and 
investment banking, and venture capital income, where both components are approximately 
equal contributors to systemic risk. 
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2.2.3 Bank Profitability  
In general, bank profitability explains the influence of increase in financial soundness on 
banks’ risk bearing capacities and on their ability to create liquidity (Rauch, Steffen, Hackethal, 
& Tyrell, 2009; Shen et al., 2009). As a result, this increase in financial strength may enhance 
the banks’ ability to take risks, which yields a positive relationship between bank profitability 
and transformation risk. Moreover, profitability can also account for the “too big to fail” 
philosophy of large banks (Demirgüç-Kunt & Huizinga, 2010a; Zhou, 2010). Large banks may 
be exposed to increased maturity transformation risk as they can create more liquidity, even 
in times of distress, in order to increase their profitability.  
2.2.4 Bank Credit Risk  
Classical microeconomic theories of banking support the view that credit risk is closely linked 
to liquidity transformation. Under the financial intermediation framework, Bryant (1980) and 
Diamond and Dybvig (1983) propose that a bank’s asset and liability structures are closely 
linked, more specifically in terms of loan defaults and deposit withdrawals. Kashyap et al. 
(2002) and Holmström and Tirole (1998) reveal this asset-liability interaction goes beyond the 
banks’ balance sheet business and also involves off-balance sheet lending and funding 
activities. Diamond and Rajan (2005) propose that banks lend from the money they obtain 
from unskilled depositors, with the promise to pay this money back to the depositors on 
demand. This become problematic when a large number of economic projects, funded with 
loans, generate insufficient returns, or the borrowers are unable to pay back the principle 
loan amounts and the bank cannot meet depositors’ withdrawal requirements. Consequently, 
this decrease in assets encourages depositors to withdraw their funds, thereby forcing banks 
to call in all loans which ultimately leads to a reduction of aggregate liquidity in the market. 
Hence, higher credit risk restricts banks’ liquidity creation function.   
More recently, many studies have examined, mainly from a theoretical perspective, the 
relationship between credit risk and maturity transformation risk and how this interaction 
influences bank stability (Acharya & Mora, 2015; Imbierowicz & Rauch, 2014; Gorton & 
Metrick, 2012; He & Xiong, 2012; Acharya & Viswanathan, 2011; Gatev et al., 2009). Acharya 
and Viswanathan (2011) reveal that, in normal times, more emphasis on short-term market 
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debt might lead to severe asset shocks and a rapid drying up of liquidity in economic 
downturn. As their primary function, financial firms raise debt that has to be rolled-over 
constantly, which is used to finance assets. They found that, during stressful conditions, when 
asset prices deteriorate, banks find it much more difficult to roll over the debt. Therefore, 
banks with higher debt face more severe liquidity risk that may lead to a run on banks. 
Similarly, expanding Diamond and Dybvig’s (1983) work, He and Xiong (2012) also highlight 
the debt rollover risk.  He and Xiong’s study assumes that a bank has debt maturities spread 
over time, with various creditors and that these creditors are exposed to an intrinsic risk of 
bank failure during the next contract period if other future maturing creditors choose not to 
rollover their debt contracts. This may result in a run on lenders and banks being unable to 
rollover their debts, leading to liquidity dry up in the market. Consequently, a lack of funding 
sources provides banks with incentives to hold more liquid assets and restrict them to 
perform their normal liquidity creation function, in order to fulfil depositors’ demands. 
 Gordon and Metrick (2012) have examined the relationship between liquidity and credit risk 
in securitized banking. The empirical results show a substantial increase in refinancing rates 
and funding haircuts in wholesale market caused perceived credit risks in the form of 
subprime loans. Although investors exhibit asymmetric information regarding the actual 
subprime risks held by banks, the fear of decrease in their investment value, which caused 
non-availability of short-term market funding resulted in severe liquidity problems for the 
banks in the recent global financial crisis.  
2.2.5 Bank Market Power  
Bank market power may influence the availability of funding (Petersen & Rajan, 1995) and the 
split of loan portfolio (Berger, Miller, Petersen, Rajan, & Stein, 2005). Previous literature has 
hypothesized the impact of bank competition on liquidity creation in two opposing ways. The 
first theory proposes that increased competition increases the fragility of banks by reducing 
bank profits, which normally serves as a “buffer” against shocks during stress conditions. This 
provides a reason for the banks to lessen liquidity creation by restraining both the volume of 
loans granted, and the volume of deposits accepted, to mitigate the bank’s risk. Horvath, 
Seidler, and Weill (2016) argue that under this “fragility-channel” hypothesis, an increase in 
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bank competition should lead to a decrease in liquidity creation.  Petersen and Rajan (1995) 
support this view, claiming that increased competition reduces credit supply, as banks are less 
likely to grant loans to borrowers that are not in previously established relationship with 
them, in a competitive market. The idea is that decreased market power reduces incentives 
for banks to establish long-term relationships with new borrowers that may create an 
abnormal credit demand in the future.  
The second viewpoint relates to the influence of competition on bank pricing policies and 
suggests that increased competition leads to deteriorating lending prices and escalating 
deposit rates, thereby increasing the demand for both loans and deposits. Several studies 
provide empirical support for a link between competition and low lending rates (Love & Pería, 
2015; Carbo-Valverde, Rodriguez-Fernandez, & Udell, 2009). Enhanced competition 
stimulates demand for loans by alleviating financing obstacles. Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and 
Maksimovic (2004) provide empirical support for this argument in their finding that increased 
bank concentration increases financing obstacles in general, while Hainz, Weill, and 
Godlewski (2013) show that increased concentration is associated with higher collateral 
requirements. Berger and Bouwman (2009) explain that banks with greater market power 
may enhance their liquidity creation by making more loans and attracting more funds, either 
from the depositors or from the wholesale market. This suggests a positive link between 
competition and liquidity creation that may lead to increased exposure to transformation 
risks.  
2.2.6 Bank Size  
Generally, bank size is classified in terms of net total assets. In line with the argument of ‘too 
big to fail’ philosophy, the implicit regulator guarantee decreases banks’ funding cost, which 
enables them to invest in more risky assets (Iannotta, Nocera, & Sironi, 2007). Tesfaye (2012) 
highlighted regulators’ protection of large banks as the cause of moral hazard problems. This 
also reduces the incentive to hold more liquid assets for larger banks and allows difference in 
liquidity creation among the banks, relative to their size. The literature provides both positive 
and negative relationship between bank size and liquidity creation. As Delechat, Arbelaez, 
Muthoora, and Vtyurina (2012), reveal, liquidity increases with bank size, however, after a 
threshold, their study shows a marginal decrease in liquidity holdings, with an increase in 
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bank size, denoting a non-linear relationship between them. In addition, during stress 
conditions, larger banks perform more liquidity creation, hence exposing to higher losses due 
to the sale of illiquid assets. Furthermore, Rauch et al. (2009) and Berger and Bouwman (2009) 
note that smaller banks are less involved in liquidity creation, as they are focused mainly on 
transformation activities and intermediation processes. 
These findings contradict some of the previous studies, such as Audretsch and Elston (2002), 
who found that smaller banks possess relatively more liquid assets and less liquidity 
constraints. Similarly, Kashyap et al. (2002) also revealed a strong influence of bank size on 
liquidity creation and concluded that as smaller banks face constraints in accessing capital 
markets, they tend to maintain higher levels of liquidity. Similarly, Shen et al. (2009) also 
found a nonlinear relationship between bank size and liquidity risk. Large banks follow the 
‘too big to fail argument’ and find incentives to perform their liquidity creation function more 
aggressively; hence, they are exposed to higher maturity transformation risks. However, the 
negative sign on the coefficient of size square revealed that in larger banks (over a certain 
level), this size effect becomes negative to liquidity creation. Similarly, Fungáčová et al. (2010) 
examined the size effect on the relationship between bank capital and liquidity creation in 
emerging markets, and revealed that small banks with higher capital create less liquidity. 
However, they could not find any significant effect of bank capital on liquidity creation in large 
banks. While investigating the effect of monetary policy on liquidity creation, Berger and 
Bouwman (2010) found that restrictive monetary policies negatively impact upon the liquidity 
creation of small banks only. 
2.2.7 GDP  
GDP indicates the financial wellbeing of any country. In the past, many studies have 
established the impact of macroeconomic factors on bank liquidity. For example, Gavin and 
Hausmann (1996) determined macroeconomic instability as one of the major causes of bank 
failures. The authors revealed that the impact of negative shocks increases the inability of 
borrowers to repay their obligations, giving rise to non-performing loans, which hampers the 
bank’s performance and ultimately causes financial instability. Determining the impact of 
economic downturn, Bordo, Eichengreen, Klingebiel, and Martinez‐Peria (2001) argue that 
the degree of loan defaults is even higher during periods of recession. Depositors perceive 
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high solvency risk during recession periods, which triggers unexpected large deposit 
withdrawals. This leads to bank runs, causing liquidity risks and ultimately bank insolvency. 
Similar findings have been revealed by Shen et al. (2009). Analyzing the cyclical effect on bank 
liquidity preferences, Aspachs, Nier, and Tiesset (2005) propose that banks prioritize liquidity 
during economic uncertainties when they have less opportunities to increase their lending 
assets. Painceira (2010) suggests that banks’ incentive to hold more liquid assets decreases 
during periods of economic upswings; however, banks are likely to maintain high levels of 
liquidity during stress conditions.  
Empirical Literature on Determinants of Maturity Transformation Risk 
Very few studies have focused empirically on bank specific, industry specific and 
macroeconomic determinants of funding liquidity risk. Rauch et al. (2009) identifies the 
determinants of liquidity risk and attempts to ascertain the elements of liquidity creation. The 
authors highlighted monetary policies and macroeconomic variables as the most significant 
determinants of banks’ liquidity creation. Their results illustrate that bank specific variables, 
such as financial performance and size, have no significant relationship on the maturity 
transformation function. 
Following Saunders and Cornett (2007), Shen et al. (2009) employs funding gap ratio as a 
liquidity risk measure to investigate the factors causing bank liquidity risk.3 They apply 
instrumental variable techniques on unbalanced panel bank data from 12 advanced 
economies, for the period of 1994 – 2006. They found components of liquid assets and 
dependence on external funding as the main causes of funding liquidity risk. The study also 
found a non-linear relationship among liquidity and bank size. Additionally, macroeconomic 
variables such as GDP and inflation, as well as supervisory and regulatory factors, have been 
shown to have a significant effect on banks’ liquidity risks. 
Using a large dataset of 781 commercial banks, from the US and Europe, over the period of 
2000 – 2008, Angora and Roulet (2011) found that banks’ maturity transformation risk 
reduces with an increased concentration of potentially securitizable loan portfolios. The 
                                                          
3 (Saunders & Cornett, 2007) indicated that banks can measure liquidity risk exposure by determining their 
financing gap. The financing gap is defined as the difference between a bank’s average loans and average core 
deposits. 
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authors also find that banks which rely more on short-term market funding tend to have 
higher maturity transformation risks. The study utilizes the inverse of net stable funding ratio 
(I_NSFR) and net stable funding difference (NSFD), as measures of maturity transformation 
risk. Among other bank-specific and macroeconomic factors, the authors found that bank 
capital, size, market power and loan loss provisions are significant in reducing the banks’ 
maturity transformation risk, whereas, economic growth and interest rate spreads are 
significant in explaining increased maturity transformation risks, in the sample banks.  
Munteanu (2012) used country specific data and multiple regression model to identify the 
determinants that influence retail banks’ liquidity in Romania. The author used two different 
liquidity measures,4 and divided the dataset into pre-crisis and during the crisis.5 The findings 
revealed these two measures have different policy implications in the pre-crisis and during 
crisis periods. Further, macroeconomic factors, such as unemployment and inflation, were 
found to be significant in explaining bank liquidity, which suggests the need for continuous 
reporting of aggregate risks. The authors also reveal that the Z-score (a bank’s stability 
indicator) has a significant effect on bank liquidity during the crisis period. 
Bonfim and Kim (2012) also explained that the relationship between liquidity and bank size, 
efficiency and loan to deposit ratio depends on the type of liquidity risk measure used. They 
found   strong empirical evidence of peer effect in banks’ risk taking. In addition, the banks 
with greater customer lending tend to have higher loan to deposit ratios and usually maintain 
minimum liquidity ratios.  
Horvath, Seidler, and Weill (2012) examined the potential impact of tighter capital 
requirements on banks’ liquidity creation in the Czech Republic and found Basel III capital 
requirements can reduce liquidity creation. They note that increased liquidity creation can 
trigger bank insolvency. Using an exhaustive data sample of 2000 to 2010, the authors 
performed Granger – causality tests in a dynamic GMM panel estimator framework and 
revealed that capital is negatively associated with liquidity creation in their sample banks 
                                                          
4 The two liquidity measures are L1- net loans/total assets and L2 – liquid assets/deposits and short-term 
funding. 
5 (Munteanu, 2012) used the period from 2008 – 2010 as the crisis period. 
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(mainly small banks). In short, they found that well capitalized banks are less involved in their 
maturity transformation function.  
Few studies have also attempted to identify the factors that influence the funding liquidity 
risk in Islamic banking sector. Alman and Oehler (2012) investigated the liquidity 
transformation factors in Islamic banks. The study used a cross-country data set of 36 Islamic 
and 42 conventional banks over the period of 2000 – 2010. The results revealed that liquidity 
transformation is negatively associated with the regulation of Islamic banks. The authors used 
the liquidity transformation gap (LTG) to measure bank liquidity transformation as the 
dependant variable, and found that the bank risk taking, solvency and interbank demands are 
negatively associated with the liquidity transformation of Islamic banks. In addition, larger 
Islamic banks create more liquidity. One of the downside of using LTG is that it does not 
classify assets and liabilities according to product categories. In addition, such measures do 
not indicate the extent of liquidity creation beyond which it offsets the advantage of 
performing this function.  
In a comparative study, Muharam and Kurnia (2012) applied the multiple linear regression 
model to investigate the influence of bank capital, profitability, net interest margin, liquidity 
gaps, and risky liquid assets, on liquidity risk in the Indonesian banking sector. Their study 
utilized a sample of 3 conventional and 3 Islamic banks in Indonesia, over the period of 2007 
– 2011. The findings showed that capitalization and ROE are negatively associated, while 
liquidity gaps are positively associated with bank liquidity, in the case of conventional banks. 
The results also found a significant and negative influence in regards to ROA and a positive 
significant impact for ROE and NIM on bank liquidity, in the case of Islamic banks.  
To determine how the Islamic banking sector in Malaysia manages its liquidity, in response to 
variations in different idiosyncratic and macroeconomic factors, Mohamad, Mohamad, and 
Samsudin (2013) applied dynamic panel data estimation technique to 17 Islamic banks from 
1994 to 2009. The empirical results show that Islamic banks are liquidity providers in times of 
economic upswings and that the liquidity of Islamic banks deteriorates with an increase in 
financing. The findings also reveal a non-linear (U – shaped) relationship between bank size 
and liquidity, during the study period.   
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Ben Jedidia and Hamza (2015) examined the relationship between various bank-specific and 
macroeconomic factors, and the liquidity risk in Islamic banking. The study used a sample of 
60 Islamic banks in the Middle East and North African (MENA) countries, over the period of 
2004 to 2012. The authors reveal that banks profitability is a significant determinant of 
increased liquidity risk in the sample banks. Whereas, the liquidity risk is significantly reduced 
with an increase in bank capitalization and investment ratio. GDP growth is insignificant in 
explaining Islamic banks’ liquidity risk.  
Ghenimi and Omri (2015) compared the liquidity risk determinants of conventional and 
Islamic banks in the Gulf countries. Using a sample of 33 conventional and 11 Islamic banks 
from 2006 to 2013, their findings show that return on assets and non-performing loans are 
the most common factors that significantly increase liquidity risks, in both Islamic and 
conventional banking systems. Bank size, return on equity, capital adequacy, and inflation 
were found to be significant in reducing the liquidity risk, in both Islamic and conventional 
banks.  
Using a panel dataset of 42 Islamic banks, from 15 Arab countries, over the period of 2007 
and 2014, Alzoubi (2017) found a negative correlation between cash ratio and liquidity risk. 
The author also suggested that bank size, solvency and investment ratio are the significant 
factors in reducing the liquidity risk of sample banks. Whereas, the researcher found a strong 
positive influence of bank profitability and poor asset quality on liquidity risk, during the study 
period. In addition, the findings established a weak non-linear relationship between bank size 
and liquidity risk. Table 2.1 summarizes the empirical literature on the factors influencing 
banks’ maturity transformation risks. 
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Research Focus Methodology Main Findings 
Rauch et al. 
(2009) 
457 German Saving 
banks 







Interest rates and unemployment are significantly and negatively 
associated with the banks’ liquidity creation. Whereas, bank-
specific factors, such as size and financial performance, have no 
significant influence on their maturity transformation function. 




1994 – 2006 Causes of liquidity 
risk and relationship 





Risky liquid assets, less-risky liquid assets, external funding 
dependence, supervisory and regulatory factors, GDP and inflation 
are the significant factors causing liquidity risk. Bank size has a non-
linear relationship with liquidity risk. Moreover, banks’ financial 




banks from the US 
and European 
region 






Banks that rely more on short-term market funding tend to have 
higher maturity transformation risks. Whereas, concentration in 
potentially securitizable loan portfolios significantly reduce 
maturity transformation risk. Additionally, bank capital, size, 
market power and loan loss provisions are significant in reducing 
banks’ maturity transformation risk, whereas, economic growth 
and interest rate spreads are significant in explaining the increased 





2002 – 2010  Determinants of 




The two liquidity measures used have different policy implications 
in the pre-crisis and during crisis period. Further, macroeconomic 
factors, such as unemployment and inflation, are found to be 
significant in explaining bank liquidity. Additionally, Z-score (bank’s 
stability indicator) has a significant effect on bank liquidity during 
the crisis period. 
Bonfim and Kim 
(2012) 
3,500 banks from 
45 countries of the 
US and European 
region 
2002 – 2009  Determinants of bank 
liquidity risk and the 





Peer effect is significantly associated with bank’s risk taking 
behaviour, which calls for macro-prudential liquidity risk 
management approach. In addition, bank size, net interest margin, 
return on assets, cost efficiency, net loans to total assets, and loans 
to customer deposits, are significant factors influencing banks’ net 
stable funding ratio. Moreover, banks with greater customer 
lending tend to have higher loan to deposit ratios and usually 
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Horvath et al. 
(2012) 
31 banks from the 
Czech Republic 
2000 – 2010  Relationship between 






Bank capital is negatively associated with liquidity creation, i.e. well 
capitalized banks are less involved in their maturity transformation 
function. In addition, bank size, non-performing loans, stability and 




36 Islamic and 42 
conventional banks 
from the Persian 
Gulf and states of 
the GCC region 
2000 – 2007  Determinants of 
liquidity 
transformation in a 




Bank risk, solvency and interbank demand are significantly and 
negatively associated with liquidity transformation in Islamic banks. 
In addition, larger Islamic banks create more liquidity.  
Muharam and 
Kurnia (2012) 
3 Islamic and 3 
conventional banks 
from Indonesia 
2007 – 2011  Factors influencing 





Liquidity risk of Islamic bank increases with an increase in return on 
assets, whereas, return on equity and net interest margin are 
significant factors for improving bank liquidity, in terms of cash to 
asset ratio. 
Mohamad et al. 
(2013) 
17 Islamic banks 
from Malaysia 
1994 – 2009  Determinants of 





Islamic banks are liquidity providers in times of economic upswings 
and the liquidity of Islamic banks deteriorates with an increase in 
financing. Moreover, bank size shows a non-linear (U – shaped) 
relationship with liquidity. 
Ben Jedidia and 
Hamza (2015) 
60 Islamic banks in 
the MENA region 
2004 – 2012 Determinants of 
liquidity risk in 
Islamic banks 
System GMM Profitability is positively related to the liquidity risk of Islamic 
banks. Bank capitalization and investment ratio are the significant 
contributors in lowering the liquidity risk in sample banks. 
Whereas, economic growth has no significant influence on Islamic 
banks’ liquidity risk. 
Ghenimi and 
Omri (2015) 




2006 – 2013  Factors influencing 
liquidity risk in a dual 
banking system 
OLS, FE and RE Bank capitalization, size, return on equity, net interest margin, and 
inflation, lower liquidity risk in Islamic banks. Whereas, returns on 
assets and non-performing loans show a significant positive 
relationship with the liquidity risk of both Islamic and conventional 
banks. 
Alzoubi (2017) 42 Islamic banks 
from 15 Arab 
countries 
2007 – 2017  Determinants of 





Cash ratio, size, capital adequacy and investment ratio are 
significant factors in reducing the liquidity risk in Islamic banks. 
Return on assets and poor asset quality are positively correlated 
with bank liquidity risk. In addition, the study finds a weak non-
linear relationship between bank size and liquidity risk.  
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Empirical Literature on Maturity Transformation risk and Bank 
Performance 
Previous empirical literature provides mixed evidence on the relationship between funding 
liquidity risk and bank performance. One strand of literature supports the argument that 
banks will incur more cost in tying up of additional resources in liquid assets and will result in 
a decrease in profitability (Curak, Poposki, & Pepur, 2012; Naceur & Kandil, 2009; Li, 2007; 
Demirguc, Laeven, & Levine, 2003; Guru, Staunton, & Balashanmugam, 2002). The other 
strand of literature argues that with less liquid assets, banks become vulnerable to a classic 
run on bank or solvency risk and suggests a positive relationship between liquidity and bank 
performance (Olagunju, David, & Samuel, 2012; Sufian & Habibullah, 2009; Kosmidou, 2008; 
Bourke, 1989). In addition, some empirical literature provides evidence of mixed or no 
relationship between liquidity and profitability (Ariffin, 2012; Ommeren, 2011; Shen et al., 
2009; Pasiouras & Kosmidou, 2007; Athanasoglou, Delis, & Staikouras, 2006).  
Molyneux and Thornton (1992) replicated and extended their study on the seminal works of 
Short (1979) and Bourke (1989). The authors examine the determinants of bank performance 
across 18 European countries, over the period of 1986 – 1989. They use the ratio of liquid 
assets to total asset as a proxy for liquidity and found a negative and significant relationship 
with bank profitability, measured as return on assets (ROA). Their results imply that more 
liquid assets held by a bank increases its intermediation cost and reduces its capacity to 
generate profits. Since holding more liquid assets reduces the maturity transformation risk 
(Li, 2007), this suggests a positive correlation between bank earnings and their degree of 
exposure to maturity transformation risk. 
Guru et al. (2002) analyze the Malaysian banking industry between 1985 and 1998 and 
investigate the factors that determine a successful commercial bank. Their results also 
provide evidence of a negative relationship between liquidity and bank profitability. Demirguc 
et al. (2003) analyzed a sample of commercial banks from 72 different countries, over the 
period of 1995 – 1999. They applied the generalized least square technique to assess the 
effect of bank regulations, concentration, inflation and national institutions on bank 
performance and found a negative relationship between liquidity and bank profitability. Li 
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(2007) investigates the impact of bank specific characteristics and banking environment on 
financial performance of the UK banking industry, over the period of 1996 – 2006 and found 
a weak negative relationship between bank liquidity and profitability.  
Using the Generalized Method of Moments technique, Naceur and Kandil (2009) examined 
the impact of capital requirements on Egyptian banks’ stability and performance between 
1989 and 2004. The authors’ results show a positive and statistically significant relationship 
between liquidity risk and profitability of domestic banks. Consistent with these results, 
Alexiou and Sofoklis (2009) also found a positive relationship between liquidity risk and bank 
profitability. The authors examine the critical factors that affect the profitability of six major 
commercial banks of Greece over the period of 2000 – 2007. Their findings suggest that an 
increase in liquidity, as measured by the ratio of loans to customer deposit, result in decline 
in bank profitability. In addition, Curak et al. (2012) examined the bank-specific, industry 
specific and macroeconomic determinants of bank profitability in the Macedonian banking 
sector. They utilized the two-step system GMM technique to quantify various factors affecting 
profitability, based on of a dataset of 16 banks, over the period of 2005 to 2010. The authors 
use the ratio of loan to deposit as a proxy of liquidity risk and found a positive relationship 
with bank profitability. They suggest that banks with a higher loan to deposit ratio utilize their 
resources in higher yield assets which results in increased profitability.  
On the contrary, Bourke (1989) reviewed the performance of banks in twelve countries in 
Europe, America and Australia over a period of ten years (from 1972 to 1981). The author 
investigated internal and external determinants of profitability in a sample of 90 banks from 
these territories and found the ratio of liquid assets to total assets, as a proxy of liquidity, was 
statistically significant and positively related to bank performance, as measured by ROA. The 
results imply that banks with less maturity transformation risk, by holding more liquid assets, 
perform better. 
Using an unbalanced pooled data set of Greek commercial banks over the period of 1990 to 
2002, Kosmidou (2008) shows a statistically significant and positive relationship between 
bank liquidity and performance. Similarly, Olagunju et al. (2012) comes to the similar 
conclusions. The authors conducted a survey on the liquidity management and bank 
performance in Nigerian banks. Using unstructured questionnaires and descriptive statistics, 
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they found a positive and significant relationship between banks’ preference of holding liquid 
assets and profitability. Additionally, Sufian and Habibullah (2009) analyzed the banking 
industry in China between 2000 and 2005 to identify the firm-specific and macroeconomic 
determinants of commercial bank profitability. The authors found that more liquid state-
owned commercial banks showed higher profitability. They argued that one possible reason 
for this relationship is that a bank requires more liquidity to meet accelerating screening and 
monitoring costs with an increase in the portion of loans in the bank’s asset portfolio.  
Several studies find both negative and positive effects related to maturity transformation risk 
and bank performance. Kosmidou, Tanna, and Pasiouras (2005) analyzed the internal and 
external determinants of profitability in UK commercial banks over the period of 1995 to 
2002. The authors had results were inconclusive, as the ratio of liquid assets to customers 
plus short-term funding, a proxy of liquidity, was statistically significant and positively related 
to return on average assets, but negatively related to net interest income. In their study, 
Pasiouras and Kosmidou (2007) examined the effects of bank-specific characteristics, financial 
market structure and macroeconomic conditions, on the performance of domestic and 
foreign commercial banks in 15 European countries between 1995 and 2001. The authors 
found that the ratio of net loans to customers and short-term funding is significant and 
positively related to return on average assets of domestic banks, whereas in case of foreign 
banks, the relationship is significant but negatively related. Furthermore, Ariffin (2012) 
studied the relationship between liquidity risk and profitability in the Malaysian Islamic 
banking system. The results show a positive correlation between liquidity risk and bank 
profitability, based on return on assets. However, the study found a negative correlation 
between liquidity risk and return on equity. Similarly, Shen et al. (2009) investigated the 
causes of liquidity risk and determinants of bank performance in 12 advanced economies, 
over the period of 1994 – 2006. The authors used financing gap ratio as a proxy of liquidity 
risk and found a statistically significant and positive relationship with banks’ net interest 
margin in a market-based financial system. However, a negative and significant relationship 
was established between liquidity risk and return on assets, as well as return on equity, in the 
sample banks. The results also showed that liquidity risk had no effect on bank performance 
in the bank-based financial system. The authors concluded that liquidity risk is endogenous 
to bank performance. 
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Some authors find no relationship between liquidity and financial performance. Athanasoglou 
et al. (2006) studied the factors effecting profitability in the banking system of South East 
Europe between 1998 and 2002. Their findings revealed that loans to total assets, as a 
measure of bank liquidity, had no significant effect on either return on asset or return on 
equity, proxies of bank performance.  Ommeren (2011) came to similar conclusions. In his 
study on the determinants of profitability in 354 European banks over the period from 2000 
to 2009, the author found   a negative but statistically insignificant relationship between bank 
liquidity and profitability.  
Few studies have also explicitly examined the influence of liquidity on bank profitability, in 
the case of Islamic banks. Previous literature provides mixed evidence on the liquidity – 
profitability relationship and depends mainly on the liquidity measure used in the study. 
Haron (2004) examined the influence of various internal and external factors on the 
profitability of 14 Islamic banks. The author found that, in the sample, financing to deposit 
ratio, as a measure of bank liquidity, is significant in explaining increased profitability. In the 
same vein, Srairi (2009) examined the influence of several factors at bank, industry and 
country level, on the profitability of Islamic banks in GCC region. The study found a significant 
negative relationship between liquidity and Islamic banks’ profitability. The author argued 
that the possible reason for this negative association could be the high opportunity costs 
associated with holding excessive liquid assets. Asutay and Izhar’s (2007) study also revealed 
a significant negative relationship between liquidity and Islamic bank profitability. Rachdi and 
Mokni (2014) analyzed the factors affecting conventional and Islamic bank profitability in the 
MENA region, using a sample of 15 conventional and 15 Islamic banks over the period of 2002 
to 2009. The authors employed a generalized method of moment estimation technique and 
found that liquidity risk and ownership status are significant and positively associated with 
the profitability of Islamic banks, while bank capital is significant in determining conventional 
banks’ profitability. In the case of Islamic banks, the results also reveal a negative 
management efficiency – profitability relationship. On the contrary, based on a sample of 16 
Islamic banks in Malaysia, during 2005 and 2008, Wasiuzzaman and Tarmizi (2010) found a 
significant and positive influence of liquidity and management efficiency on Islamic banks’ 
profitability. However, bank capital and asset quality were negatively associated with 
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profitability. Further, gross domestic product and inflation positively influenced Islamic banks’ 
profitability during the study period. 
Idris et al.’s (2011) study did not find any significant relationship between liquidity and 
profitability in 9 Malaysian Islamic banks, during the period of 2007 to 2009. More recently, 
Chowdhury and Rasid (2015) employed the ordinary least squares method to analyze 2013 
annual data from 44 Islamic banks in the Asian and African region. Their results also showed 
no empirical evidence of association between liquidity and profitability in the sample Islamic 
banks.  Mirzaei (2011) found mixed empirical evidence on the influence of liquidity on Islamic 
banks’ profitability. Using an unbalanced dataset of 175 Islamic and conventional banks from 
12 Middle Eastern countries over the period of 1999 to 2008, the authors found that the liquid 
assets ratio was significantly and negatively associated with the return on assets of Islamic 
banks, whereas the return on equity of Islamic banks showed significant improvement with 
an increase in liquid assets.   
Based on the literature discussed, the findings regarding maturity transformation risk and 
bank profitability are mixed. For example, Molyneux and Thornton (1992) and Guru et al. 
(2002), reveal a negative and significant relationship between bank liquidity and profitability. 
Srairi (2009) and Rachdi and Mokni (2014) came to similar conclusions, when   investigating 
the impact of liquidity on Islamic banks’ profitability. In contrast, Bourke (1989) and Kosmidou 
(2008) found a significant positive relationship between liquidity and bank profits.  Sufian and 
Habibullah (2009) also reveal a significant and positive relationship between liquidity and 
bank profitability. Similarly, Haron (2004) and Wasiuzzaman and Tarmizi (2010) reveal a 
significant positive relationship between liquidity and profitability of Islamic banks. In the case 
of conventional banks, Ommeren (2011) and Athanasoglou et al. (2006), and Chowdhury and 
Rasid (2015) and Idris et al. (2011), in the case of Islamic banks, did not show any empirical 
evidence of bank liquidity – profitability relationship. To the best of our knowledge, no study 
has examined the influence of IFSB’s new liquidity measure (NSFR) on Islamic banks’ 
profitability. Therefore, we can conclude that the impact of banks’ liquidity transformation 
function on financial performance remains ambiguous and further research is required. Table 














1986 – 1989 Determinants of bank 
profitability (net profit 
before tax, net profit after 
tax) 
Regression - OLS  Banks’ profitability is positively associated with high capital 
ratios and nominal interest rates. Moreover, government 
ownership shows significant and positive impact on 
profitability.  For liquidity ratios, the study finds a weak 
inverse relationship with bank performance. 
Bourke (1989) America, Europe 
and Australia 
1972 – 1981 Concentration, staff 
expense, liquidity, 
government ownership 
interest rate, market growth 
and inflation as 
determinants of banks 
profitability 
Regression - OLS Capital ratios, liquidity ratios and interest rates are 
positively related to profitability. While staff expense 




Malaysia 1985 – 1998   Determinants of a successful 
commercial bank 
Regression – OLS  Loans to deposit ratio as a measure of liquidity is weak and 
negatively associated with bank profitability 
Demirguc- Kunt 
et al. (2003) 
72 countries 1995 – 1999  Bank regulations, 
concentration, inflation, and 
national institutions on bank 
net interest margins NIM 
GLS – Random 
Effects 
Bank liquidity measured as a ratio of liquid assets to total 






United Kingdom 1995 – 2002 Bank-specific, 
macroeconomic and market 
structure factors on banks' 
performance 
Regression – Fixed 
Effects 
Ratio of liquid assets to customer and short-term funding 
is statistically significant and positively related to return on 
assets and is negatively related to net interest margins. 
Athanasoglou et 
al.  (2006) 
South Eastern 
European (SEE) 
1998 – 2002 Determinants of bank 
profitability 
Random Effects – 
Generalized Least 
Square 
Loans to total asset as a measure of bank liquidity has no 
significant effect on bank performance measured as return 
on assets and return on equity 
Li (2007) United Kingdom 1999 – 2006  Bank profitability and risk 
management practices 




Liquidity measures as liquid assets to total deposit and 
borrowing is statistically significant but negatively related 










15 EU Countries 1995 – 2001  Determinants of bank 
profitability (ROAA) 
Regression – Fixed 
Effects 
Bank profitability is statistically significant and negatively 
associated to the level of liquid assets held by domestic 
banks; however, it shows a positive relationship with liquid 
assets in case of foreign banks. 
Kosmiduo 
(2008) 
Greece 1990 – 2002 Determinants of 
performance of Greek banks 
Unbalanced Pooled 
Time Series Fixed 
Effects Regression 
The banks with high ratio of net loans to customer and 
short-term funding as a measure of liquidity risk are less 
profitable in terms of return on assets. 
Alexiou and 
Sofoklis (2009) 
Greece 2000 – 2007  Determinants of bank 
profitability 
Regression – Fixed 
Effects  
Loans to deposit ratio is statistically significant and 




China 2000 – 2005  Firm specific and 
macroeconomic 
determinants of bank 
profitability 
Regression – Fixed 
Effects 
More liquid state-owned banks show higher profitability. 




Egypt 1989 – 2004  Effect of capital regulations 





Liquid assets are statistically significant and negatively 
related to profitability of domestic banks.    
Alexiou and 
Sofoklis (2009) 
Greece 2000 – 2007  Determinants of bank 
profitability 
Regression – Fixed 
Effects  
Loans to deposit ratio is statistically significant and 
negatively related to bank profitability.  
Shen, Chen, Kao 
and Yeh (2010) 
12 advanced 
economies 
1994 – 2006  Firm specific and 
macroeconomic, 
supervisory and regulatory 
determinants of bank 
profitability 
 
Regression – Fixed 
Effects 
 
Liquidity risk measured as financing gap ratio is statistically 
significant and positively associated with banks' net 
interest margin, in market-based financial systems. 
However, a negative significant relationship is established 
between liquidity risk and return on average assets as well 
as return on average equity of the sample banks  
Sufian (2011) Korea 1192 – 2003  Firm specific and 
macroeconomic 
determinants of bank 
profitability 
 




Bank liquidity is negatively related to performance 
Ommeren 
(2011) 





Liquid assets to short-term funding as a measure of 
liquidity shows negative but statistically insignificant 
relationship with return on average assets  
Curak (2012) Macedonia 2005 – 2010  Bank-specific, industry-
specific and macroeconomic 
2-step System 
GMM 
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Liquidity management has a significant effect on bank 
profitability. An optimum liquidity level needs to be 
maintained as both illiquidity and excess liquidity have 
adverse effects on bank profitability. 
Ariffin (2012) Islamic banks 
from Malaysia 
2006 – 2008 Liquidity risk and bank 






Liquidity risk measured as liquid assets to liabilities is 
positively correlated with ROA of Islamic banks from 2006 
to 2008. However, negative correlation was found in 2007 
between liquidity risk and both performance measures 
(i.e., ROA and ROE). 
Haron (2004) Islamic banks  Determinants of Islamic 
bank profitability 
Panel Data Dummy 
Variable Regression  
Financing to deposit ratio as a measure of bank liquidity is 
significantly and positively associated with the profitability 
of Islamic banks. 
Srairi (2009) 18 Islamic and 48 
Conventional 
banks in GCC 
region 
1999 - 2006 Impact of bank-specific, 
macroeconomic and 
financial structure factors 
on profitability in dual 
banking system 
Regression – 
Pooled OLS, FE and 
RE 
Islamic banks that hold less liquid assets are more 
profitable. In addition, bank capital, loan growth, inflation 
and financial market development are the significant 
positive contributors of Islamic bank profitability. 
Whereas, operating efficiency is negatively correlated with 
the profitability of Islamic banks. 
Asutay and 
Izhar (2007) 
1 Islamic bank in 
Indonesia 
1996 – 2001  Internal and external 
determinants of Islamic 
banks profitability. 
Regression – OLS  Bank liquidity shows a significant and negative relationship 




16 Islamic banks 
in Malaysia 
2005 – 2008  Internal and external 
determinants of Islamic 
banks’ profitability 
Regression – OLS Liquidity and operational efficiency significantly and 
positively related to Islamic bank profitability. In addition, 
both economic growth and inflation show a positive 
influence on bank performance. Whereas, bank capital and 
asset quality are negatively correlated with the 
profitability of the sample Islamic banks.  
Rachdi and 
Mokni (2014) 
15 Islamic and 15 
conventional 
banks in MENA 
region 
2002 – 2009  Bank profitability 





Liquidity risk and ownership structure are significantly and 
positively associated with profitability of Islamic banks, 
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Idris et al. 
(2011) 
9 Islamic banks in 
Malaysia 








44 Islamic banks 
from Asian and  
2013 Factors influencing the 
profitability of the Islamic 
banks 
OLS Liquidity risk and credit risk and economic growth are 
insignificant in explaining profitability of Islamic banks 
during the study period. Equity financing and inflation 
have significant and positive relationship with banks’ 
profitability. Whereas, operating cost has a significant 
negative impact on profitability of Islamic banks. 
Mirzaei (2011) 175 Islamic and 
conventional 
banks in 12 
Middle Eastern 
countries 
1999 – 2008  Determinants of bank risk 
and return in Islamic and 
conventional banking 
system 
FE and GMM Liquid assets ratio, as a measure of bank liquidity is 
significantly and positively associated with return on 
assets, while it shows a significant and negative 
relationship with return on equity. 
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Empirical Literature on Maturity Transformation Risk and Bank Stability 
The role of banks as liquidity transformers, and the inherent fragility associated with this role, 
has long been studied in the seminal papers of Bryant (1980) and Diamond and Dybvig 
(1983).6 These studies reveal that maturity mismatch between assets and liabilities makes 
them inherently unstable, by exposing them to the possibility of panic-based bank runs. This 
not only hold true for banks’ balance sheet business, but also for the lending and funding 
business conducted through off-balance sheet items (Kashyap et al., 2002; Holmström & 
Tirole, 1998).  
Some studies argue that higher asset liquidity facilitates the sale of bank assets during 
financial distress - and hence reduces banks’ incentive to avoid them. Therefore, banks may 
assume additional risks (credit risk and capital risk) and so increase the probability of default. 
Diamond and Rajan (2001) argue that bank liquidity creation is a driver of financial fragility 
and propose that high liquidity transformation is most likely reason behind bank failures. With 
an increase in liquidity creation function, banks may be forced to sell their illiquid assets in 
order to meet unexpected withdrawals from depositors during stress conditions. Thus, they 
elevate the risk of failure when assets are insufficient to meet non-contingent commitments 
(Allen & Gale, 2004).  
Empirical evidence has shown that high liquidity creation may be detrimental to bank 
stability, using private credit as a proxy for liquidity in the system. Cottarelli, Dell’Ariccia, and 
Vladkova-Hollar (2005) found that the ratio of credit to GDP increases by 5 to 10% prior to 
banking crises. Similarly, Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) and Kaminsky and Reinhart 
(1999) provide evidence that increased lending to the private sector usually precedes banking 
crises. Borio (2014) also contends that high loan growth is an impending signal of bank crises. 
In another empirical study, Nguyen, Skully, and Perera (2013) investigate the relationship 
between liquidity and bank stability and examine the effect of market power on this 
relationship. Using a large data set of 5,603 banks, from 113 countries, over the period of 
1996 to 2010, the authors found that stability is positively associated with banks’ liquidity. 
                                                          
6 Banks transform liquidity through creating liquid claims or deposits on illiquid assets or loans. 
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However, their results show that banks with greater market power find incentive to increase 
their portfolio risk in order to charge higher rents and thus become less stable.  
On the contrary, there are few studies which have found that higher bank liquidity makes 
them less vulnerable to idiosyncratic shocks because they can meet any unexpected large 
withdrawals or utilization of committed credit lines (Carletti, Hartmann, & Spagnolo, 2007; 
Wagner, 2007). Illiquidity serves as a channel through which contagion is spread across the 
banking sector (Allen & Gale, 2004) and which may result in a systemic meltdown (Diamond 
& Rajan, 2005). Bernanke (1983) supports this argument, claiming that a fall in liquidity 
creation can increase individual and systemic bank failures, thereby reducing credit supply 
and leading to an economic downward spiral.  
In the empirical literature, Hong, Huang, and Wu (2014) employed a hazard model on 
quarterly panel data of US banks, between 2001 to 2011, to investigate the relationship of 
liquidity risk measures using Basel III liquidity regulatory ratios (net stable funding ratio (NSFR) 
and liquidity coverage ratio (LCR)). The authors argue that higher liquidity creation is a 
predictor of bank failure and suggest that in order to avoid such failures, liquidity risk should 
be minimized, not just on an individual bank level, but also at a system level as well. These 
findings support new liquidity requirements under the Basel III accord through which banks 
are now required to maintain and improve their solvency, even under high liquidity pressure. 
Similarly, Yan, Hall, and Turner (2012), studied the association between tighter capital 
regulations and Basel III liquidity requirements on a sample of 11 UK banks over the period of 
1997 to 2010. They found that higher regulatory capital requirements not only reduce the 
probability of a banking crisis, but also reduce economic losses from a banking crisis. 
Moreover, Jiraporn, Chalermchatvichien, and Jumreornvong (2014) examine the impact of 
NSFR on bank risk-taking behaviour, using a sample of 68 banks from 11 East Asian countries 
between 2005 and 2009. Their findings revealed an inverse relationship between capital 
stability and banks’ risk-taking, measured as Z-score. 
Studies in the recent past have also attempted to investigate the influence of several internal 
and external factors on the stability of the Islamic banking sector. Čihák and Hesse (2010) 
attempted to examine the role of Islamic banking on financial stability. The authors used a 
large sample (77 Islamic banks and 397 conventional banks), from 18 countries, over the 
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period of 1993 to 2004. By applying Z-score as a measure of financial stability, the findings 
revealed that small Islamic banks are more stable than small conventional banks. Moreover, 
small Islamic banks showed greater financial stability than large Islamic and conventional 
banks. The authors argued that large Islamic banks are deterrent to overall financial stability.  
Examining the financial performance and stability of the banking sector in the Middle Eastern, 
Mirzaei (2011) found that liquidity is a significant determinant of Islamic banks’ stability. The 
author used Z-score and Sharp ratio to measure the banks’ stability and found that the liquid 
assets ratio is positively associated with the stability measures used in the study. In a 
comparative study on the business model, efficiency and stability of Islamic and conventional 
banks, Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Merrouche (2013) revealed that Islamic banks are more 
stable, better capitalized, have higher intermediation ratios and asset quality, and are less 
cost efficient than conventional banks. The findings also revealed that small Islamic banks are 
more reliant on market funding, have higher mismatches in maturities of assets and liabilities, 
and are better capitalized than larger Islamic banks. 
In a recent study, Trad, Trabelsi, and Goux (2017) examined the role of Islamic banking on 
overall financial stability. The authors used a dataset of 78 Islamic banks, from 12 different 
countries, from 2004 to 2013. They found inconclusive evidence on the liquidity – stability 
relationship. The findings revealed that liquidity, when measured as liquid assets to total 
assets ratio, is significantly and positively associated with banks stability. Conversely, the ratio 
of liquid asset to customer deposit and short-term funding, as a measure of liquidity, showed 
a significant and negative relationship with bank stability. 
To the best of our knowledge, there is only one study by Ashraf, Rizwan, and L’Huillier (2016), 
which specifically focuses on the influence of IFSB’s proposed NSFR on the stability of Islamic 
banks. Using a large unbalanced dataset of 136 Islamic banks, from 30 different countries, 
between 2000 and 2013, the authors examined the potential impact of NSFR on bank stability. 
The authors found that the inclusion of this new regulatory measure has a significant impact 
in explaining the increased stability of Islamic banks. The results further revealed that the 
marginal impact of NSFR on bank stability decreases with an increase in bank asset size. The 
empirical literature on the liquidity and bank stability relationship is summarized in Table 2.3. 
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1973 – 1996  Influence of bank credit 
ratios on macroeconomic 
development and financial 
stability. 
Random Effects Higher bank-credit-to-GDP ratio, as a measure of liquidity 












Bank liquidity is positively correlated with financial stability, 
whereas, higher credit to private sector induces financial 
fragility. In addition, the likelihood of financial crisis increases 




20 countries 1970 – 1995  The relationship between 




Increased lending to the private sector usually precedes banking 
crises. 





1996 – 2010  Influence of bank liquidity 
on stability. The role of 
market power in 






Banks which maintain high levels of liquid assets are more 
stable. Moreover, with increased market power, banks tend to 
increase their portfolio risks for higher gains, and thus are less 
stable.   
Yan et al. (2012) 11 UK banks 1997 – 2010  Cost – benefit analysis of 




VAR and VECM 
Inclusion of Basel III liquidity and capital requirements are 
significantly beneficial to the financial stability and economic 
growth, in the long-run. 
Hong et al. (2014) 9,349 US 
commercial 
banks 
2000 – 2011  Causal relationship 
between Basel III liquidity 
risk measures and bank 
failure. 
OLS and FE NSFR is significantly and negatively related to bank failure. In 
addition, the Idiosyncratic liquidity risk has a limited impact on 
bank failures, whereas systemic liquidity risk is a major 
contributor to financial crisis.  
Jiraporn et al. 
(2014) 
68 banks from 
11 East Asian 
countries 
2005 – 2009  Impact of NSFR on risk-
taking behavior of banks 
Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) 
The extent of bank risk-taking significantly decreases with an 
improvement in capital stability, which in turn reduces the 
probability of a financial distress. 
Čihák and Hesse 
(2010) 
77 Islamic and 
397 
conventional 
Banks from 19 
countries 




Small Islamic banks are more stable than small conventional 
banks.  
Large conventional banks are financially stronger than large 
Islamic banks. 
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Mirzaei (2011) 175 Islamic and 
conventional 
banks from 12 
Middle Eastern 
countries 
1999 – 2008 Determinants of bank risk 
and return in Islamic and 
conventional banking 
system 
FE and GMM Liquid asset ratio, as a measure of bank liquidity shows a 
significant and positive relationship with banks’ stability. 
Beck, Demirgüç-
Kunt, et al. (2013) 
88 Islamic and 
422 
conventional 
banks from 22 
countries 
2005 – 2009  Comparative analysis of 
business model, efficiency 
and stability in Islamic and 
conventional banks. 
OLS and FE Islamic banks are more stable, better capitalized, have higher 
intermediation ratios and asset quality, and are less cost 
efficient than conventional banks. In addition, small Islamic 
banks are more reliant on market funding, have higher 
mismatches in maturities of assets and liabilities, and are better 
capitalized than larger Islamic banks. 
Trad et al. (2017) 78 Islamic banks 
from 12 
countries 
2004 - 2013 Risk and profitability of 
Islamic banks 
System GMM The ratio of liquid assets to total assets is positively correlated 
with bank stability, while liquid asset to customer deposit and 
short-term funding is inversely related to bank stability. In 
addition, bank size and capital are significant contributors to the 
increased financial soundness of Islamic banks, in terms of both 
profitability and stability. 
Ashraf et al. 
(2016) 
136 Islamic 
banks from 30 
countries 
2000 – 2013 Impact of NSFR on stability 












Measures of Maturity Transformation Risk 
Deep and Schaefer (2004) were the first to empirically measure the maturity transformation 
risk. They estimated transformation risk as the difference between liabilities due within one 
year (liquid liabilities), and near cash (liquid) assets, scaled to gross assets. The authors used 
panel regression analysis on data from the 200 largest US banks, from 1997 to 2001. Their 
result showed that banks exhibited unexpectedly low liquidity transformation of about 20%. 
Their study also revealed that deposit insurance provides less incentive for the banks to perform 
their liquidity transformation function, as insured deposits generally replace uninsured liabilities, 
instead of expanding the deposit base or encouraging banks to make more loans. Further, the 
credit risk in loan portfolios appears to discourage liquidity transformation.  
Berger and Bouwman (2009) used a more sophisticated approach to measure liquidity 
creation, where they classified assets and liabilities according to product category and 
maturity. They included off-balance sheet activities, not considered by Deep and Schaefer 
(2004). Their study found a positive and significant relationship between capital and liquidity 
transformation for large banks. This was negative for small banks.  
Although liquidity creation increases banks illiquidity and transformation risk, Berger and 
Bouwman’s (2009) measure for liquidity creation does not indicate to what extent liquidity 
creation may become damaging for a bank, in terms of excessive liquidity creation and 
exposure to transformation risk. To overcome this issue, Angora and Roulet (2011) used the 
Basel III accord guidelines, and determined the net stable funding difference (NSFD) as a 
measure of “how much is too much,” for liquidity creation in the US and European banks. 
NSFD is derived by scaling the difference between the required amount of stable funding and 
the available amount of stable funding on total assets.
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Chapter 3 
Data and Methodology 
This chapter identifies various estimation procedures applied to achieve the objectives of this 
study. More specifically, section 3.1 explains the data sources. Section 3.2 presents the 
regression models. The selection of  dependant and independent variables for each of the 
research questions are justified in sections 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5. Section 3.6 explains the selection 
of the study’s estimation techniques.   
Data Sources 
This study applies an unbalanced panel dataset, comprising of 55 full-fledged Islamic banks, 
from 11 Islamic states of Asia and the MENA region, for a period of 10 years (from 2006 – 
2015), to ascertain the determinants of banks’ maturity transformation risk and the effect of 
this maturity transformation risk on Islamic banks’ performance and stability. The selection 
of the sample countries is based on the common religious belief as the majority of these 
populations are Muslim. Following Lee and Hsieh (2013), we deleted dropped banks from the 
sample if the data are available for three years or less. Further the banks selected for this 
study are listed banks with publicly available annual reports from their web sites. Secondary 
data based on the annual financial reports of the sample banks is acquired from Bloomberg 
database and cross-validated with their published annual reports. Data on macroeconomic 
variables is retrieved from the World Bank database7. Table 3.1 shows the name of the 
countries and the number of Islamic banks from each country selected for our study. the 










                                                          
7 See http://data.worldbank.org/indicator for data on macroeconomic variables of each country. 
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Table 3.1.  Sample of Banks and Observations 
No. Country Bank number Observations 
1 Bahrain 6 60 
2 Bangladesh 7 50 
3 Egypt 3 30 
4 Indonesia 6 43 
5 Kuwait 5 44 
6 Malaysia 8 64 
7 Pakistan 4 35 
8 Qatar 4 34 
9 Saudi Arabia 4 37 
10 Turkey 3 27 
11 UAE 5 46 
Total 55 468 
Source: Author’s own computation based on data from the Bloomberg database (2006 – 2015) and banks’ annual reports. 
 
Table 3.1A reports the annual and geographic observation distribution of Islamic banks 
included in this study. 
 
Table 3.2A.  Annual and Geographic Observation Distribution of Islamic Banks 
 
Country Banks 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Bahrain 
Albaraka Banking Group 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Alsalam Bank 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Arab Banking Corp Bsc 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Bahrain Islamic Bank 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Ithmaar Holding Bsc 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Khaleeji Commercial Bank 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Bangladesh 
Al-Arafah Islami Bank Ltd 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Exim Bank 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
First Security Islami Bank Ltd 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Icb Islamic Bank Ltd 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Islami Bank Bangladesh Ltd 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Shahjalal Islami Bank Ltd 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Social Islami Bank Ltd 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Egypt 
Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank/Egypt 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Al Baraka Bank Egypt E.S.C 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Faisal Islamic Bank Of Egypt 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Indonesia 
Bank Bca Syariah 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Bank Bni Syariah 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Bank Bri Syariah Pt 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Bank Muamalat Indonesia Tbk 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
Bank Panin Syariah Tbk Pt 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Bank Syariah Mandiri Pt 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Kuwait 
Ahli United Bank 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Boubyan Bank 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
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Kuwait Finance House Bsc 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Kuwait International Bank 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Warba Bank 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 
Malaysia 
Affin Islamic Bank 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Ambank Islamic 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Bank Islam Malaysia 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 
Bank Muamalat Malaysia Bhd. 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Cimb Islamic Bank Bhd. 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
Hong Leong Islamic Bank Bhd. 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Public Islamic Bank Bhd. 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Rhb Islamic Bank Bhd. 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Pakistan 
Al Baraka Bank (Pakistan) Ltd. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
Bankislami Pakistan Ltd. 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Dubai Islamic Bank Pakistan Ltd. 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
Meezan Bank 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Qatar 
Barwa Bank 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Masraf Al Rayan (Q.S.C.) 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Qatar International Islamic 
Bank (Q.S.C) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Qatar Islamic Bank (S.A.Q) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Saudi 
Arabia 
Al Rajhi Bank 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Alinma Bank 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Bank Albilad 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Bank Al-Jazira 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Turkey 
Albaraka Turk Katilim Bankas 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Asya Bank 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 
Turkye Finans Katilim Bankasi 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
United Arab 
Emirates 
Abu Dhabi Islamic Bank 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Al Hilal Bank (Pjsc) 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Dubai Islamic Bank 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Emirates Islamic Bank 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Sharjah Islamic Bank 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 Observations per Year 30 33 41 48 52 53 54 54 54 49 
Source: Author’s calculation based on data from the Bloomberg database (2006 – 2015) 
 
 
Econometric Model Specifications 
3.2.1 Determinants of Maturity Transformation Risk Model 
This section presents specifications of the econometric model adopted to identify the 
determinants of maturity transformation risk in Islamic banks. Previous studies have 
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documented that various factors (for example, bank capital, fee income, loan loss provisions, 
size, inflation and gross domestic product), have a significant influence on the liquidity 
transformation function and risk of conventional banks. These factors are classified into bank 
specific, industry specific, macroeconomic and supervisory or regulatory factors (Aspachs et 
al., 2005; Shen et al., 2009). Following Shen et al.’s (2009) study, we specify the following 
general linear model to analyze the influence of internal and external factors on the maturity 
transformation risk in Islamic banks.  










𝑖𝑡 =  µ𝑖 +  𝑣𝑖𝑡 
(𝑀𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑗𝑡) = dependent variable for bank ‘𝑖’ of country ‘𝑗’ at time ‘𝑡’, with ‘𝑖 =  1. . . 𝑁 and 
𝑡 =  1 …  𝑇’.  
N is the number of banks and T defines the length of the sample period.  
(∏𝑖𝑡
𝑏 , ∏𝑖𝑡
𝑚) = denote to bank-specific and macroeconomic variables, respectively. 
( 𝑖𝑡) = disturbance term.  
(µ𝑖) = unobserved heterogeneity (the fixed effect).  
(𝑣𝑖𝑡) = idiosyncratic error. 
 
Equation (3.1) is a one-way error component regression, where (µ𝑖) is ~IIN (0, 𝜎µ𝑖
2 ) and 
independent of (𝑣𝑖𝑡) which is ~IIN (0, 𝜎𝑣𝑖𝑡
2 ). 
The selection of the dependent variable and explanatory variables, including various bank-
specific and macroeconomic factors, introduced in equation (3.1) is discussed in section 3.4. 
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3.2.2 Maturity Transformation Risk and Banks’ Performance Model 
In the quest to ascertain the effect of maturity transformation risk on bank performance, the 
following linear model is specified based on the previous literature (Abduh & Idrees, 2013; 
Athanasoglou, Brissimis, & Delis, 2008; Dietrich & Wanzenried, 2011) and is shown in 
equation (3.2). 














Where (𝜋𝑖𝑡) denotes the dependent variable as a measure of profitability, and is estimated 
by return on average assets (ROAA) or return on average equity (ROAE). 𝑗 represents a 
country in which bank 𝑖 operates at time 𝑡, with 𝑖 = 1, … , 𝑁 and 𝑡 = 1, … , 𝑇. N represents the 
number of cross-sectional observations and T is the length of the sample period.  Further the 
model consists of a constant term 𝛼 and a vector of 𝑘 × 1 parameters (𝜕, 𝛿, 𝜗, 𝜙, 𝜆) that 







 and macroeconomic variables ∏
𝑚
𝑗𝑡. Finally, 𝑖𝑡 refers 
to the stochastic error component, capturing unobserved heterogeneity (fixed-effect) 𝜇𝑖  and 
an independent idiosyncratic effect 𝑣𝑖𝑡 , and is assumed to be identically and independently 
distributed with mean 0 and variance 𝜎𝜀
2. 
Previous studies have provided evidence that bank profitability shows a tendency to persist 
over time (Athanasoglou et al., 2008; Berger, Bonime, Covitz, & Hancock, 2000; Dietrich & 
Wanzenried, 2011; Goddard, Liu, Molyneux, & Wilson, 2011). Following the literature, our 
study also adopts the dynamic characteristic of the model, by including a one-period lagged 
dependent variable 𝜋𝑖,𝑡−1 of bank 𝑖 at time 𝑡 among the explanatory variables. The coefficient 
of the one-period lagged dependent variable 𝜕 measures the adjustment speed of banks’ 
profitability to equilibrium. A value of the coefficient between 0 and 1 reflects the persistence 
of profits over the time, which will eventually return to the equilibrium level. Athanasoglou 
et al. (2008) explains that a coefficient value near 0 implies a fairly competitive market 
structure with a high speed of adjustment, while a value near 1 reflects a less competitive 
industry with a low speed of adjustment.  
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The selection of the dependent variable and explanatory variables, including various bank-
specific, industry-specific and macroeconomic variables, introduced in the regression model 
(equation 3.2) are discussed in section 3.5. 
3.2.3 Maturity Transformation Risk and Bank Stability Model 
This section investigates the contribution of maturity transformation risk in explaining the 
overall bank stability, while controlling for other bank specific, industry and macro-
economic factors. Following the literature on financial stability (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, et al., 
2013; Čihák & Hesse, 2010; Nguyen et al., 2013), we specify the following model in a general 
linear form as: 
 (3.3) 
The subscripts  refer to individual banks, countries and time horizon.  denotes the 
dependent variable as a measure of bank stability.  measures the magnitude of 
contribution of stability from previous years,  determines the sign and the slope of 
maturity transformation risk (MTR) on bank stability. , ,  are the vectors of bank-
specific, industry-specific and macroeconomic variables, respectively.  are the 
parameters to be estimated, along with a constant measured by a scaler .   is 
the error term. The model is specified as a one-way error component regression, where  is 
~IIN (0, ) and is independent of  which is ~IIN (0, ). 
The selection of the dependent variable and other explanatory variables, including various 
bank-specific, industry-specific and macroeconomic variables in equation (3.3), are 
discussed in section 3.5. 
Justification of Variable Selection in Determinants of Maturity 
Transformation Risk Model and Hypotheses Development 
This section develops the foundation for identifying various factors that determine maturity 
transformation risk in the Islamic banking system. In our literature review chapter, we have 
summarized the theoretical and empirical explanations for various relationships with bank 
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exposure to maturity transformation risk. The findings from the review are used to 
hypothesize expectations for the relationship of different determinants. 
This section further extends the discussion into two main parts. First, it reviews the 
dependent variable as the proxy for banks’ maturity transformation risk, followed by the 
selection of explanatory variables, categorized into bank-specific and macroeconomic 
determinants of maturity transformation risk, in selected Islamic banks. Second, it also 
hypothesizes the expected sign for the relationship between maturity transformation risk and 
the explanatory variables. 
3.3.1 Dependent Variable 
Net Stable Funding Ratio: 
In the aftermath of the US 2007 subprime loan crisis, the need for improved bank liquidity 
management practices, drew increasing regulatory attention. To address these requirements, 
the Basel Committee on Banking Regulation and Supervision (BCBS) proposed several 
international guidelines for banks to assess their liquidity position (BIS, 2009). Among them, 
the Basel III accords include the implementation of NSFR across the globe. This ratio is a micro-
prudential measure of maturity transformation risk that limits the banks to excessively rely 
on un-stable short-term funding (Arvanitis & Drakos, 2015). In other words, it proposes 
managing the bank's liquidity position over a one-year period by introducing continuous 
structural changes in the bank’s balance sheet, to fund their activities with more stable 
funding sources. 
In an attempt to harmonize the robust management and monitoring of liquidity risk in the 
Islamic banking industry, across the Islamic jurisdictions, the Islamic Financial Services Board 
(IFSB) endorsed the Basel III liquidity regulations, with some modifications to the criteria to 
calculate the NSFR, to account for the unique asset and liability structure of Islamic banks. 
IFSB issued the Guidance Note No. 6 (GN-6), to calculate the net stable funding ratio for 
Islamic banks (IFSB, 2015). 
Similar to the conventional banking system, the NSFR (under the IFSB’s guidelines), is a ratio 
of the available amount of stable funding to the required amount of stable funding. The 
available amount of stable funding constitutes bank capital, liabilities with residual maturities 
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of one year or more, and stable deposits.8 The required amount of stable funding is the value 
of bank assets that are difficult to liquidate or utilize as collateral in secured borrowing, during 
liquidity stress conditions, over a one-year period.  
The net stable funding ratio is calculated as: 
𝑁𝑆𝐹𝑅 =
𝐴𝑣𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔
𝑅𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑚𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔
> 100%  (3.4) 
 
To calculate the available amount of stable funding (ASF) and required amount of stable 
funding (RSF) utilizing the IFSB guidelines, each of the assets and liabilities categories are 
assigned appropriate weights. For example, to calculate RSF factor, the highly liquid assets 
(cash) receive a weighting of 0%. A 100% weight is assigned to highly illiquid assets (fixed 
assets). For the ASF factor, the weights assigned to funding sources depends on their stability 
and ranges from 100% for total regulatory capital (excluding Tier 2 with residual maturity less 
than one year) to 0% for net Sharı’ah-compliant hedging instruments. A detailed breakdown 
of the proposed weights assigned to the respective balance sheet items of Islamic banks is 
provided in Appendix Table A.1. 
Although the IFSB’s GN-6 provides comprehensive quantitative guidelines, the major 
limitation in calculating the NSFR is the lack of available granular data on liquidity risk 
reporting across Islamic banks. Most of the NSFR related studies in the recent past, use the 
approximation method to assign weights to various balance sheet items, while calculating the 
NSFR utilizing Basel III guidelines (Giordana & Schumacher, 2011; Gobat, Yanase, & Maloney, 
2014; Hong et al., 2014; King, 2013). These assumptions are in line with broader 
interpretations of corresponding assets and liabilities, giving due consideration to their 
liquidity and maturity profile. Following the conventional approach, to compute the NSFR 
variable, we made the following assumptions in regard to liquidity and the maturity of various 
balance sheet items of Islamic banks, according to Ashraf et al.’s (2016) methodology. 
                                                          
8 A portion of non-maturity deposits and term deposits, with effective maturities of less than one year, are expected 
to stay within the institution. 
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a) The conservative approach is applied when treating the financing.  A weighting of 85% 
is assigned to all financing with a residual maturity of less than 1 year, while a 
weighting of 100% is assigned to all other financing with a residual maturity of more 
than one year. 
b) Since the classification of encumbered and unencumbered assets and high-quality 
liquid assets (HQLAs) is not available in most of the publicly available data, we assigned 
a 5% weight to investment in government securities, consistent with the GN-6 NSFR, 
and a 50% weighting to all other securities with a maturity of more than one year. 
c) A 100% weight is assigned to all other assets, including fixed assets financing to 
financial institutes with a residual maturity of more than one year and 5% to the off-
balance sheet items. 
d) We also assumed a 100% weight for total regulatory capital. 
e) A 50% haircut is applied to all non-remunerative deposits and funding from financial 
institutions with a residual maturity of less than one year. 
f) Because of the limitation in publicly available data on the classification of stable and 
unstable deposits, we utilized the maturity disclosure of banks’ funding. A factor of 
95% is assigned to all deposits with a residual maturity of more than one year and a 
90% factor is assigned to deposits with a residual maturity of less than one year, 
consistent with the GN-6 guidelines. 
Equation 3.5 shows the mathematical from of the NSFR (IFSB, 2015), as follows: 
 
𝑵𝑺𝑭𝑹 =
[𝟎. 𝟓 ∗ (𝐝𝐞𝐦_𝐝𝐞𝐩𝐨𝐬𝐢𝐭 + 𝐬𝐭_ 𝐦𝐚𝐫𝐤𝐞𝐭_𝐝𝐞𝐛𝐭 + 𝐨𝐭𝐡𝐞𝐫_𝐬𝐭_𝐥𝐢𝐚𝐛)
+ 𝟎. 𝟗𝟎 ∗ (𝐝𝐞𝐩 < 𝟏 𝐲𝐞𝐚𝐫) + 𝟎. 𝟗𝟓 ∗ (𝐝𝐞𝐩 > 𝟏 𝐲𝐞𝐚𝐫) +  𝟏 ∗ (𝐥𝐭_𝐦𝐚𝐫𝐤𝐞𝐭_𝐥𝐢𝐛𝐢𝐥𝐢𝐭𝐢𝐞𝐬 + 𝐫𝐞𝐠_𝐜𝐚𝐩)]
[𝟎. 𝟎𝟓 ∗ (𝐠𝐨𝐯_ 𝐬𝐞𝐜 + 𝐎𝐁𝐒)
+ 𝟎. 𝟓 ∗ (𝐥𝐭_𝐦𝐚𝐫𝐤𝐞𝐭𝐚𝐛𝐥𝐞_𝐚𝐬𝐬𝐞𝐭𝐬 + 𝐟𝐢𝐧_𝐅𝐈𝐬 <  𝟏 𝐲𝐞𝐚𝐫)
+ 𝟎. 𝟔𝟓 ∗ (𝐫𝐞𝐚𝐥_𝐞𝐬𝐭𝐚𝐭𝐞 > 𝟏 𝐲𝐞𝐚𝐫) + 𝟎. 𝟖𝟓 ∗ (𝐜𝐨𝐧𝐬𝐭_𝐥𝐨𝐚𝐧𝐬 < 𝟏 𝐲𝐞𝐚𝐫)





A higher value of NSFR corresponds to more stable funding available than the required 
amount of stable funds, in which case the banks find less difficulty in meeting their current 
liquidity obligations. Whereas, the lesser value of this ratio refers to the extent of a bank’s 
inability to meet unexpected customer withdrawal requirements, without borrowing money 
from external sources or fire selling assets at a discount, consequently exposing them to an 
increased maturity transformation risk (Roulet, 2011). 
 
3.3.2 Explanatory Variables 
In this study, we include the following banks-specific, and macroeconomic explanatory 
variables, to determine their effect on maturity transformation risk in the Islamic banking 
system.  
3.3.2.1 Bank – specific Factors 
Capitalization: Among bank-specific variables, bank capital signifies the degree of cushion 
maintained by the bank, to absorb losses from ongoing operations, when exposed to risk and 
uncertainty. Under the risk absorption theory, Allen and Gale (2004) ascertained that higher 
capital requirements increase the liquidity creation of financial institutions. The study 
revealed that increased liquidity creation exposes banks to higher levels of risk, as losses 
increase with levels of illiquid assets required to satisfy customer liquidity demands. This 
activity is directly related to the risk transformation role of the financial intermediaries (Al-
Khouri, 2012). Increased liquidity needs encourage banks to incur higher losses due to the 
disposal of illiquid assets at available market prices, rather than desired prices, to meet 
customer obligations. However, higher bank capital has the ability to absorb these losses and 
expands the financial intermediaries’ risk-bearing capacity (Bhattacharya & Thakor, 1993; 
Coval & Thakor, 2005).   
On the contrary, Diamond and Rajan (2011) argue that a nominal intermediary service levy 
will be charged to depositors, to lend their respective deposits. However, the mismatch 
between this fee and the repayment capability of risky borrowers, will provoke depositors to 
withdraw their funds, promoting financial fragility. In extreme cases, this may lead to bank 
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runs, causing severe bank liquidity problems and affect the financial sector as a whole. Similar 
findings revealed by Gorton and Winton (2000), who argued the “crowding out effect” where 
the banks’ preference to meet higher capital requirements by shifting investors’ funds to their 
capital accounts. Nevertheless, these investments are susceptible to financial uncertainty and 
cyclical variations which are uninsured and difficult to withdraw when required, leading to a 
decrease in liquidity creation.  
Based on the above discussion, we hypothesize that maturity transformation risk decreases 
with increased levels of bank capital.  
 
Liquid Assets: Shen et al. (2009) argue that the nature of bank assets (and their ability to turn 
these into cash), are a key contributor of liquidity risk. They indicate that holding liquid assets 
can reduce a bank's liquidity risk, as during normal conditions a bank can sell or collateralize 
its liquid assets to obtain liquid funds. However, this may not hold true under liquidity stress 
conditions. Consequently, we categorized liquid assets into risky liquid assets (RLA) and less 
risky liquid assets (LRLA), to ascertain the degrees of liquidity of these assets. Further, we 
scaled the risky liquid assets and less risky liquid assets with the banks’ total assets to 
standardize them. They are represented as RLA_TA and LRLA_TA, respectively. LRLA, such as 
cash and balances, with central banks, government sukuk and other short-term government 
securities, can be easily collateralized or sold with a minimum price risk. This process involves 
low transaction costs. Thus, we hypothesize that an increase in proportion of less-risky liquid 
assets in total assets decreases banks’ maturity transformation risk. On the other hand, RLA 
includes medium and long-term investments in trading securities that are relatively difficult 
to sell or collateralize to meet liquidity requirements.  
Therefore, we assume that a bank’s maturity transformation risk increases with an increase 
in the proportion of risky liquid assets in the total assets.  
 
Profitability: We are also interested in capturing capture the effect of banks’ financial 
soundness on risk taking behaviour. In general, bank profitability explains the influence of 
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increased financial soundness on banks’ risk bearing capacity and their ability to create 
liquidity (Shen et al., 2009). As a result, this increased financial strength may enhance the 
banks’ ability to take risk, which yields a positive relationship between bank profitability and 
transformation risk. Moreover, profitability can also account for the “too big to fail” 
philosophy of large banks (Demirgüç-Kunt & Huizinga, 2010a; Zhou, 2010). Large banks may 
be exposed to increased maturity transformation risks as they can create more liquidity, even 
in stress conditions, in order to increase their profitability.  
We therefore hypothesize that financial soundness encourages banks to increase their 
liquidity creation function, which can lead to increased maturity transformation risk. 
 
Credit Risk: Many researchers have studied the impact of credit risk in determining 
transformation risk (Fungáčová et al., 2010; Berger & Bouwman, 2009; Deep & Schaefer, 
2004). The lower the credit risk, the more aggressively a bank can extend its lending activities. 
Consequently, better asset quality encourages the banks to create more liquidity, which in 
turn leads to increased exposure to transformation risk.  
Based on the above arguments, we hypothesize an inverse relationship between credit risk 
and maturity transformation risk.  
 
Bank Size: Bank size is generally described in terms of net total assets. In line with the 
argument of the ‘too big to fail’ philosophy, the implicit regulator guarantee decreases banks’ 
funding costs, which enable them to invest in more risky assets (Lannotta et al., 2007). Tesfaye 
(2012) contends that regulators’ protection of large banks as the cause of the moral hazard 
problem. This also reduces banks’ incentive to hold more liquid assets. This explains 
differences in liquidity creation among banks; in short, liquidity creation is relative to their 
size. As Delechat et al. (2012) reveal, liquidity increases with bank size. However, after a 
certain level the relationship turns counter wise. Further, Rauch et al. (2009) and Berger and 
Bouwman (2009) note that smaller banks are less involved in liquidity creation as they focus 
mainly on transformation activities and intermediation processes. These findings are in line 
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with some of the previous studies.  Audretsch and Elston (2002) found that smaller banks 
possess relatively more liquid assets and less liquidity constraints. Similarly, Kashyap et al. 
(2002) also revealed the influence of bank size on liquidity creation and concluded that as 
smaller banks face constraints in accessing capital markets, they tend to maintain higher 
levels of liquidity.  
Hence, we hypothesize a positive effect of bank size on risk exposure. 
 
Non-Deposit Dependence: Banks that rely excessively on external sources of funding, rather 
than on core deposits, to fund their financing activities may face difficulties in meeting 
liquidity requirements when the need arises (Saunders & Cornett, 2007). Moreover, short-
term market funding is relatively cheap and abundantly available under normal conditions, 
which provides banks with an incentive to fund their loans in order to inflate their balance 
sheets, for a short period of time. However, short-term market debt is considered less stable 
than long-term market funding and short-term deposits are considered more stable than 
short-term market debt (BIS, 2009). Consequently, the more banks are funded by market 
debts, the higher the potential instability of their funding sources, and the higher the degree 
of transformation risk exposure.  
Thus, we hypothesize a positive relationship between non-deposit dependence and maturity 
transformation risk. 
 
Market Power: Bank market power may influence the availability of funding (Petersen & 
Rajan, 1995) and the split of loan portfolios (Berger et al., 2005). The influence of bank market 
power on asset liquidity and funding liquidity has been studied by Nguyen et al. (2013).  They 
found a quadratic relationship between market power and banks funding liquidity. Berger and 
Bouwman (2009) have also analysed bank liquidity creation and its relationship to 
transformation risk. The authors also found that banks with greater market power may 
enhance their liquidity creation by making more loans and attracting more funds, either from 
depositors or from the wholesale market.   
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Thus, we expect a positive relationship between banks’ market power and exposure to 
transformation risk.  
 
3.3.2.2 Macroeconomic Factors 
Gross Domestic Product: Determining the impact of economic downturn, Bordo et al. (2001) 
argue that the degree of loan defaults is even higher during periods of recession. As a result, 
depositors perceive high solvency and risk triggering unexpected large deposit withdrawals. 
This leads to bank runs, causing liquidity risk and ultimately bank insolvency. Shen et al. (2009) 
came to similar conclusions. Analyzing the cyclical effect on bank liquidity preferences, 
Aspachs et al. (2005) propose that banks prioritize liquidity during periods of economic 
uncertainty when they have less opportunities to increase their lending assets. Painceira 
(2010) suggests that banks’ incentive of holding more liquid assets decreases during economic 
booms, however, banks are likely to maintain high levels of liquidity during stress conditions. 
We therefore hypothesize that the banks increase their liquidity creation and their exposure 
to transformation risk during economic booms. 
 
Inflation: In our study, inflation is also included as another macroeconomic factor effecting 
maturity transformation risk. As Vodová (2013), revealed, bank vulnerability, in terms of 
nominal values of loans issued to borrowers, increases with rate increasing inflation rates. 
This hampers banks’ liquidity creation function, as they are more likely to maintain their 
liquidity when the economy is under high inflationary pressure, thus reducing their exposure 
to maturity transformation risk.  
Based on this argument, we hypothesize an inverse relationship between inflation and risk.  
 
The extended form of equation (3.1) is conceptualized to determine the influence of the bank-
specific and macroeconomic factors (as discussed in Shen et al. (2009)) on maturity 
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transformation risk, with respect to the restrictions specific to the products and activities of 
Islamic banking. 
𝑵𝑺𝑭𝑹𝒊𝒕 = 𝜹𝟏𝑵𝑺𝑭𝑹𝒊𝒕−𝟏 + 𝝑𝟏𝑪𝑨𝑷𝒊𝒕 + 𝝑𝟐𝑳𝑹𝑳𝑨_𝑻𝑨𝒊𝒕 + 𝝑𝟑𝑹𝑳𝑨_𝑻𝑨𝒊𝒕
+ 𝝑𝟒𝑹𝑶𝑨𝑨𝒊𝒕 +  𝝑𝟓𝑳𝑳𝑹𝑻𝑳𝒊𝒕 + 𝝑𝟔𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬𝒊𝒕 + 𝝑𝟕𝑵𝑫𝑫𝒊𝒕 + 𝝀𝟏𝑴𝑷𝒊𝒕
+ 𝝁𝟏𝑮𝑫𝑷𝒋𝒕 + 𝝁𝟐𝑪𝑷𝑰𝒋𝒕 + µ𝒊 + 𝒗𝒊𝒕 
(3.6) 
 
Table 3.2 defines all of the selected variables included in equation (3.6), along with their 
expected signs. 
 
Table 3.3. Definition of Variables in Determinants of Maturity Transformation Risk Model 
(Equation 3.6) 





NSFR Net stable funding ratio is defined as the 
ratio of available amount of stable 
funding to required amount of stable 
funding 
 
    Independent Variables 
    Bank-specific 
Capitalization CAP Ratio of total regulatory capital to total 
assets.   
- 
    Less-risky 
Liquid Assets 
LRLA_TA Ratio of less risky liquid assets to total 
assets. LRLA includes cash and balances 
with central banks, government sukuk 
other short-term sovereign securities. 
+ 
    Risky Liquid 
Assets 
RLA_TA Ratio of risky liquid assets to total assets. 
RLA includes inter-bank assets and other 
trading securities. 
- 
    Profitability ROAA Ratio of net income to average total 
assets. 
- 
    Credit Risk LLRTL Ratio of loan loss reserves to total loans. + 
    Size Ln_TA Natural log of total assets - 




NDD Ratio of total short-term and long-term 
market debt to total liabilities. 
- 
 STB Ratio of short-term borrowing to 
customer deposit and total short-term 
borrowing 
- 
Market Power MP Ratio of bank assets to industry total 





GDP Annual percentage growth in GDP - 








Justification for Variable Selection in Maturity Transformation Risk and 
Bank Performance Model 
In this section, we justify the selection of both the dependent and independent variables for 
our empirical models. 
3.4.1 Performance Measures 
There is a wide range of empirical literature which uses return on assets (ROA), return on 
equity (ROE) and net interest margins (NIM) as accounting measures of bank performance 
(Abduh & Idrees, 2013; Dietrich & Wanzenried, 2011; Ommeren, 2011; Athanasoglou et al., 
2008; Kosmidou et al., 2005).  
In our study, we also use the return on average assets (ROAA) as our main measure of bank 
profitability. The ROAA is defined as the ratio of net income to average total assets expressed 
as a percentage. As an alternative profitability measure, we use the return on average equity 
(ROAE), which is the ratio of net profits to average equity, expressed as a percentage.  
The ROAA is the most commonly used performance measure in the literature, which reflects 
a bank’s ability to generate profits from its assets (Golin & Delhaise, 2013). It shows the profits 
earned per dollar of assets and indicates how effectively the bank’s management utilizes its 
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assets to generate profits. To capture changes in assets during the financial year, our study 
relies on the average assets value. The other measure of profitability is the return on average 
equity (ROAE), defined as the return to shareholders on their equity. According to Flamini, 
Schumacher, and McDonald (2009) ROA is preferred over ROE as a measure of bank 
performance, because an analysis of ROE neglects higher risks associated with higher levels 
of financial leverage and the effect of regulation on leverage. Furthermore, studies using NIM 
as the performance measure of Islamic Banks are limited in the literature (Yannikaya, Gumus 
& Pabuccu, 2018).  
Thus, we consider the ROAA as a better measure of profitability and use it as the main 
dependent variable, although we also report the results for the ROAE to check the robustness 
of our main results. 
3.4.2 Independent Variables Affecting Bank Profitability 
Previous studies have categorized factors affecting the profitability of banks into various 
internal and external determinants (Alexiou & Sofoklis, 2009; Athanasoglou et al., 2008; 
Kosmidou, 2008; Hassan & Bashir, 2003). Based on the existing literature, we included the 
following bank-specific, industry-specific and macroeconomic explanatory variables, to 
determine their effect on profitability in the Islamic banking system. 
3.4.2.1 Bank – specific  Factors 
Maturity Transformation Risk (NSFR): This study focuses on the sensitivity of Islamic banks’ 
profitability to their degree of exposure to maturity transformation risk. To address this issue, 
the net stable funding ratio, as a structural measure of maturity transformation risk, is 
included in our empirical analysis. Many previous studies have shown mixed empirical 
evidence on the effect of liquidity on bank performance. The higher proportion of available 
amount of stable funding may result in lower yields on banking assets, leading to less overall 
profit (Curak et al., 2012; Naceur & Kandil, 2009; Li, 2007). However, banks with less available 
liquid assets are mainly reliant on external funding sources which is associated with higher 
costs, consequently reducing the overall profitability of the bank (Olagunju et al., 2012; 
Goddard et al., 2011; Kosmidou, 2008; Bourke, 1989). Moreover, Bordeleau and Graham 
(2010) reveal a non-linear relationship between bank liquidity and profitability. The authors 
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assert that profitability increases with an increase in bank liquid asset holdings. However, 
there is an inverse relationship when the opportunity costs outweigh the benefits of holding 
liquid assets.  
We, therefore hypothesize that maturity transformation risk is negatively associated with the 
profitability of Islamic banks. 
 
Solvency: The ratio of equity to total asset, as a proxy of capital strength, is used in a number 
of previous empirical studies and is considered to be an important internal determinant of a 
bank’s profitability (Demirgüç-Kunt & Huizinga, 2010b; Ben Naceur & Kandil, 2009; 
Athanasoglou et al., 2008; Kosmidou, 2008). These studies have established a positive 
relationship between bank capital and profitability. Well-capitalized banks are considered 
relatively safe during periods of financial distress (Shen et al., 2009). Besides, banks’ expected 
profits may increase with an increase in capital due to lower bankruptcy costs. This ultimately 
banks’ funding costs because of less dependence on external funding sources (Li, 2007; Abreu 
& Mendes, 2001).  
Based on the above arguments supported by a large strand of previous studies, we 
hypothesize a positive relationship between bank capital (equity-asset ratio) and profitability. 
 
Income Diversity: The increasing dependence on non-traditional banking activities in the 
recent past, has amplified the need to recognize income diversity as an important 
determinant of bank profitability. It measures the extent of deviation of a bank’s activities 
from its primary role of intermediation. Following Molyneux and Yip (2013), we employed 
non-financing income scaled by gross income to measure Islamic banks’ income diversity. 
Non-financing income consists of fee and commission income, income from the sale of 
investment securities and other non-financing income. Banks with diversified activities are 
more stable (Köhler, 2013) and have lower funding costs (Deng, Elyasiani, & Mao, 2007) thus 
benefiting from their increased market share prices and lower debt costs. Moreover, 
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Molyneux and Yip (2013), also highlighted the strong positive impact of non-financing income 
on risk adjusted returns of Islamic banks, which are less involved in diversified activities.  
Hence, we assume a positive relationship between income diversity and bank profitability.   
 
Size: Bank size is generally used in the previous academic literature to account for economies 
or diseconomies of scale in the banking industry. In his seminal paper, Short (1979) noted a 
strong positive correlation between size and a bank’s capital strength, as relatively large banks 
tend to be more cost effective in raising capital and thus appear more profitable. Berger, 
Hanweck, and Humphrey (1987) and Athanasoglou et al. (2008) provide support for this 
argument. The authors highlight the cost benefits associated with large banks in growing 
economies. Similarly, in a cross-country context, Haron (1996, 2004), and Smaoui and Salah 
(2012), reveal that the profitability of Islamic banks is proportionate to their growing assets 
size. On the contrary, Kosmidou et al. (2005), Pasiouras and Kosmidou (2007) and Sufian and 
Habibullah (2009) have found evidence of diseconomies of scale for larger banks in their 
studies. Whereas, Eichengreen and Gibson (2001) found a non-linear relationship between 
size and bank profitability. They contest that   bank size has a positive effect on its profitability 
up to a certain extent. However, beyond this point, an increase in bank assets can have a 
negative effect on its profitability. This is due to lower yields associated with increased 
diversification activities or a bureaucratic management style.  
As the Islamic banking industry is relatively new and the majority of the banks are in a growing 
phase, it is expected profitability will increase as bank size increases and thus, we hypothesize 
a positive size-profitability relationship. 
 
Asset Quality: For a banking institute, loans are the primary source of revenue generation. 
However, these loans are also considered as the major source of credit risk. A higher credit 
risk reflects a bank’s poor asset quality. In other words, banks with an increased proportion 
of high risk loans have a higher propensity of loan defaults, which consequently effects their 
performance (Cooper, Jackson, & Patterson, 2003). Literature suggests that bank 
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performance is positively associated with asset quality. Following Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, et al. 
(2013), we used loan loss reserves and loan loss provisions, scaled by gross loans, as proxies 
to measure asset quality. Both measures reflect poor asset quality.  
Based on the above arguments, we hypothesize that the profitability of Islamic banks 
decreases with an increase in credit risk.  
 
Cost Efficiency: The cost to income ratio (CIR) is widely used as a major internal determinant 
of bank profitability (Djalilov & Piesse, 2016; Dietrich & Wanzenried, 2011; Athanasoglou et 
al., 2008; Kosmidou et al., 2005). This ratio is used as a measure of management’s efficiency 
in controlling costs. Moreover, it provides information on bank improvements in 
communication, information and financial technologies (Almazari, 2014). Kosmidou et al. 
(2005), among others, describe cost as the operational overheads of a bank and argue that a 
lower cost to income ratio reflects better management efficiency, which leads to increased 
profitability. Similarly, discussing developing economies, Sufian (2011), demonstrates the 
impeding effects of operational expense on bank profitability. However, Molyneux and 
Thornton (1992) found a positive relationship between staff expense and bank profitability. 
The authors reason that higher payroll expenditures resulted in more satisfied staff and 
ultimately to higher firm profits.  
Since the improved management of operational expenses will increase efficiency, which is 
associated with higher profitability, we expect a negative relationship between cost to income 
ratio and profitability of Islamic banks.  
 
3.4.2.2 Industry – specific Factors 
Market Concentration: The degree of concentration or level of competition, as an indicator 
of banking industry structure, is commonly used in recent studies to determine profitability 
(Djalilov & Piesse, 2016; Dietrich & Wanzenried, 2011, 2014; Mirzaei, Moore, & Liu, 2013; 
Athanasoglou et al., 2008). Following the literature, we take assets of the three largest banks 
scaled on the total assets of the industry (3_CONC), as a measure of market concentration. 
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According to structure conduct performance (SCP) hypothesis, banks can earn higher profits 
in a concentrated market because of monopolistic pricing and low competition levels, 
irrespective of bank efficiency. Whereas, the efficient structure (ES) hypothesis conjectures 
that market concentration, with the bank-specific attributes, such as better management 
efficiency, allows banks to increase their market share, which in turn leads to higher market 
concentration (Djalilov & Piesse, 2016). This implies that banks in a concentrated market are 
more efficient and thus more profitable.  
Based on the above arguments, we assume a positive relationship between market 
concentration and bank profitability. 
 
3.4.2.3 Macroeconomic Factors 
Economic Growth: The sensitivity of financial institution performance, with respect to cyclical 
output variations, within an economy is well established in the literature (Dietrich & 
Wanzenried, 2014; Bolt, Haan, Hoeberichts, Oordt, & Swank, 2012; Athanasoglou et al., 2008; 
Kosmidou, 2008). Gross domestic product (GDP) is commonly used as a macroeconomic 
determinant of bank profitability, which aggregates the overall economic activity of a country 
and GDP growth, is the reflection of its annual change. In their studies on profitability 
determinants in Islamic banks Bashir (2003), Wasiuzzaman and Tarmizi (2010) and Zarrouk, 
Jedidia, and Moualhi (2016) suggest a positive correlation between GDP growth and bank 
profitability. The economic upswings encourage banks to increase their lending activities, 
charge higher margins and improve their asset quality, consequently increasing their profits 
(Athanasoglou et al., 2008; Kosmidou, 2008). In contrast, loan demands are expected to 
decrease, along with an increase in the credit risk, due to deteriorated loan quality and high 
market volatility during economic downturns. This leads to a decline in bank’ profitability (Bolt 
et al., 2012).  
We, therefore hypothesize a positive relationship between economic growth and the 
profitability of Islamic banks. 
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Inflation:  The annual change in consumer price index (CPI), which is used as a proxy of 
inflation, is another important macroeconomic factor to determine bank profitability. 
Staikouras and Wood (2011) explain that inflation may affect bank profitability either directly 
(in terms of wages and other operating expenses), or indirectly (through changes in interest 
rates and asset prices). However, the effect of inflation on bank performance depends on how 
well the inflation rate is anticipated by managers (Perry, 1992). When inflation is fully 
anticipated, bank profitability increases through appropriate adjustment of their interest 
rates, which results in an increase in their revenues faster than costs. However, if inflation is 
unanticipated, it adversely effects bank profitability as banks may be slow to adjust their 
interest rates, which results in a faster increase in their costs, relative to their revenue. The 
relationship between the inflation rate and bank profitability is inconclusive, as evident from 
the previous empirical literature. Most studies have found a positive and significant 
relationship between inflation and the profitability of Islamic as well as conventional banks 
(see for example, Wasiuzzaman & Tarmizi, 2010; Athanasoglou et al., 2008; Asutay & Izhar, 
2007; Haron, 2004; Demirgüç-Kunt & Huizinga, 1999). However, Khrawish (2011) and 
Kosmidou (2008) found a negative relationship in Greece and Jordan, respectively.  In 
contrast, Saad and El-Moussawi (2012) and Naceur (2003) did not identified any significant 
relationship between inflation and net interest margin. Therefore, the relationship between 
inflation and bank profitability is considered ambiguous.   
 
The regression model (equation 3.2) is extended in equation 3.7, to reflect the explanatory 
variables, as discussed in the most studies on Islamic banking performance (see for example, 
Alharbi, 2017; Abduh & Idrees, 2013; Hassan & Bashir, 2003). The selected variables are 
included in equation 3.2 to estimate the effect of maturity transformation risk on Islamic 
banks’ performance, while controlling for other internal and external variables. 
𝑷𝒊𝒕 = 𝝏𝟏𝑷𝒊𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜹𝟏𝑵𝑺𝑭𝑹𝒊𝒕 + 𝝑𝟏𝑪𝑨𝑹𝒊𝒕 + 𝝑𝟐𝑵𝑰𝑰𝒊𝒕 + 𝝑𝟑𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬𝒊𝒕 + 𝝑𝟒𝑳𝑳𝑹𝑻𝑳𝒊𝒕




Table 3.3 defines all of the selected variables included in equation 3.7, along with their 
expected signs. 
 
Table 3.4. Definition of Variables in Maturity Transformation Risk and Bank Profitability 
Model (Equation 3.7) 




ROAA Ratio of net income to average total 
assets. 
 
    Return on 
Average Equity 
ROAE Ratio of net income to average total 
equity. 
 
    Independent Variables 




NSFR Net stable funding ratio is defined as the 
ratio of available amount of stable 
funding to required amount of stable 
funding 
- 
    Solvency CAP Ratio of total regulatory capital to total 
assets.   
+ 
    Income 
Diversity 
NII_TA Non-interest income scaled to total assets + 
    SIZE ln_TA Natural log of total assets + 
    Asset Quality LLR_TA Ratio of loan loss reserves to total loans. - 
    Cost Efficiency CIR Cost to income ratio - 
    Industry-Specific 
Market 
Concentration 
3_CONC Ratio of assets of a country’s three largest 
banks to total banking industry assets 
+ 
    Macroeconomic 
Economic 
Growth 
GDP Annual percentage growth in GDP + 
    Inflation CPI Year-on-year change in consumer price 
index 
? 





Justification for Variable Selection in Maturity Transformation Risk and 
Bank Stability Model 
This section justifies the dependent variable, which function as a proxy for bank stability, as 
well as the various bank-specific, industry-specific and macroeconomic variables as 
determinants of bank stability. Further, this section hypothesizes the relationship between 
the selected explanatory variables and bank stability, with the expected signs. 
3.5.1 Measure of Bank Stability 
Bank stability is often measured as the distance from default. According to Boyd and Runkle 
(1993), Hannan and Hanweck (1988) and Boyd and Graham (1986), firm insolvency occurs 
when losses exceed capital. Subsequently, the probability of insolvency is defined as the 
probability that losses  exceed equity , which can be expressed as follows: 
 (3.8) 
 
where  is the return on average assets and  is the capital share in assets.  




The Z-score, which is widely accepted in recent banking literature as a measure of the safety 
and soundness of both Islamic and conventional financial institutions (Köhler, 2015; Beck, 
Demirgüç-Kunt, et al., 2013; Čihák & Hesse, 2010; Rahman, 2010), is an inverse proxy for the 
bank’s probability of default. It is the only account-based risk measure that combines 
profitability, leverage and volatility. The Z-score is calculated based on the formula given by 
Lepetit and Strobel (2013) as follows: 
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𝒁 =  
𝒄𝒂𝒓 +  𝝁(𝒓𝒐𝒂𝒂)
𝝈(𝒓𝒐𝒂𝒂)
 (3.10) 
where 𝑐𝑎𝑟 is the capital to asset ratio, 𝜇(𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑎) is the expected of return on assets and 𝜎(𝑟𝑜𝑎𝑎) 
is the volatility in returm on assets for each bank. The mean of return on assets and volatility 
in return on assets are computed over the full sample period and are combined with the 
current value of capital. The resulting Z-score measures the distance of the likely occurrence 
of a bank default event, in terms of standard deviations of return on assets, which suggests 
that a higher Z-score reflects higher bank stability. A higher Z-score can be attained through 
an increase in profitability, an increase in equity and stable returns that will result in a more 
stable bank with a decreased overall risk. Some of the previous studies apply Z-score to 
capture the overall financial stability (Lee & Hsieh, 2014), whereas others use this to measure 
the probability of individual banks defaulting (Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, et al., 2013; Čihák & 
Hesse, 2010; Laeven & Levine, 2009). Since the Z-score’s distribution is highly skewed, we 
follow Schaeck and Cihák (2014) and Laeven and Levine’s(2009) recommendations to use log 
transformed Z-scores (ln_Zscore) as a measure of bank stability in our study, in order to avoid 
of the effect of extreme values. 
3.5.2 Explanatory Variables 
Prior empirical studies on the soundness of the Islamic banking sector have classified stability 
determinants into broad categories of financial, structural and macroeconomic variables 
(Ashraf et al., 2016; Abedifar, Molyneux, & Tarazi, 2013; Beck et al., 2013; Čihák & Hesse, 
2010). Following the previous literature, we specify a set of bank-specific, industry-specific 
and macroeconomic variables to assess their potential impact on the stability of Islamic banks, 
as follows. 
3.5.2.1  Bank – specific Factors 
Maturity Transformation Risk: We are interested in determining the impact of contemporary 
liquidity regulations on the stability of Islamic banks, as the importance of the banks’ role in 
liquidity and maturity transformation has emerged during the recent 2018 global financial 
crisis (Acharya & Mora, 2015; Berger & Bouwman, 2009). To fulfil this objective, we 
introduced the NSFR variable into our bank stability model. The NSFR is a micro prudential 
structural measure which reflects the long-term funding stability of banks. The higher NSFR 
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ratio is achieved when available stable funds are more than the required stable funds, which 
implies that banks are able to meet their liquidity obligations when the need arises. 
Conversely, if the required amount of stable funding exceeds the available funding, this may 
expose banks to maturity transformation risk (or a mismatch in the maturities of assets and 
liabilities). This mismatch may cause customer panic or lead to a run on banks (see for 
example, Diamond and Dybvig, 1983). Thus, we use the NSFR to account for the classic ‘bank-
run’ risk.  
Based on the above arguments, we hypothesize that inclusion of NSFR as a regulatory 
requirement is positively associated with the overall financial soundness of Islamic banks. 
  
Bank Capital: A wide range of theoretical literature has argued the salutary effect of capital 
on bank survival probability (Acharya, Mehran, & Thakor, 2016; Allen, Carletti, & Marquez, 
2011; Mehran & Thakor, 2011; Holmstrom & Tirole, 1997). Accordingly, these models suggest 
that an increase in equity provides banks with incentive to monitor their borrower 
relationships. Moreover, it also attenuates investments in more risky assets, thereby lowering 
the credit risk and subsequently the risk of default. This implies that higher capital improves 
the likely probability of bank stability. On the contrary, while advocating the risk-absorption 
hypothesis, Bhattacharya and Thakor (1993) and Coval and Thakor (2005), have argued that 
since capital provides a cushion to absorb losses, increasing equity shares may be 
counterproductive under certain conditions; it perversely increase the degree of bank risk 
exposure. Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, et al. (2013) also support the argument that capital increases 
the bank’s survival probability.  They found that Islamic banks with higher equity are more 
competitive and thus tend to be more stable.  
We, therefore hypothesize a positive relationship between capital and Islamic banks’ stability.   
 
Efficiency: We utilized cost to income ratio to control for operational efficiency in our bank 
stability model. It is a measure which explains the management quality in terms of controlling 
operational overheads. In support of Berger and DeYoung (1997) and Kwan and Eisenbeis 
 66 
(1997), Chiaramonte, Poli, and Oriani (2015) suggest that inefficient banks are more prone to 
higher risks, as cost inefficiency induces the moral hazard problem, since poorly run banks 
tend to invest in more risky assets in order to improve their profitability. Abedifar et al. (2013) 
and Čihák and Hesse (2010) contested that cost inefficiency has an adverse effect on the 
solvency of Islamic banks. In their comparative study on Islamic and conventional banks, Beck, 
Demirgüç-Kunt, et al. (2013) concluded that Islamic banks generally possess lower cost 
efficiency and are less stable than conventional banks.  
Accordingly, higher cost inefficiency is expected to be negatively associated with the financial 
stability of Islamic banks.  
 
Income Diversification: We also include the ratio of non-interest income to total assets to 
control for the income diversification effect in Islamic banking stability. According to Abedifar 
et al. (2013), this ratio reflects the deviation of management focus of income generation from 
loan activities towards sources of non-traditional banking activities. The impact of income 
diversification on bank stability has produced mixed results. Abedifar et al. (2013) and Čihák 
and Hesse (2010) found that increasing reliance on non-traditional banking activities 
significantly reduce the stability of Islamic banks. Likewise, Chiaramonte et al. (2015) Lepetit 
et al. (2008) and Mercieca, Schaeck, and Wolfe (2007) also reveal that the probability of bank 
default risk increases with an increase in shares of non-interest income. On the contrary, 
Köhler (2013, 2015) shows that the stability of retail-oriented banks benefit from income 
diversity. Similarly, Ashraf et al. (2016) also found that the risk of default in Islamic banks is 
significantly reduced by increasing shares of non-interest income. Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Huizinga (2010b) concluded a non-linear relationship between diversification and insolvency 
risk, with some gains at low level of income diversity. Moreover, DeYoung and Torna (2013), 
contested that the effect of diversification on bank stability varies, from the choice of non-
traditional income sources. They explained that pure fee-based income can decrease the 
probability of bank default, whereas income generated form asset securitization, investment 
in venture capital and other risky non-traditional banking activities are more volatile, and thus 
have an adverse effect on bank stability.  
 67 
Since Islamic banking is still in its infancy stage, we assume that they rely mainly on traditional 
banking activities for revenue generation and are not involved in risky investments, therefore, 
we hypothesize that income diversification will have a positive impact on their stability.  
 
Asset Quality: Another important explanatory variable included in our model is asset quality, 
which determines a bank’s financial soundness. Conventionally, banks are involved in 
financing activities and loans are the main constituents of a bank’s assets portfolio. However, 
loans are also considered to be the most risky assets, since an increase in loans also exposes 
banks to the risk of borrowers’ default (Demirgüç-Kunt & Detragiache, 1998). This leads to an 
increase in overall bank risk and subsequently, destabilizes the banking system.  Trad et al. 
(2017) also show that better asset quality positively contributes to the stability of Islamic 
banks. Following Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, et al. (2013), we employ the ratio of loan loss reserves 
to total assets and loan loss provisions to total assets, to examine the effect of asset quality 
on bank stability. According to Abedifar et al. (2013) loan loss reserve denotes the 
management’s assessment of the overall loan portfolio quality, and the loan loss provision is 
the cost incurred by the bank after adjusting the loan loss reserve or a loan default. Both 
measures correspond to low asset quality; i.e., higher ratios imply increased risk of loan 
default, which leads to overall financial instability.  
We, therefore hypothesize that better asset quality is positively associated with increased 
bank stability.  
 
Size: To account for the possible effect of scale (in)efficiencies on solvency, we have included 
the logarithmic transformation of total assets (ln_TA) as a proxy of bank size, in our stability 
model. Smirlock’s (1985) earlier model explains the stability gains of larger banks through 
higher degrees of product and loan diversification. Consistently, De Haan and Poghosyan 
(2012) found that size is positively linked with bank stability, as larger banks show a decline 
in earnings volatility. Moreover, Triki, Kouki, Dhaou, and Calice (2017) also find evidence of a 
positive impact of size on bank solvency. According to Mesa, Sánchez, and Sobrino (2014), an 
increase in bank size results in higher efficiency gains, which ultimately leads to increased 
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bank stability. On the contrary, Bhagat, Bolton, and Lu (2015) argue that large banks may find 
incentives to take excessive risk when they perceive themselves to be “too big to fail.” This 
implies that an increase in size leads to an increase in a bank’s overall risk, which consequently 
increases the probability of bank default. While determining the stability of Islamic banks, 
Čihák and Hesse (2010) found that small Islamic banks are more stable, as compared to larger 
Islamic banks. They identified credit risk management as the key challenge for Islamic banks 
when they expand. In contrast, Trad et al.’s (2017) recent study found evidence of bank capital 
and size as key determining factors of increased profitability and stability of Islamic banks. 
Similarly, Ibrahim and Rizvi (2017) also found evident to support larger Islamic banks in terms 
of the size – stability relationship.  
Therefore, we assume that the stability of Islamic banks increase with an increase in their size. 
 
3.5.2.2 Industry – specific Factors 
Concentration ratio: We include 3_CONC in our stability model to measure banking sector 
concentration. This ratio is calculated as the sum of assets of the three largest banks scaled 
by the industry’s total assets. We employed this ratio to capture the effect of cross-country 
variation in financial stability caused by differences in market concentration. The effect of 
market concentration on stability cannot be determined a priori. Both the economic theory 
and empirical literature remain inconclusive on the concentration – fragility/stability 
relationship. According to the “concentration – stability” framework, banks with greater 
market power can reduce the financial fragility in a concentrated market through increased 
profitability and higher “capital buffers,” which allow them to absorb macroeconomic and 
liquidity shocks (Boyd, De Nicoló, & Smith, 2003).   Berger, Klapper, and Turk-Ariss (2010) and 
Schaeck and Cihak’s (2012) studies provide support for this argument. Moreover, larger banks 
are more inclined towards “credit rationing,” which enable them to maintain a higher quality 
set of assets, thus leading to greater financial stability (Boot & Thakor, 2000). Similarly, Allen 
and Gale (2004) argued that it is easier to monitor a few large banks in a market. This results 
in more efficient supervision and therefore declining risks of overall financial contagion. In 
support of the concentration – stability hypothesis, Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2006) 
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and Schaeck, Cihak, and Wolfe (2009) provide strong empirical evidence that financial crisis 
is less likely to occur in a more concentrated financial system. In contrast, the “concentration–
fragility” hypothesis assumes that the implicit government protection induces the moral 
hazard problem in banks with greater market power, when they consider themselves to be 
“too big to fail,” and invest in more risky investments which leads to a higher probability of 
bank insolvency (Mishkin, 1999). Moreover, the higher interest rate charged by monopolistic 
banks coerce borrowers to invest in risky investments, which may increase the likelihood of 
loan defaults, thus adversely affecting bank stability (Boyd & De Nicolo, 2005). Fu, Lin, and 
Molyneux (2014) reveal the repercussions of greater market concentration. They argue that 
it results reduced charter value and increased bank risk exposure, and that there is a higher 
probability of financial insolvency. While comparing both Islamic and conventional banking 
systems in Middle Eastern countries, Mirzaei (2011) also concluded that high market 
concentration is negatively associated with the financial stability of Islamic banks.   
3.5.2.3 Macroeconomic Factors 
Economic Freedom: Among the macroeconomic determinants of financial stability, economic 
freedom has recently gained the attention of researchers (see for example, Asteriou, Pilbeam, 
& Tomuleasa, 2016; Moghadam, 2013; Sufian & Habibullah, 2014, 2010). According to 
Asteriou et al. (2016), economic freedom can positively influence banking performance in 
terms of both profitability and stability, through encouraging lending and greater 
diversification. In this way, banks can attain a better risk-return frontier, which leads to 
increased efficiency and hence stability. They further argue that greater economic freedom 
provides a better business environment, which in turn leads to higher economic growth. 
Moreover, Miller, Holmes, and Feulner (2013) found a positive association between economic 
freedom and a higher level of real per capita income, which suggests an increased demand 
for banking services in those countries. While explaining the economic freedom – stability 
relationship, Sufian and Habibullah (2010) contested that the overall financial efficiency of 
Malaysian banks improves with more economic freedom. Baier, Clance, and Dwyer (2012) 
also revealed a decline in the probability of financial crises with increased levels of economic 
freedom. Following the previous studies (Asteriou et al., 2016; Sufian & Habibullah, 2010, 
2014), we utilized the index of overall economic freedom (Eco_F) from the Heritage 
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Foundation in our stability model.9 This index ranges from 0 to 100 (with 100 being the highest 
freedom value). It is composed of ten freedom indices which are equally weighted. We have 
also included the four freedom indices; business freedom (Bus_F), monetary freedom 
(Mon_F), financial freedom (Fin_F) and freedom from corruption (Cor_F), to gain further 
insight into the impact of the freedom index on the stability of Islamic banks (adopted from 
Sufian and Habibullah (2014)). We assume that economic freedom is positively associated 
with the financial soundness of Islamic banks. 
 
Economic Growth: To capture the impact of the state of an economy on its financial 
institutions’ operations, we have also considered the economic growth variable as a key 
macroeconomic determinant of financial stability. The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth 
rate is commonly used in banking literature as a proxy for economic growth (see for example, 
Köhler, 2015; Diaconu & Oanea, 2014; Bourkhis & Nabi, 2013; Sufian & Habibullah, 2012; 
Čihák & Hesse, 2010). It represents movements in the business cycle in a country or the 
fluctuations in overall economic activity, which are both likely to affect the performance of 
its financial system. In their study on Chinese banking sector, Sufian and Habibullah (2012) 
argued that the asset quality deteriorates and credit risk is likely to increase during economic 
downswings. These result in increased bank risks and thus to financial insolvency. Similarly, 
Köhler (2015) found strong empirical evidence of the positive influence of GDP growth rate 
and GDP per capita on bank stability. Diaconu and Oanea (2014) provide support for the 
argument that banks enjoy greater stability during economic upswings. Whereas, Karim, Al-
Habshi, and Abduh (2016), Bourkhis and Nabi (2013), and Čihák and Hesse (2010) were unable 
to find any relationship between economic growth and the stability of Islamic banks. Since, 
during periods of economic growth banks are encouraged to increase their lending activities, 
they can charge even higher interest rates and are able to increase their asset quality (Sufian 
& Habibullah, 2012). Thus, we assume a positive influence between the GDP growth rate and 
the stability of Islamic banks. 
                                                          




Inflation: We have also included yearly change in consumer price index (CPI) as a measure of 
inflation in our stability model to control for omitted variable bias. It reflects the price 
volatility in an economy. Some of the previous studies suggest that price stability is a 
prerequisite for the financial soundness of the banking system and that price and financial 
stability reinforce each other in the long run (Bordo, 2009; Bordo & Wheelock, 1998; 
Schwartz, 1995). Calomiris and Gorton (1991) found that the likelihood of financial crisis 
increases significantly because of high inflationary pressures during recessions. Accordingly, 
banks are inclined to charge higher interest rates during times of increased price volatility, 
consequently increasing their insolvency risk (Akram & Eitrheim, 2008). Moreover, Hardy and 
Pazarbaşioğlu (1999) and Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998) explain that countries with 
high levels of inflation are more prone to financial crises. On the contrary, Leijonhufvud 
(2007), White (2006) and Rhaguram (2005), have argued that the stable monetary policy can 
trigger financial crisis, as price stability can encourage economic agents to take greater risks 
in search of high returns. Besides, Boyd, Levine, and Smith (2001) found a non-linear negative 
stability – inflation relationship. Furthermore, Karim et al. (2016), Bourkhis and Nabi (2013), 
and Čihák and Hesse (2010) were all unable to determine the impact of inflation on the 
stability of Islamic banks. Based on the above arguments, we hypothesize that stable inflation 
at lower levels can increase financial distress for Islamic banks.  
The extended form of equation (3.3) estimates the effect of maturity transformation risk on 
the stability of Islamic banks, while controlling for other bank specific, industry specific and 
macroeconomic factors is given as follow: 
 
𝒁𝒊𝒕 = 𝜸𝟏𝒁𝒊𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜹𝟏𝑵𝑺𝑭𝑹𝒊𝒕 + 𝝑𝟏𝑪𝑨𝑹𝒊𝒕 + 𝝑𝟐𝑪𝑰𝑹𝒊𝒕 + 𝝑𝟑𝑵𝑰𝑰𝒊𝒕 + 𝝑𝟒𝑳𝑳𝑹𝑳𝒊𝒕






Table 3.5. Definition of Variables in Maturity Transformation Risk and Bank Stability 
Model (Equation 3.11) 
Category Variables Description/ Calculation Exp. Sign 
Dependent Variable 
Stability Z_score Natural log of sum of equity ratio and 
return on average assets scaled by 
standard deviation of return on average 
assets.  
𝑍 =  ln (





    Independent Variables 




NSFR Net stable funding ratio is defined as the 
ratio of available amount of stable 
funding to required amount of stable 
funding 
- 
    Bank Capital CAP Ratio of total regulatory capital to total 
assets.   
+ 
    Cost Efficiency CIR Cost to income ratio - 
    Income 
Diversification 
NII_TA Non-interest income scaled to total assets + 
    Asset Quality LLR_TA Ratio of loan loss reserves to total loans. - 
    SIZE ln_TA Natural log of total assets + 
    Industry-Specific 
Market 
Concentration 
3_CONC Sum of assets of three largest banks 
scaled by total assets of the industry 
? 
    Macroeconomic 
Economic 
Freedom 
Eco_F Index of economic freedom + 
    Economic 
Growth 
GDP Annual percentage growth in GDP + 
    Inflation CPI Year-on-year change in consumer price 
index 
- 
Source: Author’s calculations, Bloomberg (2006 – 2015), banks’ annual reports, World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators, The Heritage Foundation (2016). 
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3.6 Selection of Estimation Technique 
To incorporate the temporal effects of the dependent variables, this study applies the 
dynamic panel data model, which uses a one period lag of the dependent variables as 
explanatory variables. The introduction of these lags is crucial to control for the dynamics of 
the process.  
Consider the following general equation for dynamic panel data model 
𝒚𝒊𝒕 = 𝜸𝒚𝒊𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜷𝑿𝒊𝒕 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕,     where  𝜺𝒊𝒕 =  𝒂𝒊 + 𝝂𝒊𝒕 (3.12) 
 
𝑖 =  1, … . , 𝑁 (cross-sectional observations), 𝑡 =  1, … . , 𝑇 (time periods), 𝑋𝑖𝑡 are the 
regressors, 𝑎𝑖 is fixed individual effects and 𝜈𝑖𝑡 has zero mean, constant variance and is 
uncorrelated across time and individual. 
The empirical estimation of equation (3.12) by pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) disregards 
the panel structure of data and often results in upward-biased 𝛾 estimate of the lagged 
dependent variable 𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 in the presence of unobserved fixed effects 𝛼𝑖 (Bond, 2002). 
Moreover, the characteristics of the above specified models and proposed variables in 
equations (3.1, 3.2 and 3.3) potentially violate the classical assumptions underlying the OLS 
estimator in several aspects. First, among other assumptions of OLS, to yield unbiased, 
consistent and efficient estimates, data should be normally distributed with unknown mean 
and variance (Greene, 2003). However, Al-Jafari and Alchami (2014) note that distribution of 
financial data is generally skewed with large outliers, which violates this OLS assumption. 
Hence, using OLS to estimate parameters in a dynamic specification often yields inconsistent, 
biased and/or inefficient estimates. Another fundamental assumption of the OLS estimator is 
that all of the explanatory variables must be uncorrelated with the disturbance term and that 
the disturbances are homoscedastic and not correlated with the regressors. However, in the 
dynamic model specification, the explanatory variable 𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 is correlated with the residual 𝛼𝑖 
since 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is a function of 𝛼𝑖, which renders Generalized Least Squares (GLS) and OLS estimators 
biased and inconsistent. Similarly, Within Group (WG) estimators are also biased and 
inconsistent, as in the transformed model, while using variable differenced from mean [𝑦𝑖𝑡 −
?̅?𝑖 = 𝛾(𝑦𝑖𝑡−1 − ?̅?𝑖) + 𝛽(𝑥𝑖𝑡 − ?̅?𝑖) + (𝜈𝑖𝑡 − ?̅?𝑖)], the explanatory variable will become 
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endogenous i.e., ?̅?𝑖 is correlated with ?̅?𝑖 (Bond, 2002). In his seminal paper, Bond (2002) has 
suggested that the standard approach to overcome the issue of serial correlation or 
endogeneity is to estimate the equation through instrumental variables (IVs) regression. As 
he explains, these IVs are a set of variables that are correlated with other explanatory 
variables and are uncorrelated with the disturbance term.  
There are various instrument variables estimation techniques one can use eliminate the 
correlation among the regressors and the residuals, including two-stage least squares (2SLS), 
maximum likelihood estimation, and the generalized method of moments (GMM).  
The GMM estimator, also known as moment-estimators, are defined by minimizing some 
criterion function (Al-Jafari & Alchami, 2014). It is a robust estimation technique that does not 
necessarily involve information regarding the distribution of the residuals. The underlying 
assumption of GMM estimation is that there is no correlation among the disturbances and 
the instrument variables introduced in the model. Furthermore, the assumption of normality 
is relaxed in GMM, thus it can provide consistent estimates even in the presence of potential 
non-normal distribution of variables (Greene, 2003). The GMM estimator selects parameter 
estimates so that the correlations between instruments and disturbances are as close to zero 
as possible i.e., 𝐸 [𝜖𝑡. 𝑍𝑡] = 0, where 𝑍𝑡 = [1𝜎𝑖,𝑡−1]. Moreover, the GMM estimator can be 
robust to serial correlation and the heteroscedasticity of the unknown form, via selecting the 
appropriate weighting matrix in the criterion function (Greene, 2003).  
 The two most commonly applied GMM techniques are the Difference GMM estimator (Diff-
GMM) as specified in Arellano and Bond (1991) and the System GMM estimator (Sys-GMM) 
as explained in Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998). Roodman (2009b) 
explains that Diff-GMM estimation begins with the transformation of all the variables in the 
model through first-differencing to remove the unobserved fixed effects "𝛼𝑖" in the 
disturbance term. Further, Arellano and Bond (1991) propose a test for the hypothesis that 
there is no second-order serial correlation for the disturbances of the first-differenced 
equation. This test is important because the consistency of the GMM estimator relies upon 
the fact that 𝐸 [∆𝑣𝑖𝑡 ∆𝑣𝑖𝑡−2 ] = 0. The first-differenced equation is then estimated by using 
lags of potentially predetermined and endogenous explanatory variables. These lags are used 
as instrumental variables in the transformed equation. Hence, the Diff-GMM technique 
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overcomes the potential problem of endogeneity and autocorrelation by using lagged values 
of the independent variables as instruments. It also eliminates the unobserved heterogeneity 
in the error term (Ommeren, 2011).  
However, Roodman (2009b) reports finite sample bias in Diff-GMM estimation, as first-
differenced transformation magnifies variances in unbalanced panels. In addition, the 
coefficients estimated through Diff-GMM are rather weak when the lagged and current values 
of the potential endogenous variables are slightly correlated. In contrast, the Sys-GMM, as 
proposed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998), uses instruments in 
levels, in addition to instruments in first-difference. It also has no singularities, and exhibits 
much smaller variances. Instead of differencing, this estimation technique instruments lagged 
dependent variable and any other potentially endogenous variables among the regressors 
with variables presumed uncorrelated with the fixed effects (Roodman, 2009b).  
Based on the previous literature, we summarized the main advantages of Sys-GMM over Diff-
GMM in the following points:  
a) Baum (2006) and Roodman (2009a) contend that the Sys-GMM estimator is more 
efficient than Diff-GMM in variables that are “random walk,” or close to be random-
walk variables. Since the models used in our study include macroeconomic variables, 
which are known in economics for the presence of random walk statistical generating 
mechanisms, the Sys-GMM approach seems to be the best choice.   
b) The Sys-GMM approach has a distinct advantage over Diff-GMM because it produces 
more efficient and precise estimates by improving precision and reducing the finite 
sample bias (Baltagi, 2008).   
c) For an unbalanced panel data analysis, it is better to avoid Diff-GMM estimation, 
which tends to magnify variances over a significant range of parameter values 
(Roodman, 2009a).  
 
Roodman (2009b) explains the validity and consistency of the model based on several choices 
within the System GMM estimator. One of these choices is the selection of either a one-step 
GMM or two-step GMM estimation procedure. The one-step estimator assumes the 
disturbance term to be independent and homoscedastic over time and cross-sections, while 
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these assumptions are relaxed in two-step estimation.  Additionally, the standard variance-
covariance matrix is robust to autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity (Arellano & Bover, 
1995). In the second-step, the residuals of the first-step are used to construct the standard 
variance-covariance matrix. Monte Carlo simulations show that the two-step technique 
slightly increases the precision of the estimates, while making the standard errors to be 
severely downward biased, more common in small and finite samples (Baltagi, 2008). 
However, using the Windmeijer correction will result in robust two-step standard deviations 
(Windmeijer, 2005). Hence, our study follows a two-step procedure. 
In conclusion, we utilize the two-step system GMM technique for dynamic panel specification, 
to overcome the issues of heteroscedasticity, potential endogeneity and autocorrelation 
between error component and the regressors (Roodman, 2009b). Originally, system GMM 
method was developed to improve the behaviour of difference GMM estimators when the 
autoregressive parameter ′𝛾′ approaches unity, in which case, lagged levels of the dependent 
variable are weak instruments. Moreover, for robust standard errors, our study adopted 
Windmeijer correction. The GMM technique is preferred over OLS as it is more appropriate 
for large cross sections and small time periods. In addition, it does not require the data to 
follow the normality assumptions. 
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Chapter 4 
Empirical Results and Discussion 
Introduction 
This chapter discusses the empirical estimation of the three dynamic panel data models. 
Section 4.2 discusses the descriptive statistics of the dependent and explanatory variables 
used in our regression models. Preliminary diagnostic tests for the regression models are 
discussed in Section 4.3. Section 4.4 presents the empirical results of the dynamic panel data 
analysis of “determinants of maturity transformation risk” model, followed by robustness 
checks and post estimation specification tests to validate the System GMM results. The 
empirical estimation of “maturity transformation risk and banks’ profitability” model and 
“maturity transformation risk and banks’ stability” model are presented in sections 4.5 and 
4.6, respectively. Robustness checks are also conducted for each of these regression models, 
along with post estimation diagnostic tests, in order to validate our estimation results.  
Initial Data Analysis – Descriptive Statistics 
The main objectives of our study are to determine the factors influencing the maturity 
transformation risk in the Islamic banking sector, as well as the impact of maturity 
transformation risk on profitability and the stability of Islamic banks. Table 4.1 reports the 
summary statistics of the dependent and independent variables used in the regression 
models to address the research objectives.  
4.2.1 Dependent Variables 
Among the dependent variables used in our models, NSFR, with a mean value of 1.45, reveals 
that on average, Islamic banks maintained a minimum liquidity requirement under the new 
IFSB regulations (i.e. > 1) during the sample period (see Table 4.1). Besides, a minimum value 
of 0.81 shows that there are few banks which still need some balance sheet adjustments to 
meet these new regulatory requirements. FGR is also used as an alternative measure of 
maturity transformation risk in our analysis. The mean value of FGR is -22.45%, which shows 
the conservative financing approach of Islamic banks during the sample period. On average, 
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Islamic banks exhibit lower levels of liquidity creation with a higher dispersion of 29.07% and 
a minimum and maximum value of -114.85% and 55.28%, respectively (see Table 4.1).  
ROAA, which is used as the main dependant variable in our “Maturity Transformation risk and 
Banks’ Performance” model (equation 3.7), exhibits a mean value of 1.13% in our sample of 
Islamic banks, with a standard deviation of 2.15% and a minimum and maximum value of -
9.79%, and a maximum of 13.21%, respectively. The average ROAA value shows that Islamic 
banks remain profitable during the sample period, however, the large gap between the 
minimum and maximum values for ROAA also reveals that there is a large difference in 
profitability among these banks. The mean value of alternative profitability measure (ROAE) 
is 8.56%, and also shows a large dispersion of 19.64%, that ranges from the highest value of 
58.72% to the lowest of -173.51%, during the study period (see Table 4.1). 
Natural log of Z-score (ln_Zscore) is employed as the stability measure in our “maturity 
transformation risk and bank’s stability” model (equation 3.11). Table 4.1 shows the mean 
ln_Z-score of 2.77 with a dispersion of 0.99 and a minimum and maximum values of -2.98 and 
6.26, respectively. This indicates that the Islamic banks are, on average, closed to the 
probability of default, based on the standard deviation of return on assets, during the study 
period. Moreover, the minimum value of -2.98 shows the instability of some Islamic banks 
during the sample period.    
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Table 4.1 Summary Statistics of Dependant and Independent Variables.  
Categories Models Variables MEAN MEDIAN SD MAX MIN SKEWNESS KURTOSIS 
Dependent 
Variables 
“Determinants of Maturity 
Transformation Risk” Model 
NSFRit 1.4496 1.2718 0.4863 3.8674 0.8086 2.4069 9.46 
FGRit -22.4532 -13.6514 29.0672 55.2819 -114.857 -0.8679 3.0693 
“Maturity Transformation Risk 
and Banks’ Profitability” Model 
ROAAit 1.1255 1.0644 2.1472 13.2118 -9.7998 -0.0922 11.2122 
ROAEit 8.5615 11.0308 19.6388 58.72 -173.51 -4.7069 36.5889 
“Maturity Transformation Risk 
and Banks’ Stability” Model 




 CAPit 14.0083 11.2299 10.219 93.1355 3.2792 3.3433 19.3034 
 LRLATAit 8.5838 7.4002 6.4508 43.7711 0.1197 1.4546 6.1326 
 RLATAit 24.3065 22.1672 15.8128 76.9604 0 0.7277 3.2575 
 LLRTLit 3.8312 2.1689 6.2964 57.7954 0 4.5469 29.0046 
 ln_TAit 8.4594 8.5803 1.4276 11.8041 2.8418 -0.3908 3.3828 
 NDDit 13.2318 9.5413 14.9273 85.6817 0 2.3507 10.6181 
 STBit 11.0906 4.7877 15.2652 90.6189 0 2.4891 10.8749 
 NONII_TAit 1.2434 1.0301 1.6649 13.6373 -4.405 2.2349 16.0948 




 MPit 4.946 2.4 6.3993 36.8 0.01 2.3556 8.3175 




 ECO_Fjt 63.028 62.95 7.2077 77.7 44.2 0.0202 2.1645 
 CORR_Fjt 42.7459 44 14.5892 77 20 0.199 2.0982 
 BUSS_Fjt 67.7216 68.6 9.9248 93.5 39.8 -0.2775 3.2373 
 MON_Fjt 73.2171 72.65 6.1555 90.8 58.4 0.1908 2.4852 
 FIN_Fjt 49.0598 50 16.3988 90 20 0.6497 3.5691 
 GDPjt 4.9589 4.9688 3.778 26.1703 -7.0761 1.0939 10.1012 
 INFjt 5.3207 4.4964 3.9573 20.2861 -4.8633 0.9313 4.3814 
Source: Author’s calculations using Stata (v 14.0) software.  
All variables are defined in Tables 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4.
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4.2.2 Explanatory Variables 
Among the explanatory variables, the average CAP value of 14.01% indicates that Islamic 
banks are well capitalized. However, the high standard deviation value of 10.22% and a 
minimum value of 3.28% in particular, shows excessive reliance of some Islamic banks on 
more unstable sources of funding. Regarding the composition of liquid assets, Table 4.1 shows 
that, on average, Islamic banks hold fewer shares of LRLA in total assets (8.58%) than RLA 
(24.31%). The results reveal that during the sample period, Islamic banks held on average 
24.31% of their assets in trading securities and other long-term investments, which are 
relatively difficult to be collateralized or converted into cash compared to investment in short-
term government securities. The motivation behind this may be the higher returns associated 
with these assets while still maintaining enough liquidity to meet obligations when due.   
The credit risk, measured as loan loss reserves of the sample banks, is 3.83% of total loans on 
average, with a minimum and maximum value of 0% and 57.79% respectively. The results 
show a high variation (6.29%) in these banks during the study period. The mean value of bank 
size (ln_TA) is 8.46 represents a small dispersion in data with a standard deviation of 1.43% 
and minimum and maximum values of 2.84 and 11.80, respectively (see Table 4.1). A low 
average value of NDD (13.23%) suggests that Islamic banks rely more on core deposits than 
on external funding sources during the study period. However, the high variation of 14.92% 
and minimum and maximum values of 0% and 85.68% respectively, suggests that some 
Islamic banks are more inclined towards market funding sources to fund their assets or to 
fulfil liquidity obligations. As an alternative, the measure of external funding sources, STB also 
exhibit a low mean value of 11.09% with a high dispersion of 15.26% and minimum and 
maximum values of 0% and 90.61%, respectively.  
Table (4.1) shows the average share of the non-interest income is 1.24% of total assets of the 
banks during the sample period, with a standard deviation of 1.66%. It varies from -4.40% to 
a maximum of 13.64%. This low share of non-interest income shows that Islamic banks 
generate income from traditional banking activities. Besides, the high average value of EFF 
(55.34%) suggests that the sample Islamic banks are not managing their overhead costs 
efficiently to generate revenue during the study period.  
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Moving on to the industry specific variables, the mean value of MP is 5.11%. This reveals that 
the share of total assets of an Islamic bank in a country is quite low. One possible explanation 
could be the infancy stage of Islamic banking in many of the sample countries and that the 
Islamic banks are relatively young in comparison to their conventional counterparts. Another 
reason could be due to the presence of a large number of banks. The sample banks are from 
emerging and developing countries (whose capital markets are undeveloped) and they are 
the main source of financing. Moreover, the high mean value of 3_CONC (62.06%) also shows 
that the banking industry in the sample countries are more concentrated, with fewer large 
banks holding a maximum market share in these economies.  
The macroeconomic indicators record an average yearly economic growth (GDP) of 4.95% 
during the sample period and an average annual increase in consumer price index (INF) of 
5.32%. The mean score of the overall economic freedom index (ECO_F) remain at 63.02 during 
the study period, with a dispersion of 7.21 points and a minimum and maximum index value 
of 77.7 and 44.2, respectively (see Table 4.1). This implies that the Islamic banks are operating 
in moderately free economies and that the state or government interfere less with individual 
autonomy. The less prevalent rule of law during the study period is evident from the low mean 
score of freedom from the corruption index (CORR_F) of 42.74, which implies that the sample 
Islamic banks are operating in economies with relatively high corruption levels. A possible 
reason could be the inefficient government regulations in these countries or the imposition 
of which limit business activities. These include bureaucratic decision making and high 
transaction costs, both of which attracts bribery and encourage illicit economic interactions. 
With respect to the regulatory efficiency, the business freedom index (BUSS_F) records a 
mean score of 67.72, which shows that the entrepreneurs are moderately free in their 
business conduct during the sample period. Similarly, the monetary freedom index (MON_F) 
exhibits a high mean score of 73.21 with a small variation of 6.15 points. The minimum and 
maximum values of 58.4 and 90.8 respectively, suggest that the sample countries are mostly 
free from volatile inflationary pressures during the study period and that there is a low level 
of government interference in price determination. The financial freedom index (FIN_F) 
ranges from a minimum score of 20 and a maximum score of 90, and records an average value 
of 49.05 during the sample period (see Table 4.1). This shows that, on average, Islamic banks 
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operate in marginally suppressed economies, where the opportunities of diversified savings, 
credit, payment and investment services are less available to the customers.    
4.2.3 Trend Analysis of Maturity Transformation Risk, Profitability and Stability in 
Islamic Banks 
We measure the trend of maturity transformation risk, profitability and the stability of Islamic 
banks over the period of 2006 to 2015. Figures 4.1 and 4.2 shows the 10-year trend of 
maturity transformation risk in terms of NSFR and FGR in relation to Islamic banks during the 
sample period. One key point from these figures is that both NSFR and FGR show an overall 
decline during the study period. A possible explanation for this downward trend could be the 
impact of the 2008 global financial crisis on the economies in which these banks operate. In 
other words, Islamic banks’ ability to maintain their funding liquidity was significantly 
reduced, which adversely affected their access to available stable funds. Consequently, the 
sample banks reduced their prime role of liquidity creation, which could be a possible 
explanation for the increased financing gap ratio (FGR) during the sample period.          
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Figure 4.2 The 10 Year Trend of Overall Financing Gap Ratio (FGR) in Islamic Banks 
 
Figures 4.3 and 4.4 also show a sharp decline in profitability (both ROAA and ROAE) in our 
sample Islamic banks during the crises period. It reached its lowest level in the year 2009. 
However, from 2010 onwards, these banks show gradual improvements in their profitability 
levels. Figure 4.5 shows Islamic bank stability trends over the sample period. The overall trend 
of ln_Zscore shows that, on average, Islamic banks remain stable during the sample period 
with little or no instability as a result of external shocks (for example, 2007-08 global financial 
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Figure 4.3 The 10 Year Trend of Overall Return on Average Assets (ROAA) in Islamic Banks 
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Figure 4.5 The 10 Year Trend of Overall Stability (ln_Zscore) in Islamic Banks 
 
Pre-estimation Diagnostic Tests  
This section explains the preliminary diagnostic tests which are essential for conducting our 
regression estimates. 
4.3.1 Panel Stationarity Analysis 
Maddala and Wu (1999) highlight the importance of data stationarity tests in panel data 
analysis. As Gujarati (2009) explains, a data is stationary when its mean and variance are 
constant over time. Covariance between the two time periods depends on the time 
separating observations and not the time at which they are observed. Generally, economic 
variables tend to exhibit a time trend and are therefore non-stationary; that is, the variables 
of interest have means, variances, and covariances that are not time invariant. The main 
reason to check data stationarity is to avoid spurious regression or obtaining apparently 
significant regression results from unrelated data when nonstationary series are used in a 
regression analysis.  
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This study applies the Fisher-type Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) unit root test to assess 
whether the variables in our regression models are stationary (Choi, 2001). The motive behind 
selecting Fisher-type p test is that it is the only panel data unit root test which can incorporate 
the unbalanced nature of panel data with gaps. Moreover, the lag lengths of individual ADF 
tests can differ.  
The following stochastic process 𝑦𝑖𝑡 is produced by the first order autoregressive process as 
follows: 
𝚫𝒚𝒊𝒕 = 𝜶 + 𝜸𝒚𝒊𝒕−𝟏 +  𝜹𝒕 + ∑ 𝜷𝒊𝒋𝚫𝒚𝒊𝒕−𝒋
𝒌
𝒋=𝟏
+ 𝜺𝒊𝒕 (4.1) 
H0: 𝛾 = 0 ; for all 𝑖 
H1: 𝛾 < 0;  𝑖 = 1,2, … . . , 𝑁 
We assumed ‘𝛾 =  𝜌 –  1’, however the lag order for the difference term allows 𝜌𝑖 to have 
different values across the banks. The null hypothesis of a unit root is rejected if 𝜌 < 1 in 
favour of the alternative that the variable is stationary. Both, inverse chi-square and modified 
chi-square test statistics of unit root test for all the variables included in our three regression 
models are reported in Appendix Table B.1. The test results obtained strongly reject the null 
hypothesis, and thus provide no evidence of unit root in any of the variables. Hence, all the 
variables are stationary.  
4.3.2 Panel Correlation Analysis 
One of the assumptions of the classical linear regression model (CLRM) is that there should 
be no multicollinearity among the explanatory variables or regressors included in the 
regression model (Gujarati, 2009). The main reason to check for multicollinearity is that in the 
case of high multicollinearity among the regressors, their estimates possess large standard 
errors which implies that the coefficients cannot be estimated with a high degree of precision 
or accuracy. Furthermore, in case of perfect multicollinearity, the regressor coefficients 
become indeterminate.  
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In this study we apply the Pearson Pairwise correlation test to confirm the correlation among 
the dependent and independent variables. We also use it to test for multicollinearity among 
the regressors used in our regression models. We follow the critical value of correlation (that 
is, 0.8) among the two regressors to detect the presence of multicollinearity, as suggested by 
Gujarati (2009). The test statistics of Pearson correlation, between the variables used in our 
regression models, are presented in Appendix Tables B.2.1, B.2.2 and B.2.3. The results show 
a significant correlation among the dependant and independent variables in each model. 
Moreover, the correlation coefficients between all the regressors, remain under the critical 
value of 0.8, which shows no sign of the multicollinearity problem among the selected 
variables.    
4.3.3 Hausman Test for Fixed or Random Effects  
We further examined whether individual effects are fixed or random. To choose between the 
fixed or random effect models, we applied Hausman test. The idea underlying the Hausman 
test is that both the fixed effects and random effects estimators (say 𝜃𝑏1 and 𝜃𝑏2 respectively) 
are consistent if there is no correlation between the error terms (𝜇𝑖) and the regressors(𝑿𝑖𝑡). 
The test compares the consistent fixed effects estimator with the random effects estimator 
that is assumed to be efficient. The null hypothesis of no systematic difference between the 
two estimators is given as. 
H0: 𝜃𝑏1𝑖𝑡 − 𝜃𝑏2𝑖𝑡 = 0 
H1: 𝜃𝑏1𝑖𝑡 ≠  𝜃𝑏2𝑖𝑡 
The test statistics of the Hausman test, between the pairs of coefficients of variables in our 
regression models, are presented in Appendix Tables B.3.1, B.3.2 and B.3.3. The results show 
that the null hypothesis of the difference in coefficients between fixed and random estimation 
is systematically rejected at a 1% significance level, providing support for the fixed effects 
model. 
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4.3.4 Breusch-Pagan/Cook Weisberg Test for Heteroscedasticity  
Another critical assumption of CLRM is that the residuals (𝜇𝑖) must have a constant variance 
(𝜎2) over time and among the groups; that is, that  the disturbances are homoskedastic 
(Gujarati, 2009).  
The mathametical notation of homoskedatsticity can be written as follows: 
𝑬(𝝁𝒊
𝟐) =  𝝈𝟐;  for all 𝒊,   where 𝑖 = 1, 2, … … . , 𝑁 (4.2) 
In the context of panel data analysis, the deviation from homoskedastic errors is likely to be  
error variances specific to the cross-sectional unit 𝑖 – a condition termed as heteroskedasticy, 
which can be expressed as: 
𝑬(𝝁𝒊
𝟐) =  𝝈𝒊
𝟐,   where 𝑖 = 1, 2, … … . , 𝑁 (4.3) 
Following Greene (2003), we applied Breusch – Pagan modified Wald statistics for groupwise 
heteroskedasticity in the error terms of the fixed effect regression models. 
H0: 𝜎𝑖
2 =  𝜎2 ; for all 𝑖 where 𝑖 = 1,2, … . . , 𝑁 
H1: 𝜎𝑖
2 ≠  𝜎2   
The null hypothesis states that for all the banks the error variances remain constant (𝜎2) over 
the time period. We tested for the presence of heteroskedasticy using xttest3 syntax 
command in Stata (v. 14.0). The test results for all of the regression models are reported in 
Appendix Table B.4.1. The p-value of the 𝜒2 statistics show that the null hypothesis is stongly 
rejected for all the regression models and confirms the presence of heteroskedastic 
disturbances in these models. As Gujarati (2009) notes, the presence of heteroskedasticity in 
residuals violates CLRM assumptions as the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation. Although 
it remains consistent and unbiased it is  no longer efficient; that is,  the parameters do not 
possess minimum variances and hence are not BLUE. The GMM estimation technique is 
preferred over OLS, generalized least squares (GLS) and two stage least squares (2SLS) if there 
exist unobserved heteroskedasticity in the error terms (Greene, 2003).   
 89 
4.3.5 Woodridge Test for Autocorrelation in Panel Data 
The problem of autocorrelation arises when the disturbance term of one particular 
observation correlates with the residual of another observation, which violates the CLRM 
(Gujarati, 2009). In mathematical form, the CLRM assumption of no autocorrelation can be 
written as: 
 (4.4) 
Gujarati (2009) and (Baltagi, 2008) argue that as the influence of economic events is 
persistence over time, the assumption of no autocorrelation is very restrictive in panel nature  
data. In the case of the presence of serial correlation, the GMM approach works more 
efficiently than pooled OLS or FE (Wooldridge, 2001). In this study, we employed the 
Wooldridge test of no-autocorrelation. According to Drukker (2003) the Wooldridge test of 
autocorrelation can address the unbalanced panel data with or without gaps in the 
observations. Moreover, this test is more efficient as it relaxes several specification 
assumptions, including the unobserved individual fixed effects, the presence of 
heteroskedasticity and the need of non-stochastic regressors Drukker (2003). 
The nul hypothesis of the Wooldridge test is that no serial correlation exists in the sample 
data. Therefore, if p-value of this test’s result is lower than 0.05, then the null hypothesis is 
rejected in favor of alternative hypothesis of autocorrelation i.e., , which means 
that the data has serial correlation, hence the use of GMM is preferred over pooled OLS or FE 
estimators. The test results for all of the regression models are presented in Appendix Table 
B.5.1. The p-value of less than 0.05 shows that the null hypothesis is rejected for all of the 
regression models and confirms the presence of autocorrelation in the error terms in these 
models. 
Estimation Results – Determinants of Maturity Transformation Risk 
Model 
Table 4.2 presents the two-step System GMM dynamic panel data estimation results of 
“Determinants of Maturity Transformation Risk” model (equation 3.6), using the net stable 
funding ratio (NSFR) as the dependent variable.   
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Table 4.2    Estimations based on Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFRit) as Dependent Variable 
using Two-step System GMM Model 
  (A)  (B)  (C)  (D) 
         
NSFRit-1 
  0.5463*** 
(0.8212) 
  0.5822*** 
(0.0900) 
  0.5579*** 
(0.0870) 
  0.6024*** 
(0.0913) 




















         
ROAAit 
  2.5577*** 
(0.9620) 
  2.4820** 
(1.0304) 
  2.0569** 
(0.9654) 
  1.9785* 
(1.0849) 
         
LRLA_TAit 


















         
MPit 



















   
0.2292 
(0.3723) 
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cons. 
  195.4170** 
(77.0498) 
  273.0737*** 
(86.8460) 




         Equation (A) and (B) are the two specifications of our proposed model in equation (3.6), where equation (A) estimates the 
bank-specific variables only, while macroeconomic variables are included in equation (B). Equation (C) and (D) are also 
estimated with the similar specifications, using short-term borrowing to customer deposit and total short-term borrowing 
(STB) as an alternative measure of external funding. All explanatory variables are defined in Table 3.2. 
Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. ***, ** and * indicates statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations using Stata (v 14.0) software.  
We applied two specifications in equation (3.6). First, we ran the regression using only bank 
specific variables and for the second specification, we included macroeconomic variables in 
the model. Equation (A) in Table 4.2 shows the results with bank-specific variables only while 
equation (B) includes macroeconomic variables in the model as well. We also included an 
alternative measure of external funding (that is, STB instead of NDD) and re-ran our model 
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with the same specifications. The regression results, using bank specific factors only and with 
the inclusion of macroeconomic factors, are shown in equations (C) and (D), respectively. The 
estimation results obtained from both specifications, as well as those which utilize the 
alternative measures for external funding dependence, were mostly in line with our 
expectations.  
A higher value of NSFR reflects lesser maturity transformation risk. Thus, the results in Table 
4.2 are interpreted in reverse order; in other words, a positive sign of the coefficient shows a 
negative impact on the exposure to maturity transformation risk. The lagged dependent 
variable is significant at a 1% level, confirming the dynamic specification of the model, which 
implies that banks’ current exposure to maturity transformation risk is moderately affected 
by their stable funding from previous years.  
Among the explanatory variables, the coefficients of most bank-specific factors, including 
bank size, capitalization, profitability, less-risky liquid assets and non-deposit dependence, 
are consistent with our expectations and confirm our hypotheses. However, we found a stark 
contrast from our hypothesis in explaining the effect of risky liquid assets and market power 
on banks’ maturity transformation risk. The positive and statistically significant relationship 
between SIZE and risk is consistent with Čihák and Hesse’s (2010) findings that large Islamic 
banks create more liquidity. Large Islamic banks may find incentive to invest in more illiquid 
assets for higher gains at a decreased funding cost. However, while doing so, they also 
increase their maturity transformation risks. Our findings are also consistent with previous 
studies (Delechat et al., 2012; Rauch et al., 2009,Iannotta et al., 2007), where authors argue 
that the banks’ liquidity risk increases along with increasing size.  
Bank capitalization (CAP) also shows a highly significant and positive relationship with 
maturity transformation risk in Islamic banks. An increase of 1% in bank capital, results in an 
increase of 0.53% in maturity transformation risk in the sample banks. The results reveal that 
better capitalized banks are more involved in their liquidity creation function, which in turn 
exposes them to a higher degree of maturity transformation risk. This view favours the “risk 
absorption” hypothesis or the idea that higher capital improves the bank’s ability to create 
more liquidity (Repullo, 2004).  
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Among other explanatory variables, bank performance, liquid assets (both less-risky liquid 
assets and risky liquid assets), and market power have shown a statistically significant impact 
on maturity transformation risk, but in the opposite direction. The positive and statistically 
significant coefficient of bank performance (ROAA) reflects that increased profitability helps 
Islamic banks to increase their liquidity position, therefore reducing their exposure to 
maturity transformation risk. The results imply that the Islamic banks’ profits are procyclical 
in nature. In short, increased profits will allow banks to offer better liquidity. Our findings are 
consistent with Bourke (1989), Demirguc et al. (2003), and Kosmidou et al.’s (2005) findings.  
These authors all record a positive relationship between bank profitability and liquidity.  
As hypothesized, the coefficient of less-risky liquid assets to total assets ratio (LRLA_TA) 
shows a negative association with maturity transformation risk, at a significance level of 1%. 
The results reveal that the sample Islamic banks can mitigate their transformation risk by 
holding much liquid assets, such as cash and balances with central banks, and/or short-term 
marketable instruments (like Islamic treasury bills and other short-term government 
securities).  Shen et al. (2009) found similar results, and suggested that banks enhance their 
liquidity shock absorption capacity while increasing the proportion of highly liquid assets in 
their total assets, thereby minimizing their maturity transformation risk. Nevertheless, 
holding a high share of liquid assets ensures a bank’s ability to meet its financial obligations 
(to its customers).  
In contrast to our expectation of a positive relationship, the results reveal a statistically 
significant and negative impact of the ratio of risky liquid assets to total assets (RLATA) on 
maturity transformation risk. This suggests that Islamic banks that hold part of their assets in 
the portfolios, such as trading securities and other medium and long-term investments, are 
able to meet their liquidity requirements when the need arises, even though these come at a 
relatively higher cost than securing funds through less-risky liquid assets. Since, both risky 
liquid assets and less-risky liquid assets constitute banks’ overall liquid assets, the higher 
proportion in total assets prevents a bank from failing in its liquidity commitments, such as 
customers making large deposit withdrawals and any such unexpected future costs (Vodová, 
2013; Shen et al., 2009). 
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The coefficient of market power (MP) remains statistically insignificant, when using only bank-
specific variables to estimate our model (equation A). However, the variable shows a 
significant impact in mitigating the maturity transformation risk in our sample banks, after 
controlling for macroeconomic variables in the model (equation B). The positive and 
statistically significant coefficient of market power (MP) on the dependent variable implies 
that the capacity of Islamic banks in meeting their liquidity obligations increases with an 
increase in their market power, thus reducing their maturity transformation risk. Nguyen et 
al. (2013) provides support for this argument. They noted that banks with high market power 
tend to increase their liquidity through ease of access to funding sources. However, this may 
provide banks with incentive to accelerate their liquidity creation function which leads to 
increased exposure of maturity transformation risk. The results show that Islamic banks with 
greater market power enjoy more ease of access to low cost market funding sources, thus 
enabling them to meet their liquidity requirements, as and when required.  
Additionally, our study also revealed a statistically significant and positive relationship 
between market funding and maturity transformation risk in our sample banks. We utilized 
two measures of external funding dependence. In equations A and B, we estimated our model 
specifications using total short and long-term borrowing, scaled on total liabilities (NDD), as a 
proxy, for external funding dependence. To further test the consistency of our results, we 
utilized the ratio of short-term borrowing to customer deposit and total short-term borrowing 
(STB), and estimated equations C and D, for both specifications. As expected, in all cases, an 
excessive reliance on funding sources other than deposits expose Islamic banks to a higher 
degree of maturity transformation risk. The results are even robust when we used an 
alternative measure of external funding structure. This finding is consistent with Basel’s 
(2009) argument that short-term deposits are considered to be a more stable funding source 
than short-term market debt. Thus, it can be said that the maturity transformation risk in our 
sample Islamic banks will increase with more dependence on market funding sources. Our 
results reiterate those of Angora and Roulet (2011), Shen et al. (2009), Saunders and Cornett 
(2007). 
Among the macroeconomic variables, the consumer price index, as a proxy for inflation (INF), 
shows a significant and positive impact on maturity transformation risk at a 5% level. This 
implies that an increase in the general price level of goods and services is directly related to 
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higher production costs, resulting in augmented borrowing demands from individuals and 
business enterprises. This increases banks’ lending opportunities, which effectively increases 
their exposure to maturity transformation risk. Our findings are consistent with several 
previous studies (Shen et al., 2009; Pasiouras & Kosmidou, 2007; Athanasoglou et al., 2006) 
and shows that a percentage point increase in inflation rate will increase the maturity 
transformation risk among our sample banks by 1.05%.  
Our estimation results show no significant effect of loan loss reserves to total loan ratio on 
the maturity transformation risk in Islamic banking. We also find no significant evidence of 
the impact of gross domestic product (GDP) as a measure of economic activity, on maturity 
transformation risk in Islamic banks during the sample period. 
4.4.1 Robustness Check 
In order to confirm the robustness of our estimation results, we re-ran equation 3.6 with same 
specifications, utilizing the Financing Gap Ratio (FGR) as an alternative measure for the 
maturity transformation risk. The results of equations A1 and B1 in Table 4.3 reveals the 
estimates of bank-specific only and inclusive of macroeconomic variables, respectively, where 
NDD is used as a measure of external funding dependence. Further robust results were 
obtained from equations C1 and D1 applying both specifications, using STB as an alternative 
measure of external funding dependence. The estimates obtained in all four equations are 
largely consistent with previously obtained results in our initial analyses, in terms of the 
relationship and statistical significance. These tests thus verify the robustness of the results. 
The estimation results for FGR, as the dependent variable of maturity transformation risk, 








Table 4.3 Estimations based on Financing Gap Ratio (FGRit) as Dependent Variable using 
Two-step System GMM 
  (A1)  (B1)  (C1)  (D1) 
         
FGRit-1 
  0.4313*** 
(0.1415) 
  0.4948*** 
(0.1418) 
  0.5696*** 
(0.1029) 
  0.5928*** 
(0.0937) 
         
SIZEit 
  4.5562** 
(1.9780) 
  4.6655** 
(1.8136) 
  3.9829*** 
(1.3700) 
  4.1120** 
(1.3001) 
         
CAPit 
  0.5515*** 
(0.1812) 
  0.4812*** 
(0.1731) 
  0.3341** 
(0.1527) 
  0.3093** 
(0.1447) 




















         
RLA_TAit 
  0.3498*** 
(0.1087) 
  0.3302*** 
(0.1000) 
  0.2809*** 
(0.0793) 
  0.2747*** 
(0.0709) 










         
LLRTLit 
  0.3426** 
(0.1425) 
  0.3086** 
(0.1456) 
  0.2826** 
(0.1409) 
  0.2870** 
(0.1268) 
         
NDDit 
  0.6213*** 
(0.1548) 














  0.4673** 
(0.0969) 


















  0.2078 
(0.2036) 
         
cons. 
  -112.4755** 
(45.4679) 






         Note: FGR is used as an alternative measure of maturity transformation risk. Equation (A) and (B) are the two specifications 
of our proposed model in equation (3.6), where equation (A) estimates the bank-specific variables only, while 
macroeconomic variables are included in equation (B). Equation (C) and (D) are also estimated with the similar specifications, 
using short-term borrowing to customer deposit and total short-term borrowing (STB) as an alternative measure of external 
funding. All explanatory variables are defined in Table 3.2. 
Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
Source: Author’s calculations using Stata (v 14.0) software. 
 
Apart from bank performance (ROAA) and credit risk (LLRTL), all other coefficients are highly 
consistent with the initial results, where the new liquidity regulation NSFR, serves as the 
measure for maturity transformation risk. The former shows an insignificant relationship with 
FGR (as the alternative measure of maturity transformation risk), while the later reveals a 
positive and statistically significant relationship. One possible explanation of this variation 
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may be because of the sensitivity of the dependent variable with the explanatory variables. 
FGR is primarily the difference between total loans and customer deposits, which is more 
sensitive to the loan loss reserves held by a bank in a given time period. However, since bank 
profitability is procyclical in nature, as an indicator of stable funding structure, NSFR increases 
alongside increasing ROAA.  
4.4.1.1 Alternative Estimation Technique 
We utilized quantile regression for panel data to estimate the relationship between the 
covariates and the dependent variable at different points in the distribution of ′𝑦′ conditional 
on median (Powell, 2016), thus proving further evidence of the robustness of our previous 
results. This estimation technique is utilized to determine the behaviour of the explanatory 
variables in our initial model (equation 3.6) among various groups, formed through the 
conditional distribution of the dependent variable (Baum, 2013). We formed various quartiles 
ranging from q10 to q90, to determine the effect of our explanatory variables in each group.  
Table 4.4 shows the result of each quartile. The overall results are consistent with the initial 
estimates based on the two-step System GMM, both in terms of direction and significance. 
More specifically, among the bank-specific variables, SIZE is positive and statistically 
significant with maturity transformation risk in q10 and q20. However, it loses its significance 
in q30 and q40, but becomes significant from q50 onwards. This result implies that individual 
bank size is not statistically significant for the group of banks, which maintain NSFR value 
between q30 and q40. Moreover, bank capitalization (CAP) loses its significance in q50 and 
q70. Similarly, ROAA shows insignificance in q50 only.  
The bank-specific variables, LRLA_TA, RLA_TA and NDD, and the macroeconomic variable, 
INF, show consistent significance in each of the quartiles. These factors contribute most in 
determining the maturity transformation risk in our sample banks. Further, MP shows a 
significant relationship with the dependent variable from q60 onwards, revealing that MP 
may not be a contributing factor in determining maturity transformation risk in our sample 
banks, within the lower quartiles range. Similarly, credit risk (LLRTL) shows a significant effect 
in determining the maturity transformation risk in lower and higher quartiles. However, it 
becomes insignificant in mid quartile range (from q50 to q70). Surprisingly, GDP also shows a 
highly significant and negative relationship with maturity transformation risk of our sample 
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banks in q60 and q80 only, whereas we were unable to determine any relationship between 
GDP and risk in our initial estimates using the system GMM technique.
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Table 4.4. Quantile Regression Estimations (Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) as Dependent Variable) 
     q10     q20     q30     q40     q50     q60     q70     q80     q90 
          
NSFRit-1 0.2141*** 0.3129*** 0.3568** 0.6456*** 0.6611*** 0.6145*** 0.7770*** 0.6561*** 0.8669*** 
 (0.0207) (0.0469) (0.1410) (0.0612) (0.1004) (0.0261) (0.0143) (0.0730) (0.0240) 
          
SIZEit -0.0097*** -0.0153*** -0.0056 0.0021 -0.0250*** -0.0849*** -0.0521*** -0.0497*** -0.0588*** 
 (0.0033) (0.0023) (0.0039) (0.0041) (0.0035) (0.0054) (0.0087) (0.0108) (0.0089) 
          
CAPit -0.0071*** -0.0041*** -0.0055*** -0.0024*** 0.0032 -0.0020*** -0.0003 -0.0029*** -0.0059*** 
 (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0014) (0.0003) (0.0031) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0005) (0.0008) 
          
ROAAit 0.0060** 0.0135*** 0.0121*** 0.0095*** -0.0079 0.0163*** 0.0077*** -0.0130* 0.0162*** 
 (0.0025) (0.0047) (0.0022) (0.0014) (0.0090) (0.0016) (0.0029) (0.0078) (0.0027) 
          
LRLA_TAit 0.0133*** 0.0089*** 0.0137*** 0.0094*** 0.0112*** 0.0134*** 0.0114*** 0.0193*** 0.0111*** 
 (0.0011) (0.0007) (0.0035) (0.0009) (0.0019) (0.0006) (0.0002) (0.0043) (0.0006) 
          
RLA_TAit 0.0101*** 0.0088*** 0.0100*** 0.0068*** 0.0064*** 0.0093*** 0.0063*** 0.0084*** 0.0070*** 
 (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0021) (0.0007) (0.0009) (0.0006) (0.0003) (0.0021) (0.0008) 
          
MPit 0.0004 0.0005 -0.0018 0.0002 -0.0031 0.0146*** 0.0039*** 0.0171*** 0.0045*** 
 (0.0012) (0.0005) (0.0020) (0.0007) (0.0056) (0.0011) (0.0008) (0.0044) (0.0015) 
          
NDDit -0.0043*** -0.0035*** -0.0034*** -0.0033*** -0.0049*** -0.0041*** -0.0014*** -0.0037*** -0.0008** 
 (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0001) (0.0007) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0009) (0.0003) 
          
LLRTLit 0.0016** 0.0043*** 0.0029*** 0.0007** 0.0020 0.0000 -0.0003 -0.0039* 0.0077*** 
 (0.0007) (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0003) (0.0022) (0.0003) (0.0013) (0.0022) (0.0021) 
          
GDPjt 0.0025 0.0008 -0.0004 0.0000 -0.0006 0.0031*** 0.0018 0.0072*** 0.0036 
 (0.0016) (0.0010) (0.0009) (0.0007) (0.0012) (0.0009) (0.0012) (0.0020) (0.0038) 
          
INFjt -0.0114*** -0.0045*** -0.0078*** -0.0042*** -0.0023* -0.0150*** -0.0057*** -0.0049* -0.0137*** 
 (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0022) (0.0006) (0.0012) (0.0015) (0.0010) (0.0027) (0.0028) 
Note: Bootstrap standard errors are in parenthesis. ***, ** and * indicates statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Source: Author’s calculations using Stata (v 14.0) software.
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4.4.2 Validity of Two-step System GMM Estimations 
The validity of the two-step System GMM depends on the strength of instrumental variables. 
Among others, a fundamental requirement is exogenous instruments, which ensures the 
consistency of the estimations. The exogeneity of instruments can be assessed by the Sargan 
or Hansen J test for over-identified restrictions, under the null hypothesis that the 
instruments, as a group, are exogenous. The test statistics follow the Chi-squared (𝜒2) 
distribution, with degrees of freedom equalling the difference between the number of 
moment conditions and the number of parameters. While the Hansen J test is more robust 
than the Sargan test to heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation, it is significantly weakened by 
instrument proliferation. However, as can be seen from the results reported in Tables 4.5 and 
4.6, the number of instruments is smaller than the number of groups, as suggested by 
Roodman (2009b). Therefore, the Hansen J test is reasonably employed in our study. 
While the Hansen J test examines the endogeneity of instruments as a group, the validity of 
subsets of instruments could also be examined by the Difference-in-Hansen test. Under the 
null hypothesis of the exogeneity of instrument subset, the test statistic follows the Chi-
squared (𝜒2) distribution, with degrees of freedom equalling the number of suspect 
instruments. In this study, the instrumental variables are divided into two smaller subsets, 
including IV-style and GMM-style instruments. The test results in Tables 4.5 and 4.6 show that 
the null hypothesis cannot be rejected at the 10% significance level, which confirms that the 
instruments subsets used in both IV style and GMM style are exogenous. 
Another condition of valid instruments is no autocorrelation in the first-differenced 
idiosyncratic disturbances 𝛥 𝑖𝑡  =  𝑖𝑡  −  𝑖𝑡−1. The negative first-order autocorrelation AR(1) 
is expected, since 𝛥 𝑖𝑡 relates to 𝛥 𝑖𝑡−1 via the shared term 𝑖𝑡−1; however the evidence is 
uninformative (Roodman, 2009b). Therefore, the test of second-order autocorrelation AR(2) 
should be addressed. This study tests for autocorrelation in disturbances proposed by 
Arellano & Bond (1991), with the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation, which is widely 
accepted as the standard test for autocorrelation in GMM. If the nth -order autocorrelation 
is not present, lags of n or further could be utilized as instruments. Since this study uses lags 
of 2 and earlier, the AR(2) tests must be insignificant to ensure the validity of the models. 
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Tables 4.5 and 4.6 present the summary of the post estimation tests to confirm the validity of 
the two-step System GMM estimators. We utilized NSFR and FGR as dependent variables in 
the determinants of maturity transformation risk models, respectively. All F-statistics of the 
estimations are highly significant at the 1% significance level. Thus, the joint null hypothesis 
that all estimated coefficients are jointly equal to zero is rejected. In other words, at least one 
of the parameters in each model is non-zero, indicating the overall significance of the models 
(Hill, Griffiths, & Lim, 2008). 
Table 4.5 Post-estimation Specification Tests in Determinants of Maturity 
Transformation Risk Model (NSFR as the Dependent Variable) 
         
  (A)  (B)  (C)  (D) 
         
F-Statistics  
 53.90 
p = 0.000 
 49.31 
p = 0.000 
 34.07 
p = 0.000 
 29.57 
p = 0.000 
         
AR(1) test stat 
 -2.56 
p > z = 0.011 
 -2.55 
p > z = 0.011 
 -2.60 
p > z = 0.009 
 -2.61 
p > z = 0.009 
         
AR(2) test stat 
 -0.58 
p > z = 0.561 
 -0.31 
p > z = 0.756 
 -0.45 
p > z = 0.655 
 -0.24 
p > z = 0.812 
         
Hansen J-stat 
 𝜒2 (23) = 25.16 
p > z = 0.342 
 𝜒2 (23) = 21.65 
p > z = 0.541 
 𝜒2 (23) = 24.84 
p > z = 0.359 
 𝜒2 (23) = 21.44 
p > z = 0.554 
         
Difference-in-Hansen tests       
         
- GMM instruments for 
levels 
 𝜒2 (7) = 9.24 
p > z = 0.236 
 𝜒2 (7) = 6.26 
p > z = 0.541 
 𝜒2 (7) = 9.15 
p > z = 0.242 
 𝜒2 (7) = 7.33 
p > z = 0.396 
         
- IV  𝜒
2 (7) = 8.89 
p > z = 0.261 
 𝜒2 (9) = 8.06 
p > z = 0.541 
 𝜒2 (7) = 8.15 
p > z = 0.319 
 𝜒2 (9) = 7.38 
p > z = 0.597 
-          
No. of Instruments  33  35  33  35 
         
         
No. of Banks  55  55  55  55 
         
Observations  412  412  412  412 








Table 4.6 Post-estimation Specification Tests in Determinants of Maturity 
Transformation Risk Model (FGR as the Dependent Variable) 
         
  (A1)  (B1)  (C1)  (D1) 
         
F-Statistics  
 63.12 
p = 0.000 
 65.03 
p = 0.000 
 75.95 
p = 0.000 
 49.56 
p = 0.000 
         
AR(1) test stat 
 -2.32 
p > z = 0.020 
 -2.62 
p > z = 0.009 
 -3.10 
p > z = 0.002 
 -3.18 
p > z = 0.001 
         
AR(2) test stat 
 0.21 
p > z = 0.836 
 0.42 
p > z = 0.675 
 0.29 
p > z = 0.769 
 0.32 
p > z = 0.752 
         
Hansen J-stat 
 𝜒2 (22) = 22.79 
p > z = 0.414 
 𝜒2 (22) = 20.71 
p > z = 0.539 
 𝜒2 (37) = 31.14 
p > z = 0.739 
 𝜒2 (40) = 36.45 
p > z = 0.631 
         
Difference-in-Hansen tests       
         
- GMM instruments for 
levels 
 𝜒2 (8) = 10.65 
p > z = 0.222 
 𝜒2 (8) = 7.90 
p > z = 0.444 
 𝜒2 (8) = 11.07 
p > z = 0.198 
 𝜒2 (8) = 12.43 
p > z = 0.133 
         
- IV  𝜒
2 (8) = 4.88 
p > z = 0.770 
 𝜒2 (10) = 7.25 
p > z = 0.702 
 𝜒2 (8) = 5.52 
p > z = 0.701 
 𝜒2 (10) = 8.04 
p > z = 0.625 
-          
No. of Instruments  32  34  47  52 
         
         
No. of Banks  55  55  55  55 
         
Observations  412  412  412  412 
         Source: Author’s calculations using Stata (v 14.0) software 
The validity of two-step System GMM estimation is assessed through the number of 
instruments employed; AR(2), Hansen J and Difference-in-Hansen tests. The GMM estimation 
is considered valid if the number of instruments used is smaller than the number of groups, 
and the results of all other tests are insignificant (that is, p-values are larger than 0.10). The 
AR(1) tests’ z-statistics are negative and statistically significant in all of the specifications of 
our model, defined in equation 3.6. This indicates the presence of negative first-order 
autocorrelation among idiosyncratic disturbances in difference. However, the z-statistics of 
the AR(2) tests in all specifications are insignificant with p-values 0.561, 0.756, 0.655 and 
0.812 in Table 4.5 and p-values 0.836, 0.675, 0.769 and 0.752 in Table 4.6, respectively. 
Therefore, it is not possible to reject the null hypothesis of no second-order serial correlation 
in idiosyncratic errors in first difference, indicating the nonexistence of the first-order 
autocorrelation in their levels. Thus, lags from period 2 or earlier in levels could be employed 
as instruments in the differenced equation Roodman (2009b). In other words, the results 
support the choice of lags from period 2 and earlier as valid instruments in this study. 
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The Hansen tests of over-identification in Table 4.5 reveal the J-statistics of 25.16 (p-value = 
0.342), 21.65 (p-value = 0.541), 24.84 (p-value = 0.359) and 21.44 (p-value = 0.554) in 
equations (A), (B), (C) and (D), respectively. Similarly, Table 4.6 reports the Hansen J test 
statistics of 22.79 (p-value = 0.414), 20.71 (p-value = 0.539), 31.14 (p-value = 0.739) and 36.45 
(p-value = 0.631) in equations (A1), (B1), (C1) and (D1), respectively. The p-values greater than 
10% indicate that the null hypothesis of the enxogeneity of all instruments, as a group, can 
be accepted. Furthermore, to test the exogeneity of instrument subsets, i.e. GMM-style 
instruments for levels and IV-style instruments, the Difference-in-Hansen tests are 
conducted. All p-values of the Difference-in-Hansen test statistics for all specifications in both 
Tables 4.5 and 4.6 are insignificant (with p > 0.10). Therefore there is no evidence to reject 
the null hypothesis of exogeneity of instruments subsets. Hence, the results of both the 
Hansen test and the Difference-in-Hansen test support the exogeneity of the instrumental 
variables used in all the specifications. Such exogeneity is a crucial characteristic of good 
instruments. In addition, the number of instruments is kept smaller than the number of 
groups, as recommended by Roodman (2009b). Therefore, the consequences of too many 
instruments, is avoided. Conclusively, all post-estimation specification tests strongly support 
the validity of the two-step System GMM estimators. 
Estimation Results – Maturity Transformation Risk and Islamic Banks’ 
Profitability Model 
This section provides empirical evidence of the effect of maturity transformation risk on 
Islamic bank profitability. Table 4.7 presents the two-step System GMM dynamic panel data 
estimation results of “Maturity Transformation Risk and Islamic Banks’ Profitability” model, 
using return on average assets (ROAA) as the dependent variable.   
We applied three specifications to our regression model (equation 3.7). First, we ran the 
regression using only bank specific variables. For the second and third specifications, we 
included industry-specific and macroeconomic variables in our model, respectively. Equation 
A in Table 4.7 shows the effect of maturity transformation risk and other bank-specific 
variables on the profitability of Islamic banks. We also controlled for the industry-specific 
effects on Islamic bank profitability in equation B. The model is re-estimated after controlling 
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for the macroeconomic factors, in addition to the bank-specific and industry-specific 
explanatory variables. The results are presented in equation (C). 
Table 4.7 Two-step System GMM Estimations (Return on Average Assets (ROAAit) as the 
Dependent Variable) 
  (A)  (B)  (C) 
         
ROAAit-1 
 0.5484 *** 
(0.1764) 
 0.8088 *** 
(0.1329) 
 0.7823 *** 
(0.1045) 
         
NSFRit 
 0.3972 ** 
(0.1965) 
 0.5538 ** 
(0.2751) 
 0.5048 ** 
(0.2274) 




 -0.209 ** 
(0.0923) 
 -0.2548 ** 
(0.0996) 
         
CAPit 
 0.0626 * 
(0.0359) 
 0.1087 *** 
(0.031) 
 0.1075 *** 
(0.0223) 








         
EFFit 




 -0.0097 * 
(0.0051) 
         
LLRTLit 
 -0.0219 ** 
(0.0086) 
 -0.0485 *** 
(0.0132) 
 -0.0411 *** 
(0.012) 




 0.0126 *** 
(0.0044) 
 0.0110 ** 
(0.0043) 






 0.0462 *** 
(0.012) 






 -0.0471 * 
(0.0251) 
         
cons. 









         Equations A, B and C are the three specifications of our proposed model in equation (3.7), where equation (A) estimates the 
bank-specific variables only, while industry specific and macroeconomic variables are included in equation (B) and (C), 
respectively. All explanatory variables are defined in Table 3.3. 
Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
Source: Author’s calculations using Stata (v 14.0) software. 
The lagged profitability variable (ROAAit-1) remains highly significant in all the three 
specifications, which confirms the dynamic character of our model. The coefficient 𝜕1 takes 
the values of 0.55, 0.81 and 0.78 in equations (A), (B) and (C), respectively, which indicate a 
moderate persistence of profitability over time in the sample Islamic banks. Since the value 
of 𝜕1 is near 1, this implies that the sample Islamic banks operate in a relatively less 
competitive market structure. The significant coefficients in all specifications also confirm 
 104 
that one should consider temporal effects of profit persistence when explaining banks’ 
profitability. The recent banking literature also found evidence of profit persistence in Islamic 
banks (Trad et al., 2017; Zarrouk et al., 2016; Mirzaei, 2011), as well as in conventional banks 
(Djalilov & Piesse, 2016 ; Dietrich & Wanzenried, 2014; Goddard et al., 2011; Athanasoglou et 
al., 2008). 
According to Table 4.7, for all the regression specifications, the net stable funding ratio (NSFR) 
coefficient is statistically significant at a 5% level, with values of 0.39, 0.55 and 0.50 in 
equations (A), (B) and (C), respectively. The positive sign of the coefficients in all of the models 
are also in accordance with our expectation, which confirms our hypothesis. Moreover, the 
results show that the effect of net stable funding ratio on profitability increases after 
controlling for industry-specific and macroeconomic factors. Since maturity transformation 
risk decreases with the increase in net stable funding ratio, the regression results reveal an 
inverse relationship between exposure to maturity transformation risk and profitability in 
Islamic banks, especially during the study period. For this reason, we find evidence that the 
inclusion of this new IFSB liquidity regulation can significantly increase the profitability of 
Islamic banks. Our results are consistent with the previous studies (for example, Olagunju et 
al., 2012; Goddard et al., 2011; Kosmidou 2008). All of these authors found that banks with 
high liquidity levels had better profitability. One possible reason for this could be that banks 
holding more liquid assets are less reliant on expensive market funding, which reduces their 
costs of borrowing and consequently, they are more profitable. However, our results are 
contradictory to Curak et al. (2012), Naceur and Kandil (2009), and Li (2007) among others, 
who contend that bank profitability can be significantly reduced by holding more liquid assets 
because of low yield.  
Among the other explanatory variables, the coefficients of the bank-specific factors are 
mostly in line with the expected signs, providing empirical evidence of our stated hypotheses. 
Capitalization (CAP) shows a positive and significant impact on Islamic bank profitability in all 
specifications, which confirms our hypothesis. The coefficient of capitalization is around 0.062 
– 0.108, implying a 1% increase in equity ratio increases the return on average assets by 0.06 
– 0.11%. The positive impact of capitalization on bank profitability can be influenced by a 
number of reasons. Due to profit and loss sharing (PLS) principles, Islamic banks, with high 
bank capital, are more prudent in their lending, which reduces their credit risk and 
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consequently leads to increased profitability. However, banks with a sound capital position 
can more effectively pursue business opportunities and gain higher returns. Our results are 
consistent with Alharbi (2017), Trad et al. (2017), and Zarrouk et al.’s (2016) findings. These 
authors have all argued that higher equity proportion reduces overall risks and funding costs, 
which ultimately leads to increased profitability in Islamic banks. The idea that well-
capitalized bank are less risky, have lower borrowing costs and are consequently more 
profitable, is also supported by, and Dietrich and Wanzenried (2014), Lee and Hsieh (2013), 
and Athanasoglou et al. (2008), in the case of the conventional banking system.   
We also find a significant association between management efficiency measured by cost to 
income ratio (CIR) and Islamic banks’ profitability in regression models (A) and (C) in Table 
4.7. However, the coefficient of CIR becomes insignificant when we control for the industry 
specific variable in equation (B). Besides the three specifications, the direction of the 
relationship remains negative, which implies that the profitability of Islamic banks 
deteriorates with an increase in cost to income ratio. This result confirms our hypothesis that 
CIR is inversely related to bank profitability. This negative impact reflects management’s 
inefficiency in controlling overhead costs because of the limited experience of Islamic banks 
and a lack of qualified staff. Alharbi (2017), Zarrouk et al. (2016), and Almazari (2014) all 
identified the negative impact of management inefficiency in terms of increased cost to 
income ratio on Islamic banks’ profitability.  
The coefficient of loan loss reserves to total assets (LLRTL) also shows an inverse significant 
relationship with the dependent variable ROAA (in all models). This implies that a higher credit 
risk adversely affects Islamic bank performance, during the study period. The results show 
coefficient estimates of -0.02, -0.05 and -0.04 in panel (A), (B) and (C) respectively, suggesting 
that a 1% increase in loan loss reserves ratio will deteriorate the return on average assets by 
0.02 – 0.05%. This result confirms our expectation that an increase in the loan delinquency 
requires a bank to allocate a significant portion of its earnings to cover expected credit losses 
and consequently profitability will decrease. Though lending is the prime source of revenue 
generation for banks, it is also the major cause of credit risk, particularly when they invest in 
poor quality assets. In this case, monitoring expenses will rise and will adversely affect bank’s 
profits. Our results also find support from the empirical work of Alharbi (2017), Almazari 
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(2014), and Wasiuzzaman and Tarmizi (2010). These authors reveal that high profitability of 
Islamic banks tend to be associated with better asset quality.  
In contrast to our expected positive size – profitability relationship, bank size (SIZE) shows an 
inverse and statistically significant relationship with the profitability (ROAA) of Islamic banks 
during the study period. This is true after controlling for industry-specific and macroeconomic 
factors in equations (B) and (C), respectively. The results reveal that larger Islamic banks are 
less profitable than smaller banks, signifying economies of scale and scope for small Islamic 
banks and diseconomies of scale for larger institutions. This negative association is due to the 
increase in diversified activities, as larger banks tend to diversify more, which is linked with 
volatile returns. The other reason could be management inefficiency or because of the 
bureaucratic management style in larger Islamic banks. Our results also suggest that growing 
banks may face diminishing marginal returns so average profits would decline with size.  
Almazari (2014) and Akhtar, Ali, and Sadaqat (2011) also found similar results while analysing 
the factors influencing the profitability of Islamic banks in Pakistan. Similar results are 
reported for conventional banks by Sufian and Habibullah (2009), Pasiouras and Kosmidou 
(2007) and Kosmidou et al. (2005), where the authors find an inverse relationship between 
size and bank profitability.  
Our result did not show any significant effect of income diversification on Islamic banks’ 
profitability. Besides, the coefficient of non-interest income scaled to total assets (NONII_TA) 
remains positive in all three specifications. This shows that, although insignificant, income 
diversification fosters banks profitability. Since the Islamic banking industry is relatively new 
and the majority of the banks are the infancy stage, it is expected that Islamic banks rely more 
on traditional lending activities as their prime source of revenue generation. They are less 
involved in fee and commission income, income from sale of investment securities and other 
non-financing income. Therefore, the income diversification does not significantly improve 
the profitability of Islamic banks. 
Moving on to industry-specific factors, we measured levels of bank competition by three 
largest banks concentration (3_Conc) ratio. As expected, the results show that the coefficient 
of 3_Conc is positive and significantly associated with the profitability of Islamic banks, at a 
significance level of 1% and 5%. These results are included in our regression model in panels 
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(B) and (C), respectively. Our results find empirical evidence to support the structure conduct 
performance (SCP) theory, that the profitability of Islamic banks is enhanced in a less 
competitive market structure, especially during the study period.  Karim, Sami, and Hichem 
(2010), Ben Khediri and Ben-Khedhiri (2009), and Hassan and Bashir (2003) also found similar 
results and concluded that Islamic banks earn more profits in concentrated markets. 
Significantly Haron (1996) found that Islamic banks which operate in less competitive markets 
are more profitable, but at the cost of depositors’ welfare.    
Among the macroeconomic variables, the empirical results reveal that both economic growth 
and inflation are significant in explaining Islamic banks’ profitability. The coefficient of Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) growth rate shows a positive and highly significant impact on bank 
profits at a 1% level. This implies that economic growth could help banks to construct better 
operations strategies, and hence increase their profits. Generally, economic upswings 
encourage banks to increase their lending activities, charge higher margins and improve their 
asset quality, thus become more profitable. Our results are consistent with Zarrouk et al. 
(2016), Muda, Shaharuddin, and Embaya (2013), Wasiuzzaman and Tarmizi (2010), and 
Bashir’s (2003), work. These authors all identify a positive correlation between the GDP 
growth and the profitability of Islamic banks.  
The coefficient of inflation, measured in terms of CPI, shows a significant negative relationship 
with Islamic banks’ profitability. The results reveal that Islamic banks face much difficulty in 
adjusting their profit rates, with respect to changes in the real economic activities. This 
negative relationship can be explained by the fact that inflation is not well anticipated by bank 
managers and Islamic banks are slow to adjust their interest rates, which ultimately results in 
increasing costs (relative to their revenue). Our results are similar to Zarrouk et al.’s (2016) 
findings. In case of MENA region, they argued that rapid inflation impeded the profitability of 
Islamic banks. However, Wasiuzzaman and Tarmizi (2010) and Asutay and Izhar (2007) 
reported contrary results when explaining the impact of inflation on Islamic bank’s 
profitability in Indonesia and Malaysia, respectively. They argue that inflation is well 
anticipated in both markets and that Islamic banks achieve high profitability with increased 
inflation.  
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4.5.1 Robustness Check 
We ran our regression equation (3.7) using the analogous dataset, with return on average 
equity ROAE as an alternative measure of Islamic banks’ profitability, to ascertain whether 
our main findings were consistent. The similar three specifications were applied and the 
estimation results for ROAE, as a profitability measure, using the 2-step system GMM dynamic 
panel data approach reported in Table 4.8. Regression equation (A1) presents the results of 
the relationship of maturity transformation risk and other bank-specific factors, in explaining 
Islamic bank’s profitability. Additionally, industry-specific and macroeconomic variables were 
also included along with the bank-specific explanatory variables in our regression model. The 
results are reported in equations (B1) and (C1), respectively. The estimates obtained in all 
three regressions models are largely consistent with previous results in our initial analyses, 
thus verifying the robustness of our main findings. 
The highly significant positive coefficient of the lagged dependent variable confirms the 
dynamic nature of our model and also validates our argument to consider profit persistence 
while explaining Islamic banks’ profitability. Moreover, the coefficient of NSFR remain 
significant and positive in all of the regression models, which also validates our empirical 
finding of an inverse relationship between maturity transformation risk and the profitability 
of Islamic banks. Among the other bank specific explanatory variables, bank capital (CAP), 
non-interest income (NONII), management efficiency (CIR) and credit risk (LLRTL) are 
significant factors in explaining Islamic bank’s profitability, with ROAE as the dependent 
variable. We obtained similar results to our initial analysis, in terms of the relationship 
between bank capital and profitability, as the coefficient of CAP reveals a positive significant 
relationship with ROAE in all three specifications. We further found that NONII is a significant 
determinant of Islamic banks’ profitability when we used ROAE as a profitability measure. 
Moreover, both CIR and LLRTL show similar negative and statistically significant relationships 
in all specifications with Islamic bank’s profitability in terms of ROAE. Although the direction 
of the relationship between bank size and profitability is similar to our main findings, the SIZE 
variable loses its significance in explaining Islamic banks’ profitability, in terms of ROAE. 
Similar to our initial estimates, the coefficient of concentration ratio (3_Cons) shows a 
positive and significant relationship with the dependent variable. This positive effect of 
concentration validates our argument on SCP theory; that Islamic banks charge monopolistic 
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rents in less competitive markets, and thus achieve higher profits.  GDP growth rate and CPI 
(as macroeconomic determinants of profitability) are insignificant when Islamic banks’ 
profitability is measured by ROAE. 
Table 4.8 Two-step System GMM Estimations (Return on Average Equity (ROAEit) as the 
Dependent Variable) 
  (A1)  (B1)  (C1) 
         
ROAEit-1 
 0.4167 *** 
(0.1258) 
 0.4066 *** 
(0.1231) 
 0.436 *** 
(0.0918) 
         
NSFRit 
 10.094 * 
(5.5046) 
 10.1731 * 
(5.7409) 
 7.3738 * 
(3.9906) 
         
SIZEit 
 0.4138  
(0.9359) 
 -0.2794  
(0.8276) 
 -0.6004  
(1.0304) 
         
CAPit 
 0.6543 *** 
(0.2289) 
 0.8429 *** 
(0.3112) 
 0.6497 *** 
(0.2366) 
         
NONII_TAit 
 1.9965 * 
(1.0311) 
 2.3464 ** 
(1.1722) 
 1.8226 ** 
(0.84) 
         
EFFit 
 -0.1296 *** 
(0.0464) 
 -0.1409 *** 
(0.0473) 
 -0.1518 *** 
(0.0436) 
         
LLRTLit 
 -1.975 ** 
(0.7725) 
 -1.915 ** 
(0.7358) 
 -1.5063 *** 
(0.536) 




 0.1271 * 
(0.0682) 
 0.1027 ** 
(0.0405) 






 0.1407  
(0.1465) 






 -0.2532  
(0.3893) 
         
Cons. 
  8.0753  
(12.9828) 
 8.559  
(14.1266) 
 14.2214  
(14.0122) 
         Equations (A1), (B1) and (C1) are the three specifications of our proposed model in equation (3.7), where equation (A1) 
estimates the bank-specific variables only, while industry specific and macroeconomic variables are included in equation (B1) 
and (C1), respectively. All explanatory variables are defined in Table3.3. 
Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
Source: Author’s calculations using Stata (v 14.0) software. 
4.5.1.1. Alternative Estimation Technique 
We also applied the two-stage least square (2SLS) estimation technique to confirm our main 
results, based on the 2-step System GMM. The results for ROAA and ROAE, as the dependant 
variables of Islamic bank profitability, with 2SLS estimation technique are presented in Table 
4.9. The estimates obtained by 2SLS are mostly consistent with our previous findings. The 
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coefficient of maturity transformation risk variable (NSFR) remains statistically significant and 
positive in explaining Islamic banks’ profitability, when measured by ROAA and ROAE, in 
regression equations (1) to (6). This reveals the significance of the new IFSB liquidity ratio in 
determining the profitability of Islamic banks. The other bank-specific explanatory variables 
also show similar results obtained with 2-step System GMM estimation. Moreover, the 
coefficient of bank concentration (3-Conc) also exhibits similar results, both in terms of 
significance and direction, confirming that Islamic banks tend to charge monopolistic rents in 
less competitive environments. In terms of the macroeconomic variables, the impact of 
economic growth in explaining Islamic bank profitability remains inconclusive, as the 
coefficient of GDP growth rate shows a positive and significant effect on profitability when 
measured by ROAA. However, it is insignificant in explaining profitability in terms of ROAE. In 
addition, the inflation variable remains insignificant in determining the profitability of Islamic 
banks during the sample period.     
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     Table 4.9 Two Stage Least Square (2SLS) Estimation Results (Maturity Transformation Risk and Islamic Banks’ Profitability Model) 
VARIABLES (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 
        
ROAAit-1 0.363*** 0.469*** 0.457***     
 (0.113) (0.112) (0.115)     
ROAE it-1     0.460*** 0.451*** 0.448*** 
     (0.131) (0.130) (0.128) 
NSFRit 0.773** 0.567* 0.576*  8.711** 8.455** 8.729** 
 (0.360) (0.330) (0.332)  (4.095) (4.027) (4.176) 
CAPit 0.0528** 0.0803*** 0.0770***  0.346* 0.397* 0.374* 
 (0.0206) (0.0243) (0.0239)  (0.207) (0.215) (0.221) 
ln_TAit 0.106 0.355* 0.395**  3.248** 4.704** 4.698** 
 (0.151) (0.196) (0.197)  (1.647) (1.929) (2.109) 
NONII_TAit 0.298** 0.201* 0.210*  0.117 0.282 0.287 
 (0.126) (0.117) (0.117)  (0.840) (0.827) (0.817) 
EFFit -0.0212*** -0.0210*** -0.0206***  -0.234*** -0.231*** -0.232*** 
 (0.00521) (0.00497) (0.00493)  (0.0505) (0.0496) (0.0500) 
LLRTLit -0.0359 -0.0245 -0.0252  -1.125** -1.161** -1.168** 
 (0.0273) (0.0267) (0.0266)  (0.568) (0.563) (0.565) 
3_CONCit  0.00649* 0.00833**   0.128*** 0.125*** 
  (0.00392) (0.00422)   (0.0424) (0.0427) 
GDPt    0.0331**    -0.0293 
   (0.0154)    (0.159) 
INFt    0.00108    0.0639 
   (0.0190)    (0.181) 
        
R-squared 0.577 0.554 0.563  0.474 0.484 0.486 
Hansen J statistics 4.589 
p = 0.3321 
4.448 
p = 0.4869 
4.570 
p = 0.4706 
 6.932 
p = 0.2729 
8.308 
p = 0.3062 
8.727 
p = 0.2729 
Number of Banks 55 55 55  55 55 55 
Observations 412 412 412  412 412 412 
Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
Source: Author’s calculations using Stata (v 14.0) 
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4.5.2 Post Estimation Tests for Validity of 2-step System GMM Dynamic Panel 
Data Analysis 
A summary of the post estimation tests used to verify the validity of the two-step System 
GMM estimators, utilizing ROAA and ROAE as dependent variables, in the maturity 
transformation risk and Islamic banks’ profitability model are presented in Tables 4.9 and 
4.10, respectively. The F-statistics of all regression models are highly significant at the 1% 
significance level. Thus, the joint null hypothesis that all estimated coefficients are jointly 
equal to zero is rejected. 
4.5.2.1 Test for Autocorrelation 
The validity of two-step System GMM estimation is assessed through the number of 
instruments used, AR(2), Hansen J and Difference-in-Hansen tests. The AR(1) tests’ z-statistics 
are negative and statistically significant in all the specifications of our model, defined in 
equation (3.6). This indicates the presence of the negative first-order autocorrelation among 
idiosyncratic disturbances in difference. However, the z-statistics of the AR(2) tests in all 
specifications are insignificant, with p-values 0.575, 0.328,and 0.410 in Table 4.9 and p-values 
0.438, 0.322 and 0.150 in Table 4.10, respectively. Therefore, it is not possible to reject the 
null hypothesis of no second-order serial correlation in idiosyncratic errors in first difference. 
This result indicates the nonexistence of the first-order autocorrelation in their levels. Thus, 
lags from period two or earlier in levels could be employed as instruments in the differenced 
equation (Roodman, 2009b). In other words, the results support the choice of lags from 
period 2 and earlier, as valid instruments in this study. 
4.5.2.2 Test for Over-identification and Exogeneity of Instruments 
The Hansen tests of over-identification in Table 4.9 reveal the J-statistics of 8.12 (p-value = 
0.322), 6.41 (p-value = 0.379) and 5.42 (p-value = 0.712) in equation (A), (B) and (C), 
respectively. Similarly, Table 4.10 reports the Hansen J test statistics of 2.26 (p-value = 0.812), 
1.63 (p-value = 0.897) and 2.88 (p-value = 0.824) in equation (A1), (B1) and (C1), respectively. 
P-values greater than 10% indicate that the null hypothesis of the exogeneity of all 
instruments as a group can be accepted. Furthermore, to test the exogeneity of instrument 
subsets, the Difference-in-Hansen tests were conducted. All p-values of the Difference-in-
Hansen test statistics for all specifications, in both Tables 4.9 and 4.10, are insignificant (with 
p > 0.10). Therefore, there is no evidence to reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity of 
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instruments subsets. Hence, the results of both the Hansen test and the Difference-in-Hansen 
test support the exogeneity of instrumental variables used in all the specifications. In addition, 
the number of instruments was kept smaller than the number of groups as recommended by 
Roodman (2009b). Conclusively, all post-estimation specification tests strongly support the 
validity of the two-step System GMM estimators. 
Table 4.10  Post-estimation Specification Tests (ROAA as the Dependent Variable in 
Maturity Transformation Risk and Profitability Model) 
         
    (A)  (B)  (C) 
         
F-Statistics  
 272.67 
p = 0.000 
 145.57 
p = 0.000 
 167.79 
p = 0.000 
         
AR(1) test stat 
 -2.66 
p > z = 0.008 
 -3.17 
p > z = 0.002 
 -3.20 
p > z = 0.001 
         
AR(2) test stat 
 -0.56 
p > z = 0.575 
 -0.98 
p > z = 0.328 
 -0.82 
p > z = 0.410 
         
Hansen J-stat 
 8.12 
p > z = 0.322 
 6.41 
p > z = 0.379 
 5.42 
p > z = 0.712 
Difference-in-Hansen tests         
         
- GMM instruments for levels  𝜒
2 (2) = 2.75 
p > z = 0.253 
 𝜒2 (2) = 3.28 
p > z = 0.194 
 𝜒2 (2) = 1.84 
p > z = 0.399 
         
No. of Instruments  15  15  19 
         
No. of Banks  55  55  55 
         
Observations  412  412  412 











Table 4.11 Post-estimation Specification Tests (ROAE as the Dependent Variable in 
Maturity Transformation Risk and Profitability Model) 
    (A1)  (B1)  (C1) 
F-Statistics  
 45.70 
p = 0.000 
 45.51 
p = 0.000 
 52.10 
p = 0.000 
AR(1) test stat  -1.99 p > z = 0.046 
 -1.95 
p > z = 0.051 
 -1.86 
p > z = 0.062 
AR(2) test stat  0.78 p > z = 0.438 
 0.97 
p > z = 0.332 
 1.44 
p > z = 0.150 
Hansen J-stat  2.26 p > z = 0.812 
 1.63 
p > z = 0.897 
 2.88 
p > z = 0.824 
Difference-in-Hansen test         
- GMM instruments for levels  
2 (2) = 0.93 
p > z = 0.627 
 2 (2) = 0.23 
p > z = 0.889 
 2 (2) = 2.50 
p > z = 0.287 
No. of Instruments  13  14  17 
No. of Banks  55  55  55 
Observations  412  412  412 
Source: Author’s calculations using Stata (v 14.0) software 
 
Estimation Results – Maturity Transformation Risk and Islamic Banks’ 
Stability Model 
This section provides empirical evidence for the effect of maturity transformation risk on the 
stability of Islamic banks. For empirical estimations, we applied three specifications to our 
regression model (equation (3.11)). First, we estimated the regression model using only bank 
specific variables. For the second and third specifications, we included industry-specific and 
macroeconomic variables in the regression model, respectively. Table 4.12 presents the two-
step System GMM dynamic panel data estimation results of “Maturity Transformation Risk 
and Islamic Banks’ Stability” model, using natural log of Z-score (ln_Z-score) as the dependent 
variable. Equation (A) in Table 4.12, shows the effect of maturity transformation risk and 
other bank-specific variables on the stability of Islamic banks. We also controlled for the 
industry-specific effects on Islamic banks’ stability in equation (B). The model was re-
estimated after controlling for the macroeconomic factors, in addition to the bank-specific 




Table 4.12  Estimations based on Natural Log of Z score (ln_Z-scoreit) as the Dependent 
Variable using Two-step System GMM Model 
  (A)  (B)  (C) 
         
ln_Z-scoreit-1 
 0.6723 *** 
(0.1355) 
 0.2849 *** 
(0.1001) 
 0.5804 *** 
(0.1584) 
         
NSFRit 
 0.6647 *** 
(0.2106) 
 0.7952 *** 
(0.2368) 
 0.5958 *** 
(0.1903) 
         
SIZEit 




 0.1172 ** 
(0.0497) 
         
CAPit 






         
NONII_TAit 
 -0.12 * 
(0.0646) 
 -0.1698 ** 
(0.0766) 
 -0.1551 *** 
(0.0537) 








         
LLRTLit 
 -0.047 ** 
(0.0197) 
 -0.0569 ** 
(0.0238) 
 -0.047 *** 
(0.0113) 




 0.0066 ** 
(0.0033) 
 0.0078 ** 
(0.003) 






 -0.0295 ** 
(0.0113) 






 -0.009 * 
(0.005) 








         
Cons. 






         Equations (A), (B) and (C) are the three specifications of our proposed model in equation (3.11), where equation (A) estimates 
the bank-specific variables only, while industry specific and macroeconomic variables are included in equations (B) and (C), 
respectively. All explanatory variables are defined in Table 3.5. 
Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 
Source: Author’s calculations using Stata (v 14.0) software. 
The estimation results reported in Table 4.12 are mainly in line with our expectations. The 
coefficient of the lagged dependent variable remains positive and highly significant at a 1% 
significance level, in all three specifications. This confirms the dynamic characteristic of our 
model, which implies that the stability factor of previous year, significantly affects the current 
year stability of Islamic banks, especially during the sample period.  
The results of our regression model also show that the maturity transformation risk, as 
measured by NSFR, is a significant determinant in explaining the stability of Islamic banks. The 
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positive sign of the NSFR coefficient, in all regression specifications, is consistent with our 
expectations, as summarized in Table 3.4. The coefficient 𝛾1 takes the value of 0.66, 0.79 and 
0.59 in equations (A), (B) and (C), respectively, and remains highly significant at a 1% level in 
all three model specifications. Since maturity transformation risk decreases with an increase 
in net stable funding ratio, the regression results reveal an inverse relationship between 
exposure to maturity transformation risk and the stability of Islamic banks. Our empirical 
findings endorse the adoption of this new IFSB liquidity regulatory requirement by Islamic 
banks, which can significantly improve their stability through appropriate adjustments in 
maturities of their balance sheet components, on both assets and liability sides. Our findings 
are consistent with Ashraf et al.’s (2016) study, which argued that the inclusion of NSFR would 
lead to an increased in the financial stability of Islamic banks, by reducing the maturity 
mismatch of their assets and liabilities. A higher value of NSFR depicts the lower maturity 
mismatch between the components on both sides of the balance sheet, thus enabling banks 
to meet their funding requirements, when needed. This subsequently reduces their potential 
risk of “run on banks” and hence, they demonstrate greater stability. Our findings also find 
support from the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), which emphasized that 
core deposits are more stable than both short and long-term wholesale funding (BIS, 2009). 
Therefore, banks which rely more on market funding possess a lower net stable funding ratio 
and a higher degree of maturity transformation risk, which consequently reduces their 
stability. Similarly, a decrease in required amount of stable funding through more short-term 
financing activities and an increased proportion of less risky investments can help Islamic 
banks to achieve higher levels of stability. 
The estimation results in Table 4.12 show that the coefficients of bank-specific factors are 
largely consistent with our expectations, thus providing empirical support for our hypotheses. 
Bank size (SIZE) shows a positive impact on stability of Islamic banks in all regression 
equations. The SIZE coefficient is statistically significant at 10% and 5% in equations (A) and 
(C), respectively. This implies that larger Islamic banks show more stability in terms of their 
probability of default, as compared to smaller banks. In a recent study, Ashraf et al. (2016) 
stressed that larger Islamic banks, which maintain the regulatory requirement of net stable 
funding ratio of more than 100%, are more stable than smaller Islamic banks. Since, the banks 
included in our sample on average, maintain the ratio well above the minimum regulatory 
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requirement during the study period, our estimation results remain consistent with Ashraf et 
al.’s (2016) findings. 
Our results are also similar to the findings of Ibrahim and Rizvi (2017), who concluded that 
bank size has a significant and positive influence on the stability of Islamic banks, once they 
reach to a certain threshold asset size. A possible reason that our estimated SIZE coefficient 
remains positive in all regression specifications is that almost all of our sample banks have 
asset sizes of more than US$ 324 million (a threshold of bank’s asset size calculated by Ibrahim 
and Rizvi (2017), beyond which the SIZE coefficient shows a positive influence on stability of 
Islamic Banks). However, our results contradict those of Čihák and Hesse (2010). They argue 
that sized banks are more stable than larger Islamic banks. One possible explanation could be 
the difference in the study periods. The authors also did not consider the dynamic 
relationship, nor did they control for the potential sources of endogeneity among the 
regressors and the dependent variable.   
Among the other bank-specific explanatory variables, both income diversification (NONII) and 
credit risk (LLRTL) are associated with lower stability of the Islamic banks. The coefficient of 
NONII takes the value of -0.12, -0.17 and -0.16 in regression specification (A), (B) and (C) in 
Table 4.12, respectively, and shows an increased significance level after controlling for 
industry-specific and macroeconomic factors. Our results suggest that the increased reliance 
of bank management on revenue from non-traditional banking activities significantly reduces 
the stability of Islamic banks. This negative diversification – stability relationship can be 
explained in terms of the high volatility of income generated from diversified activities, as 
highlighted by Busch and Kick (2009) and Stiroh (2006), as well as its contribution towards 
systemic risk (Brunnermeier et al., 2012). The other reason could be that Islamic banks tend 
to over-diversify when they possess little expertise and experience in market-oriented 
diversified activities. This leads to higher risks. We find support for our estimation results from 
the previous studies of Abedifar et al. (2013) and Čihák and Hesse (2010), where the authors 
concluded that Islamic banks, which are heavily reliant on diversified income sources, are less 
stable. Our results are also consistent with the findings of previous studies on the 
conventional banking system (for example Chiaramonte et al., 2015; Demirgüç-Kunt & 
Huizinga, 2010a; Mercieca et al., 2007). In their studies, the authors make clear that an 
increase in shares of non-interest income increases the banks’ insolvency risk, due to high 
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volatility in returns. However, our results contradict the empirical findings of Ashraf et al. 
(2016), where the authors explain that an increase in shares of diverse income sources 
significantly improves the stability of Islamic banks. 
The measure of asset quality, loan loss reserves to total assets (𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑇𝐿), remains significant 
and negatively associated with the bank stability measure in our regression models, providing 
robust empirical evidence that banks with higher credit risk are more unstable. The coefficient 
of 𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑇𝐿 takes the values of -0.047, -0.056 and -0.047 in regression equations (A), (B) and 
(C), respectively. The significance level also increased from 5% to 1%, after controlling for both 
industry-specific and macroeconomic variables in equation (C). Since the higher value of 
𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑇𝐿 reflects poor asset quality, or in other words, it corresponds to a higher credit risk, our 
estimation results suggest that the stability of Islamic banks significantly decreases with 
deteriorating asset quality. Our findings are similar Trad et al.’s (2017), who assert that the 
stability of Islamic banks is a reflection of the bank’s better asset quality. 
Although the coefficients of bank capitalization (𝐶𝐴𝑃) and management efficiency (𝐸𝐹𝐹) are 
consistent with our assumption, in terms of direction, , the impact of both variables remains 
inconclusive on stability, as they lose their significance after controlling for industry and 
macroeconomic variables. Hence, we could not find any empirical evidence in support of bank 
capital and management efficiency in explaining the stability of Islamic banks. 
Our results show that the bank concentration 3_𝐶𝑂𝑁𝐶 variable is significantly associated with 
the increased stability of Islamic banks at a 5% level, and remains consistent after controlling 
for country level macroeconomic conditions. This positive concentration – stability 
relationship implies that Islamic banks are more stable in less competitive industries and 
increased competition attracts financial fragility. This can be explained by the reason that 
Islamic banking is still in its infancy stage in most of our sample countries. The regulatory 
support provided by the governments in terms of restricted entry and high capital 
requirements provide better profit opportunities, capital buffers to macroeconomic and 
liquidity shocks and consequently fewer incentives to take aggressive risks, with positive 
repercussions for financial stability. Our results are consistent with the findings of previous 
studies on the concentration – stability nexus, for example Ali, Intissar, and Zeitun (2018), 
Beck, De Jonghe, and Schepens (2013) and Berger, Klapper, and Ariss (2009), where the 
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authors concluded that the likelihood of financial stability increases in a more concentrated 
market, through increased profitability and capitalization.  
Among the macroeconomic factors, the overall economic freedom and growth in gross 
domestic product are significant factors in explaining the stability of Islamic banks. However, 
we find no empirical evidence regarding the significant impact of inflation on bank stability. 
In a stark contrast to our expectations, the coefficient of economic freedom (𝐸𝐶𝑂_𝐹) takes 
the value of -0.029 and is significant at a 5% level, suggesting that the regulatory restrictions 
significantly contribute towards the increased stability of Islamic banks. Similarly, the fragility 
of Islamic banks increases in a more deregulated environment. We find support for our 
estimation results from the recent study of Asteriou et al. (2016), who argue that greater 
economic freedom has adverse effects on the financial stability of middle income countries 
and stricter regulations have a positive impact on the stability of larger banks. A possible 
reason could be that with more economic freedom, it is easier to enter the sector. This results 
in increased levels of market competition, consequently worsening the average profitability 
of banks. This may lead to increased bank risk appetite, thus inducing financial fragility. 
Moreover, banks in a deregulated economy tend to invest in more short-term unsecure risky 
assets to obtain higher profits. While doing so, their credit risk increases, which in turn lead 
to the higher probability of bank default. The results support our previous argument that 
Islamic banks are more likely to be stable in concentrated markets, where it is also easier for 
regulators to monitor bank performance, thus ensuring their stability. However, Moghadam 
(2015) provided contradictory results and argued that banks with higher freedom to 
undertake intermediation activities can achieve economies of scale and thus are more 
efficient and stable. In a similar vein, Baier et al. (2012) found that the probability of financial 
crisis is likely to be less in economies with greater levels of economic freedom.  
Contrary to our expectations, the growth in gross domestic product (GDP) also shows a 
significant negative relationship with the stability of Islamic banks, implying that the stability 
of Islamic banks is adversely affected during the period of economic growth. Although the 
previous studies of Köhler (2015), Diaconu and Oanea (2014), and Sufian and Habibullah 
(2012) argue that better economic conditions improve bank loan quality.  Additionally, during 
periods of economic upturn, banks are encouraged to lend more and thus are more stable. 
However, our findings of the negative economic growth – stability relationship suggest that 
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larger Islamic banks lack management skills and expertise to maintain the overall asset quality 
(Beck et al., 2013), which result in increased credit risks and thus impedes their stability.  
4.6.1 Robustness Analysis 
We run several specifications tests to confirm the robustness of our main results. Table 4.13 
shows the results of various regression specifications. The results presented in equations (1) 
and (2) in Table 4.13 were obtained after interacting maturity transformation risk (𝑁𝑆𝐹𝑅) 
with bank size (𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸) and economic freedom(𝐸𝐶𝑂_𝐹), respectively. The positive significant 
coefficient of 𝑁𝑆𝐹𝑅 × 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 in equation (1) shows that the marginal impact of NSFR on 
stability increases with an increase in bank size, providing support for our main findings. The 
positive moderating effect of the interaction term suggests that larger Islamic banks, which 
maintain the regulatory requirements of NSFR are more stable. Moreover, the coefficient of 
NSFR x ECO_F is negative and significant in equation (2), provides evidence of the negative 
moderating role of this interaction term on the stability of Islamic banks. This suggests that 
the marginal effect of NSFR on the stability of Islamic banks significantly diminishes in more 
deregulated environments. 
We further utilize four different measures of economic freedom; that is, business freedom 
(BUS_F), monetary freedom (MON_F), financial freedom (FIN_F) and freedom from 
corruption (COR_F), alternatively in our regression model to determine the consistency of our 
main findings. The results are reported in equations (3), (4), (5) and (6), respectively. The 
results obtained are largely consistent with our main findings (see Table 4.12). The NSFR 
coefficient remains significant and positive in all our regression specifications, providing 
strong support for the inclusion of new IFSB liquidity requirement for Islamic banking stability. 
Moreover, income diversification, asset quality and bank concentration remain consistent in 
explaining the stability of Islamic banks. The negative and significant coefficients of both 
business freedom (BUS_F) and financial freedom (FIN_F) are consistent with our expectations. 
The results further strengthen our argument that banks operating in economies with more 
freedom are prone to financial instability. Therefore, more regulations are required to 
maintain banking system stability. Our results also suggest that a lesser degree of government 
intervention in determining the country’s monetary policy also enhances the financial stability 
of Islamic banks. Similarly, the significantly positive coefficient of freedom from corruption 
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(COR_F) also suggests that the banking system is more stable in economies with lower 
corruption levels.  
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Table 4.13    Robustness Analysis: ln_Zscoreit as the Dependent Variable in Maturity Transformation Risk and Banks’ Stability Model 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
               
Ln_Zscoreit-1 
 0.6531 *** 
(0.2223) 
 0.8959 *** 
(0.2499) 
 0.3432 *** 
(0.1275) 
 0.4027 *** 
(0.1454) 
 0.5276 *** 
(0.1246) 
 0.3089 *** 
(0.105) 
               
NSFRit 
 -3.384 * 
(1.8665) 
 7.3867 ** 
(3.4944) 
 0.9337 *** 
(0.2577) 
 0.8532 ** 
(0.3907) 
 0.4827 ** 
(0.2221) 
 0.9174 *** 
(0.2807) 
               
SIZEit 


























               
NONII_TAit 




 -0.1408 ** 
(0.0643) 




 -0.1116 * 
(0.0587) 












 -0.0032 ** 
(0.0014) 
               
LLRTLit 
 -0.041 *** 
(0.0141) 
 -0.0418 *** 
(0.0142) 
 -0.0661 *** 
(0.0125) 
 -0.0632 *** 
(0.0178) 
 -0.0477 *** 
(0.0137) 
 -0.0669 *** 
(0.0089) 
               
3_CONCit 
 0.0051 ** 
(0.0025) 
 0.008 ** 
(0.0036) 






















               
NSFRit x SIZEit 












               
NSFRit x ECO_Ft 
 
 

































































 0.0083 * 
(0.0049) 
               
GDPt 




 -0.0166 *** 
(0.0061) 
 -0.0165 ** 
(0.0072) 
 -0.0089 * 
(0.0049) 
 -0.0164 *** 
(0.0054) 














               
Cons. 
 4.9094 ** 
(2.4179) 










               
               Columns (1) and (2) are the two specifications of our regression model (equation (3.11)) with two interaction terms NSFRit x SIZEit and NSFRit x ECO_Ft, respectively. Column (3) to (6) report 
the results of our specifications after including BUSS_Ft, MON_Ft, FIN_Ft, and CORR_Ft, respectively. All explanatory variables are defined in Table 3.5. 
Robust standard errors are in parenthesis. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10%, respectively. 
 






4.6.2 Post Estimation Tests for Validity of 2-step System GMM Dynamic Panel Data 
Analysis 
The validity of two-step System GMM estimation is assessed with the number of instruments 
used, in AR(2), Hansen J and Difference-in-Hansen tests. Tables 4.14 presents a summary of 
the post estimation tests to verify the estimates obtained by the two-step System GMM 
estimation technique, utilizing ln_Zscore as the dependent variables in the maturity 
transformation risk and Islamic bank stability model. The validity of our estimation results, 
obtained for robustness analysis, are presented in Table 4.15. The F-statistics of all regression 
models are highly significant at the 1% significance level. This rejects the null hypotheses that 
all estimated coefficients are jointly equal to zero, in all model specifications. 
4.6.2.1 Tests for Autocorrelation 
The AR(1) tests’ z-statistics are negative and statistically significant in all the specifications of 
our model defined in equation (3.11), and indicate the presence of the negative first-order 
autocorrelation among idiosyncratic disturbances in difference. However, z-statistics of the 
AR(2) tests in all specifications are insignificant with p-values 0.983, 0.319, and 0.557 in Table 
4.14 and p-values 0.935, 0.517, 0.246, 0.268, 0.630 and 0.248 in Table 4.15, respectively. 
Therefore, the null hypothesis of no second-order serial correlation in idiosyncratic errors is 
accepted, indicating the nonexistence of first-order autocorrelation in their levels. This also 
confirms our choice of the number of lags selection from period 𝑡 − 2 or earlier in levels, which 
can be used as valid instruments in the differenced equation (Roodman, 2009b).  
4.6.2.2 Tests for Over-identification and Exogeneity of Instruments 
The test statistics of the Hansen test of over-identification in Table 4.14, reveal the J-statistics 
of 13.90 (p-value = 0.519), 5.11 (p-value = 0.954) and 9.75 (p-value = 0.637) in equations (A), 
(B) and (C), respectively. Similarly, Table 4.15 reports the Hansen J test statistics of 12.36 (p-
value = 0.652), 2.59 (p-value = 0.763), 2.46 (p-value = 0.982), 4.66 (p-value = 0.794), 12.83 (p-
value = 0.381), and 6.83 (p-value = 0.968) in equation (1) to (6), respectively. The p-values 
greater than 10% indicate that the null hypothesis of the exogeneity of all instruments as a 
group can be accepted. Furthermore, to test the exogeneity of instrument subsets, Difference-
in-Hansen tests were conducted. All p-values of the Difference-in-Hansen test statistics for all 
specifications in both Tables 4.14 and 4.15 are insignificant (with p > 0.10). There is no 
evidence to reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity of instruments subsets. Hence, the results 
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of both the Hansen J test and the Difference-in-Hansen test support the exogeneity of 
instrumental variables used in all the regression specifications. In addition, the number of 
instruments is kept smaller than the number of groups as recommended by Roodman (2009b). 
Conclusively, all post-estimation specification tests strongly support the validity of our 
estimation results utilizing the two-step System GMM estimation technique. 
Table 4.14 Post-estimation Specification Tests – ln_Zscore as the Dependent Variable in 
“Maturity Transformation Risk and Islamic Banks’ Stability” Model 
         
    (A)  (B)  (C) 
         
F-Statistics  
 18.23 
p = 0.000 
 16.86 
p = 0.000 
 23.13 
p = 0.000 
         
AR(1) test stat 
 -1.68 
p > z = 0.092 
 -1.69 
p > z = 0.092 
 -1.72 
p > z = 0.085 
         
AR(2) test stat 
 -0.02 
p > z  = 0.983 
 -1.00 
p > z  = 0.319 
 -0.59 
p > z  = 0.557 
         
Hansen J-stat 
 𝜒2 (14) = 13.09 
p > z  = 0.519 
 𝜒2 (2) = 5.11 
p > z  = 0.954 
 𝜒2 (12) = 9.75 
p > z  = 0.637 
Difference-in-Hansen test         
         
- GMM instruments for levels  𝜒
2 (2) = 1.65 
p > z  = 0.438 
 𝜒2 (2) = 1.78 
p > z  = 0.620 
 𝜒2 (3) = 1.03 
p > z  = 0.793 
         
- IV    𝜒
2 (4) = 7.40 
p > z  = 0.116 
 𝜒2 (2) = 2.20 
p > z  = 0.820 
 𝜒2 (8) = 8.14 
p > z  = 0.420 
         
No. of Instruments  22  21  24 
         
No. of Banks  55  55  55 
         
Observations  412  412  412 




Table 4.15 Two-step System GMM Post-estimation Specification Tests – Robustness Analysis of Maturity Transformation Risk and Banks’ Stability 
Model 




p = 0.000 
 16.86 
p = 0.000 
 44.13 
p = 0.000 
 33.98 
p = 0.000 
 24.15 
p = 0.000 
 56.83 
p = 0.000 
           
AR(1) test stat 
 
-1.53 
p > z = 0.126 
 -1.50 
p > z = 0.134 
 -1.73 
p > z = 0.084 
 -1.71 
p > z = 0.088 
 -1.68 
p > z = 0.093 
 -1.81 
p > z = 0.070 
           
AR(2) test stat 
 
-0.08 
p > z = 0.934 
 0.65 
p > z = 0.517 
 -1.16 
p > z = 0.246 
 -1.11 
p > z = 0.268 
 -0.48 
p > z = 0.630 
 -1.15 
p > z = 0.248 
           
Hansen J-stat 
 
𝜒2 (15) = 12.36 
p > z = 0.652 
 𝜒2 (5) = 2.59 
p > z = 0.763 
 𝜒2 (9) = 2.46 
p > z = 0.982 
 𝜒2 (8) = 4.66 
p > z = 0.794 
 𝜒2 (12) = 12.83 
p > z = 0.381 
 𝜒2 (15) = 6.83 
p > z = 0.962 
Difference-in-Hansen test             
           
- GMM instruments for levels 
 
𝜒2 (3) = 0.68 
p > z = 0.877 
 𝜒2 (3) = 1.67 
p > z = 0.643 
 𝜒2 (3) = 1.38 
p > z = 0.709 
 𝜒2 (3) = 3.66 
p > z = 0.301 
 𝜒2 (3) = 1.76 
p > z = 0.623 
 𝜒2 (3) = 0.70 
p > z = 0.874 
           
No. of Instruments  28  18  21  20  24  27 
           
No. of Banks  55  55  55  55  55  55 
           
Observations  412  412  412  412  412  412 




Summary and Conclusion 
Introduction 
This chapter provides a summary of the present study. Section 5.2 details the focus of the 
study. Section 5.3 summarizes the empirical findings of the study. Section 5.4 provides the 
policy implications of the research results. Section 5.5 discusses contributions to the literature. 
Section 5.6 presents the limitations of this study, while recommendations for future research 
are provided in section 5.7. 
Focus of the Study 
In the wake of the 2007-08 global financial crisis, maturity transformation risk has come to the 
attention of regulators, who have called for improved bank liquidity management practices. 
To harmonize the robust management and monitoring of maturity transformation risk in the 
Islamic banking industry, the Islamic Financial Services Board (IFSB), the standards setting 
body for Islamic financial institutions, endorsed the Basel III liquidity regulations. The IFSB 
recommended the implementation of a modified net stable funding ratio , as a 
structural measure for the maturity transformation function for Islamic banks, to account for 
their unique balance sheet structure. This micro-prudential measure of maturity 
transformation risk prohibits the banks from excessive reliance on unstable short-term funds 
(Arvanitis & Drakos, 2015), which adversely effects performance and stability of the Islamic 
banking sector. In other words, this new regulatory requirement is designed to manage the 
bank's liquidity position in the long run, by introducing continuous structural changes in the 
bank’s balance sheet, to fund their activities with more stable funding sources. This study has 
investigated the factors that are significantly associated with the maturity transformation risk 
in Islamic banks, and explored the relationship of maturity transformation risk with the 
profitability and stability of the Islamic banking sector. More specifically, this study has 
answered the following three questions. 
Question 1: 
What are the factors that significantly influence the maturity transformation risk in the 
Islamic banking sector? 
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Question 2:  
How is maturity transformation risk associated with the financial performance of Islamic 
banks? 
Question 3: 
Does the inclusion of net stable funding ratio contribute towards the improved stability of 
Islamic banks? 
To explore the above research questions, we developed three empirical models; that is the 
“determinants of maturity transformation risk” model, the “maturity transformation risk and 
Islamic banks’ profitability” model and the “maturity transformation risk and Islamic banks’ 
stability” model, respectively. The data required to achieve these objectives was sourced from 
the Bloomberg database and cross checked with the publicly available banks’ consolidated 
annual reports. We used unconsolidated data where banks’ consolidated information was not 
reported in the annual reports. In addition, we used hand collected relevant financial 
information from banks’ annual reports and followed the ISFB Guidance Note No. 6, to 
calculate the NSFR. The sample period of the study was from 2006 to 2015, and comprised of 
55 fully fledged Islamic banks, from 11 different countries. A two-step system GMM dynamic 
panel data estimation technique and various pre- and post-estimation diagnostic tests were 
used to investigate the research questions and to check the validity of the models employed 
in the study. Moreover, this study employed alternative estimation techniques, such as 
quantile regression and two-stage least squares, to check the robustness of the main findings. 
Summary of Empirical Findings 
This section summarizes the empirical findings of the three models used in this study. Before 
examining these relationships, based on dynamic panel data analysis, this study applied 
several pre-estimation diagnostic tests to check for the presence of potential unit root, 
multicollinearity, individual effects, heteroscedasticity and serial-correlation problems. We 
utilized the Fisher-type ADF test to check for the presence of unit root in our dataset, which 
can produce spurious regression results. The results in Appendix Table B.1 show that there is 
no unit root problem in the data set, which suggests that the mean and variance does not 
depend on time, hence the regression analysis can produce meaningful results (Gujarati, 
2009). The Pearson pair-wise correlation test results in Appendix Tables B.2.1 to B.2.3 show 
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that there is a significant correlation among the explanatory variables in all three models, 
which prompts further empirical investigation. The results indicate no correlation among the 
regressors exceeds the value of 0.80, which suggests the non-existence of multicollinearity 
among the selected variables (Gujarati, 2009). The individual fixed effects are confirmed in the 
three regression models, as the Hausman test p-values reported in Appendix Tables B.3.1 to 
B.3.2 remain at a significance level of less than 10%. Moreover, the results of Breusch-Pagan 
test for heteroscedasticity and the Wooldridge test for serial-correlation reported in Appendix 
Tables B.4 and B.5, respectively, also confirm that residuals are not identically distributed and 
are correlated with the explanatory variables, in all model specifications. The dynamic nature 
of the three regression models used in this study, was confirmed by introducing lagged 
dependent variable in pooled OLS10. However, the inclusion of lagged dependent variable 
causes a simultaneity problem, in which case the results obtained through pooled OLS and or 
fixed effects estimation techniques will not be consistent and efficient. To address the issues 
of heteroscedasticity, serial correlation and potential endogeneity, this study utilized the two-
step system GMM dynamic panel data estimation technique. The summary of the empirical 
results for the “determinants of maturity transformation risk” model is presented in section 
5.3.1. The empirical findings for “maturity transformation risk and Islamic banks’ profitability” 
model and the “maturity transformation risk and Islamic banks’ stability” model, are 
summarized in sections 5.3.2 and 5.3.3, respectively. 
5.3.1 Summary Findings of the “Determinants of Maturity Transformation Risk” 
Model 
The first objective of this study was to determine the influence of various bank-specific and 
macroeconomic variables on maturity transformation risk in the Islamic banking sector. Table 
5.1 summarizes the results obtained for the “determinants of maturity transformation risk” 
model. The table shows that the lagged dependent variable is highly significant in all model 
specifications, thus confirming the dynamic nature of our model. Among the bank-specific 
factors, bank size (SIZE), capital (CAP) and external funding dependence (NDD and STB) have 
a significant and positive impact on maturity transformation risk in Islamic banks, during the 
sample period, when the net stable funding ratio (NSFR) is used as the dependent variable. 
The results remained consistent after utilizing financing gap ratio (FGR) as an alternative 
                                                          
10 The R-square value increases significantly when the lagged dependent variables are introduced into the 
individual POLS regression model. For brevity, test results are not presented, since this is not the scope of the 
present study. However, the results can be made available upon request.    
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measure of maturity transformation risk. Bank profitability (ROAA), liquid assets (both less-
risky and risky liquid assets scales on total assets) and market power (MP) also show significant 
impact on maturity transformation risk in the sample banks, but in the opposite direction. 
Table 5.1 Summary of Empirical Findings using Two-step Robust System GMM – 
“Determinants of Maturity Transformation Risk” Model 
  NSFR  FGR 
  (A)  (B)  (A1)  (B1) 
         
NSFRit-1  (+)***  (+)***     
         
FGRit-1      (+)***  (+)*** 
         
SIZEit  (-)**  (-)***  (+)**  (+)** 
         
CAPit  (-)***  (-)***  (+)***  (+)*** 
         
ROAAit  (+)***  (+)**  (-)  (-) 
         
LRLA_TAit  (+)***  (+)***  (-)***  (-)*** 
         
RLA_TAit  (+)***  (+)***  (+)***  (+)*** 
         
MPit  (+)  (+)**  (-)***  (-)*** 
         
LLRTLit  (+)  (+)  (+)**  (+)** 
         
NDDit  (-)***  (-)***  (+)***  (+)*** 
         
STBit  (-)***  (-)**  (+)***  (+)** 
         
GDPi    (-)    (-) 
         
INFi    (-)**    (+)* 
         
Note: (+) and (-) represent the direction of relationship with dependent variable. Model specifications are discussed in Tables 
4.2 and 4.3. 
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Source: Author’s calculations using Stata (v 14.0) software. 
 
Among the macroeconomic variables, consumer price index, as a measure of inflation (INF) 
significantly affects the maturity transformation risk in Islamic banks during the sample period. 
Consistent results were obtained after utilizing the alternative measure of maturity 
transformation risk. Further, we could not find any evidence of the influence of bank credit 
risk (LLRTL) in determining maturity transformation risk (NSFR as the dependent variable). 
Moreover, we did not find any evidence for the impact of growth in gross domestic product 
(GDP) on maturity transformation risk in the sample banks, during the study period. 
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5.3.2 Summary Findings of the “Maturity Transformation Risk and Islamic Banks’ 
Profitability” Model 
The second objective of this study was to investigate the relationship between maturity 
transformation risk and the profitability of Islamic banks. Table 5.2 summarizes the empirical 
results obtained based on the two-step robust system GMM dynamic panel data estimation 
technique. The highly significant and positive lagged dependent variable in all regression 
specifications implies that the profitability of Islamic banks persists over time. As expected, 
the NSFR remains significant in explaining the increasing profitability of Islamic banks. 
Therefore, we suggest that the profitability of Islamic banks is significantly affected by their 
level of maturity transformation risk exposure. Our results remain robust even after 
controlling for industry and macroeconomic factors, and also after utilizing ROAE as an 
alternative measure of bank profitability. NSFR remains significant, both in direction and 
magnitude, in explaining the Islamic banks’ profitability. Moreover, various factors at bank, 
industry and country levels, included in the regression specifications, are consistent with our 
expectations. More specifically, bank capitalization (CAP) shows a positive and significant 
relationship with the profitability of Islamic banks, in all regression models. Similarly, bank 
concentration (3_CONC) also remains significant in determining the increased financial 
performance of our sample banks. On the contrary, management efficiency (EFF) and loan loss 
reserves (LLRLTL) remain significant and negative while explaining Islamic bank profitability, 
during the study period.  
However, the relationship of bank size (SIZE), income diversification (NONII_TA) growth in 
gross domestic product (GDP) and inflation (INF) with the profitability of Islamic banks remain 
inconclusive, as they lose their significance when alternative profitability measures are 
applied.  Both, SIZE and GDP are significant and positive in determining the banks’ profitability, 
when using ROAA as the dependent variable. Although the direction remains consistent, they 
lose their significance power in explaining financial performance, when ROAE is used as an 
alternative profitability measure. Furthermore, the direction of the relationship between 
inflation and profitability remains negative. But it is only significant in explaining Islamic banks’ 
profitability, when ROAA is used as the dependent variable. Similarly, income diversification 
shows a significant relationship with Islamic banks’ profitability, only when ROAE is utilized as 
the dependent variable. It shows no significant relationship with ROAA.  
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Table 5.2 Summary of Empirical Findings using Two-step Robust System GMM – 
“Maturity Transformation Risk and Islamic Banks’ Profitability” Model 
 ROAA  ROAE 
VARIABLES (A) (B) (C)  (A1) (B1) (C1) 
        
ROAAit-1 (+)*** (+)*** (+)***     
        
ROAE it-1     (+)*** (+)*** (+)*** 
        
NSFRit (+)** (+)** (+)**  (+)* (+)* (+)* 
        
CAPit (+)* (+)*** (+)***  (+)*** (+)*** (+)*** 
        
SIZEit (+) (-)** (-)**  (+) (-) (-) 
        
NONII_TAit (+) (+) (+)  (+)* (+)** (+)** 
        
EFFit (-)*** (-) (-)*  (-)*** (-)*** (-)*** 
        
LLRTLit (-)** (-)*** (-)***  (-)** (-)** (-)*** 
        
3_CONCit  (+)*** (+)**   (+)* (+)** 
        
GDPt    (+)***    (+) 
        
INFt    (-)*    (-) 
        
Note: (+) and (-) represent the direction of relationship with the dependent variable. Model specifications are discussed in 
Tables 4.7 and 4.8. 
 ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Source: Author’s calculations using Stata (v 14.0) software. 
 
5.3.3 Summary Finding of the “Maturity Transformation Risk and Islamic Banks’ 
Stability” Model 
The last objective of this study examined the relationship between maturity transformation 
risk and the stability of Islamic banks. To answer this objective, we applied the two-step robust 
system GMM dynamic panel data estimation technique. We used natural log of Z-score (ln_Z-
score) to measure the stability of Islamic banks. The results are summarized in Table 5.3. The 
highly significant value of lagged dependent variable confirms the dynamic nature of our 
model specifications and provides robust empirical evidence of the persistence of stability 
over time, in the Islamic banking sector. The coefficient of NSFR, in all regression 
specifications, remains positive and highly significant in explaining the increased stability of 
Islamic banks, which meets our expectations and thus rejects the null hypothesis of no 
association between net stable funding ratio and stability, at a 1% significance level. This 
implies that the inclusion of new regulatory requirements have significant beneficial effects 
on Islamic banks’ stability. Bank size (SIZE) is the other bank-specific factor, which is significant 
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and positively associated with the stability of Islamic banks. Moreover, 3_CONC, which is a 
measure of bank concentration, also impacts on the financial stability of Islamic banks. This 
positive concentration – stability relationship also remains significant in all of the robustness 
checks. In contrast, loan loss reserves (LLRTL) show a consistent negative and significant 
relationship with Islamic banks’ stability, during the study period. Similarly, the overall 
economic freedom (ECO_F) and growth in gross domestic product (GDP) are among the 
macroeconomic factors that show significant and negative impacts on the stability of Islamic 
banks.  
The relationship of NSFR with bank stability remains significant, even after applying a number 
of robustness specifications. First, we introduced four alternative measures of economic 
freedom in our regression model. The results presented in columns (3) to (6) in Table 5.3 
reveal that the inclusion of the business freedom index (BUS_F), the monetary freedom index 
(MON_F), the financial freedom index (FIN_F) and the freedom from corruption index, 
individually in the regression model, exhibit similar effects of new liquidity regulatory 
requirements on the stability of Islamic banks. Next, we introduced two interaction terms 
(“𝑁𝑆𝐹𝑅 × 𝐸𝐶𝑂_𝐹” and “𝑁𝑆𝐹𝑅 × 𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸”) to our regression model (see columns (1) and (2) in 
Table 5.3), and found that the effect of NSFR is more pronounced on stability, when Islamic 




Table 5.3 Summary of Empirical Findings using Two-step Robust System GMM – “Maturity Transformation Risk and Islamic Bank Stability” 
Model 
  Main Findings  Robustness Analysis 
  (A)  (B)  (C)  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
                     
ln_Zscoreit-1  (+)***   (+)***  (+)***  (+)***  (+)***  (+)***  (+)***  (+)***  (+)*** 
NSFRit  (+)***  (+)***  (+)***  (-)*  (+)**  (+)***  (+)**  (+)**  (+)*** 
SIZEit  (+)*  (+)  (+)**  (-)*  (+)  (+)**  (-)  (+)*  (-) 
CAPit  (+)*  (+)  (+)  (+)  (+)  (+)*  (+)  (+)  (+) 
NONII_TAit  (-)*  (-)**  (-)***  (-)**  (-)  (-)**  (-)*  (-)  (-)* 
EFFit  (-)  (-)*  (-)  (-)  (-)  (-)  (-)**  (-)  (-)** 
LLRTLit  (-)**  (-)**  (-)***  (-)***  (-)***  (-)***  (-)***  (-)***  (-)*** 
3_CONCit    (+)**  (+)**  (+)**  (+)**  (+)**  (+)  (+)**  (+) 
ECO_Ft      (-)**  (-)  (+)*         
NSFRit x SIZEit        (+)**           
NSFRit x ECO_Ft          (-)**         
BUSS_Ft            (-)**       
MON_Ft              (+)**     
FIN_Ft                (-)**   
CORR_Ft                  (+)* 
GDPt      (-)*  (-)**  (-)  (-)***  (-)**  (-)*  (-)*** 
INFt      (+)  (+)  (-)  (+)  (+)  (+)  (+) 
                     
Note: (+) and (-) represent the direction of relationship with dependent variable. Model specifications are discussed in Tables 4.12 and 4.13. 
 ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Source: Author’s calculations using Stata (v 14.0) software. 
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Policy Implications of the Research 
The consideration on new regulatory measures for monitoring the maturity transformation 
function of the banking industry first began in 2010, when the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (BCBS) proposed an updated capital and liquidity regulatory framework in its Basel 
III accord. This included the requirements for banks to maintain a certain level of net stable 
funding ratio (NSFR). While endorsing the Basel III requirements, the Islamic Financial Services 
Board (IFSB) instigated the implementations of the adjusted NSFR in the Islamic banking 
sector. The introduction of this regulatory ratio attracted significant attention from 
researchers, industry practitioners and regulators from both the conventional and Islamic 
banking sectors. These measures were seen as a positive step in reducing the possibility, to 
elude any future emergence of situation similar to the global financial crisis of 2007-08. This 
study provides several policy implications, relevant to the Islamic banking regulators and 
practitioners. 
The study’s findings reveal that holding enough liquid assets (both less-risky liquid assets and 
risky liquid assets), helps to maintain banks’ transformation risk, at all levels. This validates the 
new improved liquidity requirements of IFSB, in unification with the Basel III accord, for better 
management of Islamic banks’ liquidity. Furthermore, the excessive reliance on external 
funding sources, more specifically short-term market funding, increases the maturity 
mismatch of assets and liabilities in Islamic banks. This calls for the close monitoring of funding 
sources by practitioners and regulators. Additionally, we find the robust empirical evidence 
that larger Islamic banks tend to increase their maturity transformation function to gain higher 
yields and thus require adoption of improved risk management practices. The findings also 
reveal the need for capacity building in asset – liability management in the case of Islamic 
banks, which grow in their asset size. Similarly, the increased exposure of maturity 
transformation risk among better capitalized Islamic banks also highlight the importance of 
implementing strict regulations to discourage banks from excessive liquidity creation, which 
is consistent with the primary objective of the recent IFSB liquidity reforms. This provides 
support for the implementation of the adjusted net stable funding ratio in Islamic banks. 
This study reports a significant, negative relationship between maturity transformation risk 
and profitability, which implies that the adoption of NSFR leads to a better financial 
performance of Islamic banks. Our findings are important for regulators and bank managers 
in several ways. For example, the Islamic banks, which maintain the minimum regulatory 
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requirement of NSFR, either generate funds from more stable sources or hold enough liquid 
assets to meet their customers’ liquidity. While doing so, such banks are less reliant on 
expensive market funding and thus are more cost efficient and profitable. Therefore, the 
adoption of net stable funding ratio by Islamic banks can significantly improve their financial 
performance. The study’s results did not find support for the risk-return hypothesis, since the 
excessive maturity transformation function by Islamic banks does not contribute to an overall 
increase in profitability. Besides, we found that Islamic banks, which operate on a more 
conservative approach, are more profitable. These findings suggest that practitioners should 
adjust their liquidity creation function, appropriately. Moreover, the positive capital – 
profitability relationship supports the implementation of improved regulatory capital 
requirements in Islamic banks. Our results reveal that the sound capital position of Islamic 
banks provide banks with ease of access to market funding at lower costs, which in turn 
increases their profitability. This provides some important implications, especially to the 
practitioners should monitor the levels of regulatory capital to avoid being under-capitalized, 
since bank capital is a significant factor in explaining the increased performance of Islamic 
banks. Furthermore, this study also suggests that policymakers of Islamic banks should focus 
on increasing management efficiency, introduce improved collection mechanisms, and further 
strengthen their customer relationships, since the CIR and LLRTL empirically reduce the 
profitability of Islamic banks. In addition, the positive concentration – profitability relationship 
warrants increased protection of the Islamic banking industry (by regulators and 
policymakers), to achieve better efficiency and enhanced financial performance.  
This study also reports a significant, negative relationship between maturity transformation 
risk and the stability of Islamic banks, which implies that maintenance of the minimum 
regulatory NSFR requirement is important for improving the financial stability of Islamic banks, 
by reducing the maturity mismatch of their balance sheet components, on both the assets and 
liability sides. Our results strongly support the implementation of NSFR in Islamic banks and 
suggest that policymakers should introduce improved monitoring mechanism to ensure that 
Islamic banks adhere to the IFSB new liquidity regulations. This study’s findings are also 
important for regulators to ensure that they avoid systemic risk because of the increasing 
interdependence of modern technology-oriented banking industry. Moreover, the 
significantly positive bank size and concentration relationship with stability suggests that 
regulators should provide appropriate protection and encourage Islamic banks to grow in their 
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asset size, through mergers or acquisitions, and/or by increasing their core deposit funding, 
to realize the benefits of scale. The study’s findings also suggest that bank management should 
invest more in developing robust risk-mitigation tools to ensure better asset quality and the 
stable financial performance of Islamic banks, while giving due consideration to the unique 
requirements of the Islamic banking sector (for example, compliance with Sharia principles). 
The negative diversification – stability relationship is specifically pertinent to policymakers and 
bank management in that it discourages excessive reliance on non-traditional income sources.  
Finally, our empirical results suggest that overall economic freedom exerts a negative impact 
on the stability of Islamic banks, providing support for the benefits of the regulatory 
interventions contention. This implies that the stability of Islamic banks is more pronounced 
in a regulated environment, where policymakers and regulators play an active role in 
monitoring and devising policies and regulations for the financial industry (such as 
competition level and investment risk). Economic freedom is desirable to create an 
environment where less regulatory control allows banks to freely engage in various non-
traditional activities to benefit from scale and scope economies, and to attain greater financial 
performance and stability. This study’s findings suggest that regulators and policymakers 
should ascertain a certain degree of regulatory control, as the stability of Islamic banks 
deteriorates when they increase their scope of operations.      
Contribution to Literature 
Our work contributes to the existing empirical literature in several ways. First, previous studies 
that focus on the determinants of maturity transformation risk primarily examine on 
conventional banks, from either the US or European countries, where the capital market 
structure is well developed with different dynamics than in developing countries (see for 
example, Gobat, Yanase, & Maloney, 2014; Giordana & Schumacher, 2013; Angora & Roulet, 
2011; BIS, 2010). This may allow banks in the US and Europe easy access to external funding 
sources for their liquidity management. Our study contributes to the existing literature strand 
on maturity transformation risk by including a completely different banking system, that is, 
the Islamic banking system, and use bank data, from developing countries, where the banking 
system is the main source of private business financing. This allows us to examine the impact 
of operation and market restrictions, with regards to Shari'ah compliant financial instruments, 
as well as macroeconomic factors, on the maturity transformation function of Islamic banks.  
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Second, existing studies that examine the intermediation functions of Islamic banks, and in 
particular, the liquidity management requirements, theoretically or empirically, are either 
restricted to one country or are descriptive in nature (Bacha, 2008; Brown et al., 2007; Iqbal 
& Molyneux, 2005; Rosly, 2005Khan & Ahmed, 2001). This is the first study that focuses on 
the measurement of maturity transformation risk and its determinants in Islamic banks which 
operate in different countries in terms of the IFSB’s new liquidity regulations. 
Third, this study finds a positive impact of the IFSB’s proposed NSFR on the profitability and 
stability of Islamic banks. The study’s findings contribute to the growing strand of literature 
on bank liquidity creation and maturity transformation risk in Islamic banking. The study used 
hand-collected data from consolidated annual reports of Islamic banks to calculate the new 
liquidity regulatory measure based on IFSB’s GN-6 guidelines. This study also contributes to 
existing strands of literature on profitability and the stability of Islamic banks, by investigating 
the effect of NSFR as a new prudential structural measure of liquidity, while controlling for 
various factors at firm, country and industry levels. 
Finally, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that attempts to utilize state of the 
art two-step system GMM dynamic panel data estimation techniques, to account for the 
lagged effects of explanatory variables on maturity transformation risk, as well as the 
profitability and stability of Islamic banking system, to address the issues of potential 
endogeneity, heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation. This enables our study to quantify the 
most efficient estimates of the factors that affect maturity transformation risk, and the 
profitability and stability of Islamic banks. 
Limitations  
This study has several limitations, all of which suggest directions for future research. The first 
limitation of this study relates to the availability of data that is necessary to accomplish the 
research objectives identified in Chapter One. The data used for this study was derived from 
the published consolidated annual reports of 55 fully-fledged retail Islamic banks, from 11 
different countries, which is not a complete representation of the Islamic banking industry. 
One of the primary objectives of this study was to calculate the IFSB’s proposed NSFR, for 
which we needed to extract relevant financial information from banks’ annual reports. For this 
reason, we restricted our sample size to Islamic banks whose consolidated annual reports are 
publicly available in English, with a disclosure statement (maturities of assets and liabilities), 
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from their websites. Our final dataset is unbalanced panel data because the annual reports of 
some of the selected banks are not publicly available, for the complete ten years. For future 
research, we recommend accessing multiple data sources, such as Datastream and Bankscope, 
so as to generate a more representative sample of the Islamic banking industry. 
The other limitation of this study relates the accurate calculation of NSFR, following the IFSB 
guidelines. Although GN-6 issued by the IFSB provides comprehensive quantitative guidelines, 
the major limitation in calculating the NSFR is the lack of available granular data on liquidity 
risk reporting across Islamic banks. This study adopts Ashraf et al.’s (2016) methodology to 
compute the NSFR variable, and made several assumptions with respect to the category and 
maturity of various balance sheet items of Islamic banks. The assumptions made in assigning 
factors to relevant balance sheet items may affect the accuracy measurement of the maturity 
transformation risk of the sampled banks, according to the IFSB’s guidelines.  
Third, only accounting based measures were used in this study to determine the profitability 
and stability of Islamic banks. However, because of the limited study period and the lack of 
publicly available data on Islamic banking, market based profitability measures, such as 
Tobin’s Q and market-based stability measures, such as Merton’s DD and credit default swap 
(CDS) spreads, are not included in this study. For this reason, it is difficult to draw a definitive 
conclusion, since accounting based data do not take market variables into account.  
Future Research Directions 
The results presented of this study suggest several important avenues for further research 
surrounding the IFSB’s new liquidity measure for the Islamic banking industry. First, as 
highlighted earlier, the availability of existing data to measure IFSB’s proposed NSFR is limited 
and is one of the challenges in this field of research. We recommend further research to 
remedy this issue. More specifically, researchers should try to obtain data on Islamic 
investment banks and Islamic windows, and attempt to assess the impact of NSFR on the 
profitability and stability of Islamic banks with respect to the business model. The findings may 
be useful in drawing definitive conclusions on the influence of new regulatory measures on 
the profitability and stability of the overall Islamic banking sector. 
We also recommend subsequent researchers obtain frequent quarterly data on Islamic banks. 
This information will help researchers to examine, more extensively, the effects of various 
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factors (at a bank-level, industry-level and country-level), on maturity transformation risk, and 
the profitability and stability of Islamic banks. In-depth analysis may provide fruitful 
suggestions for regulators and practitioners regarding better monitoring and regulation 
practices around the maturity transformation function of Islamic banks and their impact on 
financial performance and stability. 
Finally, as highlighted earlier, in addition to the accounting measures, future research should 
include various market measures for profitability and stability. Analysing the financial 
performance and stability of Islamic banks using both accounting and market measures, can 
help researcher draw definitive conclusions regarding the influence of IFSB’s proposed NSFR 




IFSB GN-6 Weights to Balance Sheet Items of Islamic Banks 
Table A.1 Summary of Factors Assigned to Balance Sheet Items in Calculating IFSB Net 
Stable Funding Ratio  
Components of ASF Category  ASF Factor 
Placements from Financial Institutions< 1 Year 0.50 
Placements from Financial Institutions > 1 Year 1.0 
Fund Borrowing < 1 Year 0.50 
Fund Borrowing > 1 Year 1.0 
Customer Current Accounts 0.50 
Term Deposits < 1 Year 0.90 
Term Deposits > 1 Year 0.95 
Subordinated Mudarbah Sukuk < 1 Year 0.50 
Subordinated Mudarbah Sukuk > 1 Year 1.0 
Other Liabilities > 1Year 1.0 
Equity of Investment Account Holders > 1Year 0.95 
Equity of Investment Account Holders< 1Year 0.90 
Interbank Mudarbah Investments < 1 Year 0.50 
Interbank Mudarbah Investments > 1 Year 1.0 
Total Owner’s Equity 1.0 
Components of RSF Category RSF Factor 
Government Sukuk > 1 Year 0.05 
Placements with Financial Institutions/Murabaha and Wakala 
receivable < 1 Year 
0.50 
Placements with Financial Institutions/Murabaha and Wakala 
receivable > 1 Year 
1.0 
Corporat Sukuk < 1 Year 0.50 
Corporate Sukuk > 1 Year 1.0 
Investments Securities > 1 Year 0.50 
Investments in Real Estate/Investment Property > 1 Year 0.65 
Sales Receivables < 1 Year 0.85 
Sales Receivables > 1 Year 1.0 
Financing Assets < 1 Year 0.85 
Financing Assets > 1 Year 1.00 
Ijara Muntahia Bittamleek < 1 Year 0.85 
Ijara Muntahia Bittamleek > 1 Year 1.00 
Assets Acquired for Leasing < 1 Year 0.85 
Assets Acquired for Leasing > 1 Year 1.00 
Ijara Income Receivable < 1 Year 0.85 
Ijara Income Receivable > 1 Year 1.00 
Fixed Assets 1.0 







Pre-estimation Diagnostic Tests  
B.1 Fisher-Type Unit Root Test 
Table B.1 presents the Augmented Dicky-Fuller Unit Root tests of variables included in our 
three regression models (equations (3.6), (3.7) and (3.11)).  
Table B.1 Augmented Dicky-Fuller Unit Root Test for Panel Stationarity  
Variable Acronym Inv. 𝜒2 p-value  Mod. 𝜒2 p-value 
Maturity Transformation 
Risk 
NSFR 447.2656 0.0000 22.7384 0.0000 
FGR 296.5205 0.0000 12.5752 0.0000 
Profitability 
ROAA 583.7121 0.0000 31.9377 0.0000 
ROAE 421.4763 0.0000 20.9997 0.0000 
Stability ln_Zscore 268.4117 0.0000 10.6801 0.0000 
Bank Size ln_TA 227.5155 0.0000 7.9229 0.0000 
Bank Capitalization CAP 286.7022 0.0000 11.9133 0.0000 
Income Diversification NONII_TA 570.6904 0.0000 31.0597 0.0000 
Operating Efficiency EFF 435.2583 0.0000 21.9289 0.0000 
Credit Risk LLRTL 332.2949 0.0000 14.9871 0.0000 
Less Risky Liquid Assets LRLA_TA 309.6574 0.0000 13.4609 0.0000 
Risky Liquid Assets RLA_TA 440.3469 0.0000 22.2720 0.0000 
Non-Deposit Dependence NDD 398.7701 0.0000 19.4689 0.0000 
Short-term borrowing STB_CDTB 462.5838 0.0000 23.7712 0.0000 
Market Share MP 291.2479 0.0000 12.2197 0.0000 
Bank Concentration 3_Conc 257.8267 0.0000 9.9665 0.0000 
Economic Growth GDPG 245.7437 0.0000 9.5976 0.0000 
Inflation CPI 561.1361 0.0000 31.2589 0.0000 
Economic Freedom ECO_F 160.2732 0.0013 3.3894 0.0004 
Freedom from Corruption CORR_F 212.3337 0.0000 6.8993 0.0000 
Business Freedom BUSS_F 285.1926 0.0000 11.8115 0.0000 
Monetary Freedom MON_F 188.5116 0.0000 5.2932 0.0000 
Financial Freedom FIN_F 132.5754 0.0704 1.5220 0.0640 
Source: Author’s calculations using Stata (v14.0) 
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B.2 Pearson Pairwise Test for Panel Correlation 
Table B.2.1  Pearson Pairwise Correlation among the variables used in Determinants of Maturity Transformation Risk Model 
 NSFR FGR ln_TA CAP ROA LRLA_TA RLA_TA MP LLRLT NDD STB GDP CPI 
NSFR 1             
FGR 0.893** 1            
 0.000             
ln_TA -0.287** 0.382** 1           
 0.000 0.000            
CAP 0.040 0.141** -0.312** 1          
 0.385 0.002 0.000           
ROA 0.024 0.225** 0.227** 0.092* 1         
 0.599 0.000 0.000 0.046          
LRLA_TA 0.049 0.041 0.264** -0.238** 0.077 1        
 0.294 0.373 0.000 0.000 0.096         
RLA_TA 0.546** -0.159** -0.252** 0.185** -0.034 -0.313** 1       
 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.464 0.000        
MP -0.077 0.193** 0.640** -0.092* 0.075 -0.002 0.085 1      
 0.095 0.000 0.000 0.047 0.105 0.971 0.066       
LLRLT 0.199** -0.039 0.041 -0.133** -0.210** 0.057 0.329** 0.116* 1     
 0.000 0.402 0.376 0.004 0.000 0.216 0.000 0.012      
NDD -0.105* 0.435** 0.140** 0.196** 0.072 0.023 0.227** 0.196** -0.114* 1    
 0.023 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.122 0.616 0.000 0.000 0.013     
STB -0.160** 0.442** 0.151** 0.132** 0.004 -0.006 0.195** 0.210** -0.110* 0.896** 1   
 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.004 0.924 0.905 0.000 0.000 0.017 0.000    
GDP 0.091* -0.041 -0.066 0.175** 0.279** -0.096* 0.061 -0.002 -0.118* -0.058 -0.059 1  
 0.048 0.381 0.157 0.000 0.000 0.036 0.189 0.959 0.011 0.212 0.206   
CPI 0.226** -0.326** -0.383** -0.111* -0.105* -0.117* 0.178** -0.168** 0.174** -0.254** -0.282** 0.040 1 
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.016 0.022 0.011 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.385  
Source: Author’s calculations using Stata (v 14.0) software.  




Table B.2.2  Pearson Pairwise Correlation among the variables used in Maturity Transformation Risk and Profitability Model 
  ROAA ROAE NSFR ln_TA CAP NII_TA EFF LLRTL 3_Conc GDP CPI 
ROAA 1                     
ROAE 0.720** 1                   
  0.000                     
NSFR 0.024 0.027 1                 
  0.599 0.568                   
ln_TA 0.227** 0.195** -0.287** 1               
  0.000 0.000 0.000                 
CAP 0.092* -0.025 0.040 -0.312** 1             
  0.046 0.592 0.385 0.000               
NONII_TA 0.386** 0.166** 0.150** -0.045 0.140** 1           
  0.000 0.000 0.001 0.330 0.002             
EFF -0.583** -0.640** 0.029 -0.418** 0.199** -0.012 1         
  0.000 0.000 0.531 0.000 0.000 0.795           
LLRTL -0.210** -0.497** 0.199** 0.041 -0.133** 0.130** 0.306** 1       
  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.376 0.004 0.005 0.000         
3_Conc 0.090 -0.020 -0.190** 0.224** 0.059 -0.144** -0.112* 0.070 1     
  0.051 0.660 0.000 0.000 0.202 0.002 0.015 0.132       
GDP 0.279** 0.132** 0.091* -0.066 0.175** 0.025 -0.152** -0.118* -0.020 1   
  0.000 0.004 0.048 0.157 0.000 0.586 0.001 0.011 0.662     
CPI -0.105* -0.102* 0.226** -0.383** -0.111* 0.131** 0.274** 0.174** -0.280** 0.040 1 
  0.022 0.027 0.000 0.000 0.016 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.385   
Source: Author’s calculations using Stata (v 14.0) software.  






Table B.2.3  Pearson Pairwise Correlation among the variables used in Maturity Transformation Risk and Stability Model 
 ln_Zscore NSFR ln_TA CAP NII_TA EFF LLRTL 3_Conc GDP CPI ECO_F CORR_F BUSS_F MON_F FIN_F 
ln_Zscore 1               
NSFR -0.012 1              
 0.791               
ln_TA -0.008 -0.287* 1             
 0.856 0.000              
CAP 0.180* 0.040 -0.312* 1            
 0.000 0.385 0.000             
NONII_TA -0.069 0.150* -0.045 0.140* 1           
 0.136 0.001 0.330 0.002            
EFF -0.341* 0.029 -0.418* 0.199* -0.012 1          
 0.000 0.531 0.000 0.000 0.795           
LLRTL -0.352* 0.199* 0.041 -0.133* 0.130* 0.306* 1         
 0.000 0.000 0.376 0.004 0.005 0.000          
3_Conc -0.042 -0.190* 0.224* 0.059 -0.144* -0.112* 0.070 1        
 0.363 0.000 0.000 0.202 0.002 0.015 0.132         
GDP 0.078 0.091* -0.066 0.175* 0.025 -0.152* -0.118* -0.020 1       
 0.092 0.048 0.157 0.000 0.586 0.001 0.011 0.662        
CPI -0.160* 0.226* -0.383* -0.111* 0.131* 0.274* 0.174* -0.280* 0.040 1      
 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.016 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.385       
ECO_F -0.016 -0.400* 0.498* 0.147* -0.147* -0.200* 0.001 0.544* -0.033 -0.581* 1     
 0.723 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.979 0.000 0.476 0.000      
CORR_F 0.083 -0.341* 0.556* 0.138* -0.083 -0.335* -0.022 0.517* 0.094* -0.523* 0.817* 1    
 0.072 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.074 0.000 0.641 0.000 0.041 0.000 0.000     
BUSS_F -0.036 -0.048 0.298* 0.064 -0.069 -0.119* -0.042 0.292* -0.007 -0.337* 0.571* 0.311* 1   
 0.439 0.297 0.000 0.170 0.139 0.010 0.362 0.000 0.886 0.000 0.000 0.000    
MON_F 0.265* -0.309* 0.265* 0.043 0.094* -0.222* -0.175* 0.300* 0.018 -0.419* 0.533* 0.523* 0.184* 1  
 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.359 0.041 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.701 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000   
FIN_F -0.132* -0.356* 0.250* 0.186* -0.064 -0.031 0.050 0.397* -0.046 -0.413* 0.808* 0.496* 0.454* 0.342* 1 
 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.168 0.504 0.278 0.000 0.323 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000  
Source: Author’s calculations using Stata (v 14.0) software.  
All variables are defined in Table 3.4. p-values are in italics. * and ** indicate 5% and 1% significance levels.
 146 
B.3 Selection of Fixed or Random Effects Model 
Table B.3.1 Hausman Test for Determinants of Maturity Transformation Risk Model 
(Dependent Variable: NSFR)  
      -------- Coefficients -------- 
 (b) (B) (b-B) sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B)) 
 Fixed Random Difference S.E. 
SIZEit -0.0705 -0.0806 0.0101 0.0112 
     
CAPit  0.0020 0.0010 0.0010 0.0006 
     
ROAAit  0.0202 0.0201 0.0001 0.0009 
     
LRLA_TAit  0.0200 0.0203 -0.0003 0.0004 
     
RLA_TAit  0.0188 0.0188  0.0000 0.0001 
     
MPit -0.0071 -0.0008 -0.0063 0.0049 
     
LLRTLit  0.0025  0.0021  0.0004 0.0002 
     
NDDit -0.0029 -0.0038  0.0009 0.0003 
     
GDPjt -0.0004 -0.0002 -0.0002 0.0001 
     
INFjt -0.0094 -0.0088 -0.0006 0.0004 
          
                 2 (11) = 42.92 
                Prob >2 = 0.0000 
 
Table B.3.2 Hausman Test for Maturity Transformation Risk and Bank’s Profitability Model 
(Dependent Variable: ROAA)  
      -------- Coefficients -------- 
 (b) (B) (b-B) sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B)) 
 Fixed Random Difference S.E. 
NSFRit 0.4327 0.2873 0.1454 0.1413 
     
SIZEit 0.0283 0.1841 -0.1558 0.1463 
     
CAPit 0.0452 0.0445 0.0007 0.0077 
     
NONII_TAit 0.6164 0.5758 0.0406 0.0222 
     
EFFit -0.0303 -0.0325 0.0022 0.0011 
     
LLRTLit -0.0473 -0.0404 -0.0070 0.0041 
     
3_Concit -0.0024 0.0038 -0.0062 0.0037 
     
GDPjt 0.0524 0.0672 -0.0148 0.0050 
     
INFjt 0.0222 0.0276 -0.0054 0.0065 
          
                 2 (9)  = 38.06 





Table B.3.3 Hausman Test for Maturity Transformation Risk and Bank’s Stability Model 
(Dependent Variable: ln_Zscore)  
      -------- Coefficients -------- 
 (b) (B) (b-B) sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B)) 
 Fixed Random Difference S.E. 
NSFRit -3.0696 -3.2104 0.1408 0.3602 
     
SIZEit -2.9610 -3.8959 0.9349 0.5944 
     
CAPit 0.9424 0.9085 0.0339 0.0255 
     
NONII_TAit -0.9851 -1.0455 0.0604 0.0549 
     
EFFit -0.0293 -0.0345 0.0051 0.0026 
     
LLRTLit 0.1937 0.1981 -0.0044 0.0070 
     
3_Concit 0.0018 -0.0172 0.0190 0.0140 
     
ECO_Fjt 0.0335 0.0301 0.0034 0.0608 
     
GDPjt -0.0390 -0.0601 0.0212 0.0170 
     
INFjt -0.0985 -0.1356 0.0371 0.0116 
          
2 (10)  = 13.42 















B.4 Breusch-Pagan/Cook Weisberg Test for Heteroskedasticity 
Table B.4.1  Modified Wald Test Statistics for Group-wise Heteroskedasticity 
Model Dep. Var. 2 Prob >2 
Determinants of Maturity Transformation 
Risk Model 
NSFR 1.2e+05 0.0000 
FGR 82362.01 0.0000 
    
Maturity Transformation Risk and Bank 
Profitability Model 
ROAA 18160.20 0.0000 
ROAE 15173.64 0.0000 
    
Maturity Transformation Risk and Bank 
Stability Model 
ln_Zscore 38440.70 0.0000 
    
Source: Author’s calculations using Stata (v 14.0) software.  
 
B.5 Wooldridge Test for Autocorrelation 
Table B.5.1  Wooldridge Test for Autocorrelation in Panel Data 
Model Dep. Var. F stats Prob >F 
Determinants of Maturity Transformation 
Risk Model 
NSFR 36.760 0.0000 
FGR 263.235 0.0000 
    
Maturity Transformation Risk and Bank 
Profitability Model 
ROAA 49.477 0.0000 
ROAE 29.515 0.0000 
    
Maturity Transformation Risk and Bank 
Stability Model 
ln_Zscore 10.653 0.0019 
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